

JPRS-EFS-84-076

18 June 1984

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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18 June 1984

EAST EUROPE REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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TRENDS IN MECHANIZATION OF WARSAW PACT FORCES

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 4, Apr 84 pp 170-178

[Article by Rolf Hilmes, engineer, and Lt Col Guenter Lippert: "The Mechanization of Infantry in East and West; Part I--The Mechanization of Motorized Rifle Units of the Warsaw Pact Forces--an Overview"]

[Text] Since the end of World War II, the Soviet arms industry has produced seven types of combat vehicle for the motorized rifle and airborne units of the Warsaw Pact armies and a large number of variations derived from them for special tasks. Some of them were subsequently built under license or in a modified form by the national industries of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. According to the government's "White Paper 1983," about 59,000 of these armored wheeled and tracked vehicles are in service with the units of the Warsaw Pact armies stationed in Europe, 27,000 of which are of the more modern type.* Most of the phased out older models have been modified for "follow-on uses" or put in storage for reserve units. In addition, an estimated 16,000 of these vehicles have been exported to third-world countries. In the following article, Lt Col G. Lippert provides an overview of developments in the Warsaw Pact countries.

This article will be followed in one of our next issues by part II, a comparative evaluation of the combat vehicles developed in the East and the West, written by engineer R. Hilmes, the author of our series "30 Years of Battle Tank Development 1950-1980," which has now appeared in book form. The series shows clearly that the East took the logical step from the armored personnel carrier to the armored infantry combat vehicle relatively early, while in the West even today there are differences of opinions concerning operational concept and vehicle design.

* The numbers refer only to combat vehicles, not to variations used for other purposes.

The German Wehrmacht, and later the U.S. army, was the first to use armored vehicles, which gave mobility to infantrymen away from surface roads and on the field of combat and from which they could also fight--even if to a limited degree--in World War II. In both armies they were predominantly half-track vehicles, with combat weights from 5 to 15 tons, maximum armor thickness of 15 mm and a crew of 10 to 12 men. Light and heavy machine guns were used as armament, which--like the weapons of the infantrymen being carried--had to be used without protection from enemy fire over the sides of the open-top vehicles, which were classified as armored personnel carriers (APC). From the infantry units equipped with these armored vehicles grew the branch known as armored infantrymen in the Wehrmacht, which was counted as part of the armor and today, as a branch of the Bundeswehr, constitutes the entire infantry.

Because of a lack of capacity, the Soviet arms industry abstained from the development and production of armored vehicles for the infantry during World War II: it concentrated on the mass production of battle tanks and assault guns. The bulk of the rifle units followed the armored units on foot and in trucks, the infantry immediately accompanying the tanks mounted them as "jump-offs"--a procedure still practiced today in special cases and probably also for the sake of tradition.

But the Soviet army had fully recognized the value of armored vehicles for the infantry: in the context of restructuring its ground forces, whose combat troops--with the dropping of the non-motorized rifle units--were divided into motorized rifle units, mechanized rifle units and armored formations, it began the mass production of this type of vehicle at the end of the 1940's. They were classified as "Bronyetransportyori" (BTR), that is, as armored transport vehicles, which is the equivalent of APC [armored personnel carrier] in current Bundeswehr terminology. These vehicles were intended primarily for transporting infantrymen to and on the field of combat. At the same time, they were equipped with weapons which enabled the crew proper to give //supporting fire// [in italics] to the infantrymen who had dismounted for combat.

BTR-152--The First Wheeled APC

The first wheeled APC to be introduced was the BTR-152, starting in 1948. The first to be equipped with it were the newly formed mechanized rifle regiments of the mechanized divisions (MechDiv). The BTR-152, designed as a semitractor, was modelled in form and construction after the APCs of the German Wehrmacht (special-purpose vehicle 250/1 and 251/1) and the M3 of the U.S. army, although they were technically much more complex as half-track vehicles.

The basis for the BTR-152 was the chassis and engine of the ZIL-151 truck, later--beginning about 1956--it was the somewhat more powerful ZIL-157. The basic model--really just an armored truck with all-wheel drive--was soon replaced by an improved version. Its unique feature was a centrally controlled tire-pressure regulation system, which was initially mounted on the outside (BTR-152 V1) and later on the inside of the wheels (BTR-152 V2) and which improved the APC's off-road capability and operational ability. An infrared


system for the driver was retrofitted later. The BTR-152 carried a 7.62-mm SGMB machine gun or a 12.7-mm DShK-M machine gun, which the second man of the actual vehicle crew operated. The infantrymen mounted and dismounted through a wide rear door or over the vehicle sides. Three coverable firing ports in each side and two in the rear doors of the passenger compartment gave them the possibility of participating in the battle while protected by armor. However, their vision was extremely limited.

Starting in 1961, in the context of the introduction of nuclear combat weapons --probably as a stopgap solution--the BTR-152 appeared in a final version: the BTR-152 K equipped with a covered crew compartment, which provided protection from radioactive fallout and mildly reduced other effects from nuclear weapons. Besides these versions for the motorized rifle forces, different variations were produced for other purposes: one variation with high, closed bodywork, the BTR-152 U, was used as a command and radio vehicle, one equipped with the twin 14.5-mm ZPU-2 antiaircraft machine gun, the BTR-152 A, served as a form of armored air defense gun. In spite of its crudeness, the hard-to-steer BTR 152 proved to be an extremely //durable// [in italics] vehicle, which, at least in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies, is being used into the 1980's in "liaison applications": as a tractor for mine laying equipment, as an armored ambulance and as a vehicle for paramilitary units, such as the "Combat Forces of the Working Class" of the GDR. Beyond that, for decades the BTR-152 was always suitable for supplying to impecunious "friends" in the Third World as equipment aid.

BTR-50--The First Tracked APC

It was clear to Soviet planners that the BTR-152 was inadequate for the motorized rifle units which formed an integral part of the //tank// [in italics] divisions and were supposed to consolidate offensive successes in collaboration with the tanks. These units required a vehicle with cross-country capability, equipped with a tracked chassis, which should also have swimming capability if possible. Using the chassis and engine of the light amphibian PT-76 battle tank, which had gone into production beginning in 1952 at the latest, offered the most economical solution. The tracked APC derived from it, the BTR-50 P, was introduced from 1954 on. It too was designed as a semi-tractor vehicle and the first version had an open top. As in the BTR-152, a 7.62-mm SGMB or a 12.7-mm DShK-M machine gun was provided as armament. The version with the open top was also soon replaced by the roofed over BTR-50 PK or converted to a roofed over version. Since the engine of the BTR-50 is in the rear, the riflemen had to mount and dismount through the roof hatches. Firing ports were not provided in the sides, so participation in combat from inside the vehicle was out of the question. However, with a ground pressure of only 0.5 kg/cm² the amphibious APC distinguished itself by its good cross-country capability, which is the precondition for cooperating with tanks. The BTR-50 was also built in different versions, including a command and radio vehicle. It is still being used today in the Soviet army as a mine-clearing tank MTK and as a maintenance team vehicle MTP. The National People's Army continues to use it under the designation SPW-50 PK (B), slightly modified as an amphibious recovery vehicle (see No 9/83, p 505).

Table 1. In-Service Timetable for Soviet APCs/AICVs



Key:

- 1. Wheeled APCs/AICVs
- 2. Tracked APCs/AICVs

- 3. Airborne AICVs

A model corresponding to the BTR-50 in its basic construction, the OT-62, was built by the industry of the CSSR for the Czechoslovakian People's Army (CPA) and also adopted by the Polish People's Army (PPA) under the designation TOPAS.*

The abbreviation OT stands for "Obrneny Transporter" (armored transporter); the abbreviation TOPAS for "Transporter Obrneny Pasovy Stredni" (medium armored tracked transporter). Both designations come from the Czechoslovakian language.

Unlike the Soviet model, all versions of this APC have a closed passenger compartment fitted with //side doors// [in italics] an NBC filtration system and a more powerful engine (220kW). The base model, the OT-62A/TOPAS, does not carry weapons. The improved OT-62 B version (only with the CPA) has a small rotating turret above the commander's cupola, which is equipped with a 7.62-mm machine gun and an 82-mm T-21 recoilless rifle mounted on the side of the turret. The most powerful version, the TOPAS 2AP, which is only used in the PPA, has a rotating turret above the crew compartment with a 14.5-mm KPVT machine gun and a coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun. The rotating turret, which was developed in Poland, gives the two turret machine guns an elevation of up to +78° and ensures the antiaircraft defense capability of the APC. This version is still being used today by the 7th Polish Airborne Division (see No 2/84, p 88).

Transition to Full Mechanization of the Infantry

Increased industrial capacity allowed the Soviet army at the end of the 1960's to equip the //motorized// [in italics] units, which had previously moved in trucks, with APCs as well, thus bringing their equipment up to the same level as that of the //mechanized// [in italics// units. Following the new restructuring of the ground forces, generally dated in 1957, the designation "mechanized" has been dropped and only motorized rifle units are mentioned, although in fact the rifle units under discussion are mechanized completely, that is, fully equipped with //armored// [in italics] vehicles.

Two different types of motorized rifle units continue to exist insofar as their vehicles are concerned--although this is not reflected in their unit designations:

--the motorized rifle units of the //motorized rifle divisions// [in italics] which are equipped with wheeled APCs and

--the motorized rifle units of the //tank divisions// [in italics] which are equipped with tracked APCs.

BTR-60--The Transition from the APC to the AICV

This situation did not change when delivery of the BTR-60 began in 1960. The four-axed vehicle, which seems to have been derived from the eight-wheeled armored reconnaissance vehicle of the Wehrmacht, replaced the BTR-152 only in the motorized rifle divisions, while the BTR-50 was retained for the time being for the motorized rifle units of the tank divisions.

The BTR-60, which was designed as a squad vehicle, but initially had to be employed in emergencies as a semitractor vehicle, demonstrated in the base model, the open-top BTR-60 P, substantial improvements over its predecessor. Among them were:

--Floatability, with a relatively high swimming speed by means of water jet propulsion;

--Grouping of all power and transmission components inside the armored hull;

--Two engines for separate drive to two axles each (1 and 3, 2 and 4);

--Independent suspension by torsion bars;

--Large-volume, low-pressure tires with (retained) central tire-pressure control system.

However, it was surprising that the BTR-60 was supplied at all in an //open// [in italics] version. It was not until or 2 years later that the closed top version BTR-60 PA followed and finally, in 1964, the BTR-60 PB, equipped with a rotating turret and an NBC-filter system which fully met all modern requirements and became the standard version.

According to Soviet terminology, the BTR-60 PB is still considered to be a "Bronyetransportyor," that is, an APC. But with certain restrictions, the vehicle's characteristics justify the accepted Western classification of //this// [in italics] version of the vehicle as //armored infantry combat vehicle// [in italics].* The criteria are:

--The weapons which are housed in an armored rotating turret--a heavy 14.5-mm KPVT machine gun with a mean combat range of 1,000 ms and a coaxial 7.62-mm PKT machine gun--endow the vehicle with adequate firepower;

--The design of the engine and the chassis ensure good cross-country capability and high mobility;

--The motorized rifle squad housed in the NBC-protected crew compartment can fight from a mounted position under tank protection.

The "armored infantry combat quality" is restricted particularly with respect to "mounted combat:" possibilities for firing and observation to the side are limited (only three firing ports and one periscope on each side for the crew compartment); while possibilities for firing and observation to the rear are completely lacking. The additional weaknesses of the BTR-60 are:

--The crew and the motorized rifle group have to mount and dismount through roof hatches and are unprotected from enemy fire while doing so.

--The maximum elevation of the turret guns is +30°, which restricts the vehicle's antiaircraft capability.

--Power is provided by two rear-mounted gasoline engines, of 66 kW (90 hp) each. They go back to a design from the 1930's and are said to be very prone to breakdowns.

* Initially--and here probably quite unjustifiably--the BTR-152 was also classified as an armored infantry combat vehicle.

Variations of the combat vehicle version which are in service are the turretless command and radio vehicle BTR-60 PU and--to date confirmed only with the NPA--the artillery observation vehicle ABS (see No 7/82, p 386). The latter is externally indistinguishable from the combat vehicle version.

The CSSR and Poland jointly developed their own wheeled AICV, the OT-64/SKOT,* which resembles the Soviet BTR-60 in its general construction. However, it reveals a number of improvements compared with the one on which it is modelled: it was fitted with an 8-cylinder //diesel// [in italics] engine, which is located in the //center// [in italics] of the vehicle, not the rear. This uncomplicated engine is probably less prone to need repairs than the two 6-cylinder gasoline engines of the BTR-60 and it develops the same power. The rifle unit, which sits protected behind the engine block in the rear, can mount and dismount in relative safety through a twin-panel //rear-door// [in italics].

The OT-64/SKOT was also built in several versions: while the armament of the OT-64 A and B versions was mounted in the open on swivels, the standard version OT-64/SKOT 2A, supplied after 1971, was fitted with a rotating turret in various versions: one (OT-64C/SKOT 2A(1)), carries the turret of the Soviet BTR-60 PB on a hexagonal base, the other, the SKOT 2AP, which is used only by the PPA, has the rotating turret developed in Poland and already mentioned with the TOPAS 2AP, which provides the two turret guns (14.5-mm and 7.62-mm machine guns) with great elevation and gives the AICV //antiaircraft capability// [in italics].

Romania followed a different path: here the Soviet BPR-60 was built under license almost unchanged. But apparently the Romanians were also not satisfied with the Russian turret: they equipped their vehicle, the TAB-72, with a turret like that of the Poles and likewise they have at their disposal a wheeled AICV with // antiaircraft capabilities// [in italics]. The Romanians are also said to have replaced the two Soviet 66-kW engines with two 110-kW engines.

The Leap to the Tracked AICV

The introduction of the BMP, which started in 1967, as a successor to the tracked APC BTR-50, represented a qualitative leap in Soviet development of armored vehicles for the infantry. The abbreviation BMP, which stands for "Infantry combat vehicle," identifies this vehicle even in Soviet terminology as a genuine armored infantry combat vehicle. The original Western assumption that this totally new combat vehicle would become the standard type for all motorized rifle units and consequently would replace the wheeled AICV BTR-60, proved to be incorrect. However, the introduction of the BMP brought with it an extremely important change in the method of equipping units: the BMP not only replaced the BTR-50 in the motorized rifle units of the //tank// [in italics] divisions, but also took the place of the BTR-60 PB in one of every three motorized rifle regiments in the //motorized rifle// [in italics] divi-

* The abbreviation SKOT stands for the Polish "Sredni Kolowy Opancerzony Transporter" (medium armored tracked transporter).

sions. This led to a fundamental shift in the numbers between the rifle units equipped with wheeled AICVs and those equipped with tracked AICVs, which will be examined later.

With respect to its tactical and technical qualities, the BMP is not only superior to the BTR-50, but also qualitatively far superior to the BTR-60 PB:

- A modern roller track and suspension and a powerful diesel engine endow it with better cross-country capability and higher mobility;
- the low hull, running to a point at the front, and the engine and transmission located at the forward end provide better protection for the crew and the rifle unit;
- the armament concealed in a rotating turret, consisting of a 73-mm low-pressure cannon with automatic loading, a coaxial 7.62-mm machine gun and launching provisions for the Sagger antitank guided missile, provide high firepower even against armored targets;
- NBC-proof firing ports in the sides and in one of the rear doors, each coupled with a periscope, ensure that the //entire mounted motorized rifle squad// [in italics] can participate in the firefight even in //contaminated// [in italics] terrain; large rear doors permit the squad to mount and dismount under cover in combat conditions.

The high combat effectiveness of this AICV had to be bought at the expense of a few design compromises, which turn out to be its weaknesses:

- The commander, who is at the same time the squad leader, is situated forward in the vehicle hull, isolated from his squad which sits in the rear and also from the gunners located in the turret, and this restricts his command and control capabilities.
- The low-pressure gun has a low rate of fire and a short range; its post-accelerated shells have a low muzzle velocity and are sensitive to cross-winds as a result.
- The low elevation of the turret guns (+33°) restricts the antiaircraft capability of the AICV. In addition, the small negative inclination (-4°) makes fighting from cover on reverse slope positions difficult.
- The combination of threeweapons systems in the turret can easily overburden the gunner.
- The traversing range of the turret weapons is interrupted by the commander's cupola with its infrared searchlight. In combat this creates a "dead angle."
- The crew and transport compartment for the rifle squad is tight. As a consequence, a susstantial portion of the fuel (2 X 150 l) is carried in the rear doors, which are formed into fuel tanks. Although the flash point of diesel fuel is low, this represents a considerable danger when under fire from the rear.

Table 2. Dimensions and Performance Data of Soviet Wheeled APCs/AICVs

		BTR-152	BTR-60 PS	BGR-70*
Crew	Men	2	2	2
Dismounted Personnel	Men	17	9	9
Combat Weight	t	9.0	9.0	11.0
Power to Weight Ratio	kW/t	9.0	12.8	16.1
Length	m	6.83	7.22	7.62
Width	m	2.32	2.82	3.05
Height	m	2.04	2.31	2.12
Chassis	Type	Wheeled 6X6	Wheeled 6X6	Wheeled 6x6
Engine	Type	6-cyl. gas	2 X 6-cyl. gas	2 X 8-cyl. gas
Power	kW(hp)	81(110)	2 X 66(2 X 90)	2 X (88.5)(2 X 120)
Speed, Maximum	km/h			
Range (Road)	km	65	80	80-100
Climbing Capability		30°	30°	30°
Vertical Step Capability	m	0.60	0.60	0.60
Ditch Crossing Capability	m	0.80	2.00	2.00
Propulsion for Swimming	Type	-	Waterjet	Waterjet
Speed, Maximum in Water	km/h	-	10	10
Armament		7.62-mm or 12.7-mm machine gun	14.5 mm and 7.62-mm machine gun	14.5-mm and 7.62-mm machine gun
NBC-Filtration System		No	Yes	Yes
IR-Equipment (Driver/Commander)		Partial/No	Yes/Yes	Yes/Yes

In the course of series production, several minor design changes were carried out in regard to the basic model BMP. They mainly served to improve its swimming capability and visibility. Since they resulted in no perceptible influence on the tactical-technical qualities and are inconsequential for tank identification, they are ignored here.

The BMP-1 has been built under licence by industries in the CSSR. The CSSR also developed its own armored repair version with a slewing crane (see No 2/83, p 95). Among the Soviet versions that appeared were the reconnaissance tank BMP m 1976/1 and M 1976/2 and the artillery radar tank BMP M 1975, which are all equipped with a two-man rotating turret and equipment suitable for their assignment (see No 9/83, p 462).

* Dimensions and weight figures are estimated

Table 3. Dimensions and Performance Data of Soviet Tracked APCs/AICVs

	BTR-50 PK	BMP-1	BMP-2*	BMD-1
Crew	Men	2	2	3
Dismounted Personnel	Men			2
Combat Weight	t	20	9	7
Power to Weight Ratio	kW/t	16.2	13.6	14.6
Length	m	10.7	15.7	23.5
Width	m	6.90	6.74	5.12
Height	m	3.18	2.94	2.60
Engine	Type	6-cylinder diesel	6-cylinder diesel	6-cylinder diesel
Power Output	kW(hp)	176 (240)	213 (290)	225-300 (300-400) 176 (240)
Speed, Maximum Range (Road)	km/h km	45 250	70 500	above 80 500
Climbing Capability		38°	35°	35°
Vertical Step Capability	m	1.10	0.70	0.70
Ditch Crossing Capability	m	2.80	2.50	2.50
Propulsion for Swimming	Type	Waterjet	Track	Track
Speed, Maximum in Water	km/h	10 12.7-mm or 7.62-mm machine gun	7 BK 73-mm + 7.62-mm machine gun + Sagger antitank missile	10 30-mm + 7.62-mm machine gun + Spandrel antitank missile
Armament				BK 73-mm + 3 X 7.62-mm machine guns + Spandrel/ Spigot antitank missiles
NBC-Filtration System	No		Yes	Yes
IR-Equipment (Driver/Commander)	Yes/Partial		Yes/Yes	Yes/Yes
				Yes/No

The command and radio vehicle BMP-1 KSh, which was presented in No 3/84, p 146 is a one-man turret variation.

BMD-1--Specially Developed for Airborne Units

The airborne armored infantry combat vehicle BMD, which was introduced after 1970, must be regarded as a special branch of development in Soviet tracked combat vehicles for the infantry. The abbreviation BMD, which stands for

"Airborne Combat Vehicle," categorizes it too as an armored infantry combat vehicle, according to Soviet terminology. Its tactical characteristics match those of the BMP-1 in fundamental points, in spite of its weighing only half as much:

--A modern, hydropneumatic roadwheel chassis, which allows the hull to be lowered, and a powerful diesel engine endow it with good cross-country capability and high maneuverability.

--The turret weapons are the same as in the BMP-1, with matching high fire-power. The BMP's typical "dead angle" is not present because the commander's position in the BMD is not fitted with an infrared searchlight.

--An NBC-filtration system ensures operational capability in contaminated terrain.

--Firing opportunities for the airborne soldiers (one firing port each with a periscope on each side and at the rear) are supplemented by two 7.62-mm machine guns on ball mounts in the front corners. They are coupled to adjustable periscopes.

The technical construction of the BMD-1 deviates in a few points from that of the BMP:

--The engine and transmission are in the rear.

--Chassis height and chain tension can be adjusted hydropneumatically. As a result of the adjustable ground clearance (10 cm or 45 cm), swimming capability and air-portable capability are improved. In addition, the capture of covered firing or observation posts is made easier.

--Propulsion in water is not by means of the tracks, as in the case of the BMP, but is provided by a separate water jet system in the rear.

On the basis of the same turret armament and a similar construction design, the BMD exhibits otherwise almost all the same weaknesses that were pointed out on the BMP-1. In spite of the reduced strength of the dismounted personnel, room for movement inside the vehicle, which is 1.30 meters shorter, is even tighter than in the BMP-1: the commander (right), the driver (center) and the nose machine gunner (left) are so squeezed together that there are only semicircular roof hatches for the two outside seats. Three more airborne soldiers are squashed into the narrow crew compartment at the rear, between the turret rotating mechanism and the engine compartment. The "king" is the gunner, who--as in the BMP-1--has to share his space in the turret "only" with the ammunition for the turret weapons (40 X 73-mm shells, 3 X Sagger antitank guided missiles and 2,000 rounds of belted 7.62-mm ammunition), the viewing and sighting optical systems and the used shell case container.




Fig. 18 Side, front, top and rear view of the BTR-70 wheeled AICV

This constricted space was taken into account in the variations of the BMD that have been identified so far, the BMD M 1979/1 and M 1979/2: the //turret-less// [in italics] variations, which have been documented only by blurred photographs from Afghanistan and are been used as command and radio armored vehicles and also as tractor and transportation vehicles, have a //lengthened// [in italics] hull with six instead of five road wheels and five instead of four jockey rollers on the chassis (see No 3/84, p 146). In the BMD-1, combat in closed airborne AICVs could only be made more bearable for the crew by means of a retrofit: an air supply system linked to the NBC-filtration unit was built into the vehicle, which supplies fresh air to the soldiers when the crew compartment fills with powder gas (see No 9/82, p 498 and No 7/83, p 367).

At the celebration parade in Moscow in 1983 it could be seen that the anti-tank armament of the BMD-1 had also been improved: instead of the AT-3 Sagger antitank guided missile, it had been fitted with the more modern AT-4 Spigot system, which was mounted on the turret, to the right next to the gunner's hatch (for details, see No 3/84, p 127). Other modifications--such as new road wheels, a deflection plate on the upper frontal plate and a tie-down mechanism to secure the turret during parachute drops--had been seen in earlier parades.

BTR-70--Third Generation Wheeled AICV

In the mid-1970's the pace of modernization is continued in accordance with the previous plan--starting with the wheeled combat vehicles: starting in 1975, the BTR-70 is acknowledged as the new wheeled AICV for the Soviet ground forces and is shown for the first time in public in Moscow in 1980. The new vehicle is a simple development of its forerunner, the BTR-60 PB, from which it differs only a little externally. Although it does not demonstrate any recognizably radical improvements, a number of the BTR-60's weaknesses have been eliminated:

--The front wheels of the BTR-70 were included in the frontal armor to a greater degree.

--A hatch on both sides of the lower hull allows the infantrymen to mount and dismount under cover during combat.

--A rear-facing periscope on the roof of the rotating turret offers vision to the rear at least to the gunner.

--Two more powerful engines--gasoline engines again, however (GAZ-71)--have replaced the antiquated engines of the BTR-60 PB.

The armament and the rotating turret of the BTR-60 PB have been taken over basically unchanged and thus the //limited antiaircraft capability// [in italics] remains (see also No 4/83, p 183). It is hard to understand why the Soviet designers did not resort to the Polish solution to the turret (TOPAS 2AP or SKOT 2AP) and why they chose to forego antitank armament. Interestingly, Romania is also building the BTR-70 under license. The vehicle, called the TAB-77, was fitted with a diesel engine and the turret from the TAB-72, with antiaircraft capability.

BMP-2--Third Generation Tracked AICV

More effort on armaments technology was expended on the new tracked AICV, the BMP-2 (previously the BMP M 1981), which was introduced in the normal time interval at the end of the 1970's. In this vehicle not only the weaknesses of its predecessor the BMP-1 were eliminated, but substantial increases in combat effectiveness were achieved as well. With a chassis that remained almost unchanged, mainly the armament and the rotating turret were replaced by new developments. A detailed breakdown showed:

--Increased firepower and antiaircraft capability resulted from the introduction of a 30-mm automatic cannon with a great range of elevation (-6° to +70°).

--Improved capability to engage tanks as a result of being equipped with a semiautomatic weapons system with a Spandrel antitank guided missile.

--Better command and observation capabilities for the AICV commander by equipping the vehicle with a two-man turret. This simultaneously eliminates the "dead angle" in the traversing range of the turret weapons, which existed with its predecessor.

Bild 20: Vier-Seiten-Ansicht Ketten-SPz BMP-2




Fig. 20 Side, front, top and rear views of the BMP-2 tracked AICV

However, these improvements came at the price of a further restriction in the crew and transportation compartment. This resulted in a //reduction of the dismounted personnel// [in italics] of two men, since the seats were reduced by one and, in addition, the commander is no longer the squad leader as well and consequently stays with the AICV. Over and above that, a more powerful engine was probably required in order to at least be able to maintain the previous power to weight ratio in spite of the increased combat weight (see also No 7/83, p 364).

Summary and Evaluation

Looking back over the development of the USSR's APCs and AICVs, it can be seen that the Soviet command was always intent on equipping the motorized rifle groups quickly with armored vehicles which met the //current// [in italics] requirements of their time. From the beginning, preference was given to the lead acquired in this manner in vehicles operating with the troops over technically complex developments, which pointed to the future but whose later introduction could have endangered or delayed their current superiority.

As a result, the mechanization of the motorized rifle units in their //first// [in italics] phase--the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's--was carried out with makeshift means: with a truck converted to a wheeled APC and a tracked APC, which was created by setting a steel box on a tank chassis, the Soviet army achieved an //optimum combat effectiveness and psychological effect with relatively low outlay in arms technology// [in italics]. Attempts were made to meet newly arising combat requirements for as long as possible by modifications to the basic models.

After a superiority in mechanization had been created with these "cheap solutions," the first combat vehicles specially developed for the motorized rifle troops were introduced as the //second// [in italics] phase, in the mid-1960's, and in this way the lead in vehicles operating with the troops was expanded at a time when comparable Western vehicles in this category were still under development. In this phase too, adaptation to new requirements was carried out by modifying and retrofitting the basic models.

The //third// [in italics] phase, which began in the second half of the 1970's, did not bring any new designs requiring great expenditures. It was limited to the continuing qualitative development of existing types and elimination of their weaknesses. But the qualitative Soviet lead in AICV types in service with the troops was also substantially reduced in this phase: with the German Marder, which was delivered starting in 1970, the French AMX-10 and the M-2 "Bradley," which is now reaching U.S. units in Europe, the West has reacted to the Soviet challenge and today has available modern AICVs, which are qualitatively not inferior to those of the Warsaw Pact in mobility, protection and armament.

Also in this third phase the Soviet army has retained the differentiated equipping of motorized rifle units with wheeled and tracked AICVs, which was introduced at the beginning of mechanization. However, the proportions have changed radically: in the 1950's, only the relatively few motorized rifle regiments of the tank divisions, which comprise about one quarter of all combat divisions, were equipped with the more expensive tracked vehicles. At the time the ratio between the motorized rifle units equipped with tracked vehicles and those equipped with wheeled vehicles was about 1:9. When a motorized rifle regiment of the motorized rifle divisions began to be equipped with these tracked AICVs at the same time as the BMP was introduced, the ratio up to the beginning of the 1970's shifted to about 1:1.5.

The restructuring of the Soviet ground forces that began in the 1970's has shifted the ratio even further: since the time that a motorized rifle battalion has also been incorporated into the tank regiments of the tank divisions --the proportion of which in the total number of combat divisions has remained about the same--the ratio is about 1:1.1, meaning that it has almost equalized. But in cases where the proportion of tank divisions deviates from the average, quite different situations arise: in the case of the "Group of Soviet Forces in Germany" (GSFG), with its 9 tank divisions and 10 motorized rifle divisions, the motorized rifle units equipped with the BMP tracked AICV predominate with a ratio of 1.4:1. This ratio holds true for approximately all the combat divisions stationed in the approaches to the USSR, which would form the spearhead of a Soviet attack on Central Europe.*

In retrospect, it is obvious that the national industries of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries often found better solutions in their own developments than the Soviet designers. As the turret of the BTR-70 demonstrates, there have been no countereffects on these designers.

* Airborne divisions were not considered in the calculations. Calculations also did not include the fact that some motorized rifle units stationed in northern Europe and the Far East, on account of the predominant weather and terrain conditions, are equipped with the MT-LB armored transporter, which was not addressed in this article.

BULGARIA

TREATY FOR FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION WITH BULGARIA

Sofia DURZHAVEN VESTNIK in Bulgarian 6 April 1984 on pages 366-367 carries the text of Bulgarian State Council Ukase No 601, ratified on 22 February 1984, dealing with the announcement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a treaty for friendship and cooperation between the Bulgarian People's Republic and the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. For text see JPRS NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT: NEA-84-086, 31 May 84, pp 12-14.

CSO: 2200/118

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

DEVELOPMENT, FUNCTION, ACHIEVEMENTS OF MINOR PARTIES SKETCHED

Bonn AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, supplement to DAS PARLAMENT in German
No B 16-17/84, 21 Apr 84 pp 3-17

[Article by Wolfgang Mleczkowski, emigrant GDR historian, regional secretary of the Committee for an Indivisible Germany: "Movement in the Monolith--the 'Socialist Multi-Party System' of the GDR"]

[Text] Feigning unity, as possible, to the outside, the GDR is yet no monolith internally. On the one hand, political life in the GDR is molded by the SED with its over 2 million members and by the traditions of the communist workers movement, which is, however also embodied, on the other hand, in the circa 400,000 members of the other parties authorized in the GDR, the CDU [Christian Democratic Union], the LDPD [Liberal Democratic Party of Germany], the NDPD [National Democratic Party of Germany], and the DBD [Democratic Farmers Party of Germany]. Under their widely advertised loyalty protestations to the SED, a process of passing on intellectual-cultural values got started in the early 1950's that loosened up the SED's political-intellectual monoculture and slowly begins to change the GDR's sense of identity. From the ancestors Lenin, Stalin and other Soviet leaders, through Ernst Thaelmann, Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, to Scharnhorst, Frederick the Great, Luther and now even Bismarck there goes a path that could hardly have been negotiated without the efforts of the noncommunist GDR parties.

An importance transcending that now attaches to the noncommunist GDR parties due to their positive membership balance as of late and to being clearly "niche parties," parties to protect the retreat from demands made by the SED. Their sense of identity stems from their own history, not from the functions assigned them of being, among other things, "transmission belts" for SED policy. In the field of tension of Soviet postwar policy, which latently persists as before, some leaders of the LDPD, CDU and NDPD enjoyed some leeway they would use as much as they could. Now it hardly exists anymore. Differently, however, the increasingly developing contacts with all-German and foreign partners in conversations are strengthening the role which, especially, the CDU and the LDPD mean to assume in the GDR: gaining more of an influence on GDR policy.

Membership Trend and Social Structure in the "Bourgeois" Parties

Based on the difference in the number of inhabitants in both German states, the CDU of the GDR has circa half the membership the CDU in the FRG has, the LDPD, based on the same population ratio, however, has 3 1/2 times more members than its old sister party, the FDP in the FRG. Both parties after their founding in 1945 experienced a strong influx of membership that in 1948 reached the high point in the CDU with 211,176 members (excluding Berlin) but, in the LDPD, not until 1950, with 198,920 members. Then membership figures dropped steadily and both parties aged a lot. Their original political function in a parliamentary power competition of confronting other parties and political groups had been lost. Politically they had been "brought into line."

Since the early 1970's, a clear membership influx has been indicated that makes the numbers rise again. Between 1977 and 1982, e.g., according to official LDPD data, "far more than 20,000" new members were recruited. Circa 4,000 annual admissions over against circa 2,600 annual departures, primarily due to age.

A similar process is taking place in the two parties that were not founded until 1948, the NDPD and the DBD. Between 1977 and 1982, the NDPD was able to attract some 18,200 new members, circa 3,640 new admissions per year against some 2,440 departures. Compared with the LDPD and also the other noncommunist parties, the NDPD is likely to show the largest degree of aging. In the Magdeburg bezirk association, e.g., according to official reports, only 25 percent of the NDPD membership is below 40 years of age.

As a reservoir for former NSDAP members, members of the Wehrmacht, and national-conservative circles, as the intention was, the NDPD, however, gained its membership influx not until 1950 in gaining a greater importance for the self-initiative of the smaller entrepreneurs and the private craftsmen. NDPD membership at that time ensured the craft enterprise of its independence and protected retail merchants from having their stores confiscated. Independent tradesmen who had joined the LDPD and the CDU did not enjoy such a protection. Meanwhile the parties have been put on equal footing with the middle class.

The DBD, likewise founded in 1948, is essentially an occupational guild and therefore comes under different laws from those of normal political parties deprived of political influence.

NDPD and LDPD members are mostly urban. Circa 80 percent of the NDPD membership is organized in urban basic units. It is likely to be similar in the CDU, even though its proportion of farmers might be 40 percent higher. Some 80 percent of the DBD membership is, naturally, combined in rural basic units. Of its total 91,000 membership, 79,100 are working in agriculture.

The effort by the SED, to turn the LDPD and the NDPD into a similar sort of occupational guild representation of the urban middle class, has failed. "At this 11th party congress," said LDPD Chairman Manfred Gerlach,¹ "we worked out a policy as broad as at no previous party congress and are emphasizing that we are no Ko-Ha-Ge party (Author: Complementary-Craftsmen-Tradesmen Party) which means it would be completely wrong were we to concentrate on unlimited partners, craftsmen and tradesmen." A comparison of the social structure of the LDPD as

between 1948 and 1981 indicates the social composition has by and large stayed the same. What has disappeared only is the proportion of workers, which the LDPD, just like the NDPD, still showed in the late 1940's. Neither party, nor the DBD, may accept "working class" members.

Table 1: Membership Trends in the Noncommunist Parties of the GDR

<u>Year, Month</u>	<u>CDU</u>	<u>LDPD</u>	<u>NDPD</u>	<u>DBD</u>
1945, Dec	67,852	88,167	-	-
1946, Dec	207,543	179,656	-	-
1948, Dec	211,176*	197,790	-	12,000
1949, June			ca. 20,000	
1950, Jan				ca. 50,000
1950, Dec	181,042	198,920	ca. 100,000	
1951, May	170,568			
1951, June			ca. 100,000	60,000
1951, Dec		150,441		
1953			232,605	80,000
1954	136,000	99,617	172,000	
1955, Mar				72,362
1961	70,000	ca. 67,000		
1965			ca. 100,000	ca. 73,000
1966				
1970		ca. 70,000		
1975	110,000		80,000	90,000
1977	115,000	75,000	85,000	91,000
1982	125,000	82,000	91,000	103,000

*excluding Berlin

Table 2: Social Structure of LDPD Members

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1981</u>
Employees/Craftsmen	28.6%	32.0%
Tradesmen	14.4%	23.8%
"Intellectuals"	-	18.0%
Workers	14.1%	-
Farmers	11.9%	10.0%

The CDU is the only noncommunist party, however, to have retained its original character of a people's party. As there continue to be Christians even among the workers, it is allowed to accept workers. For all that, it must not make a CDU shingle of them in representative positions, such as in the people's representations.

Conflicts with the SED

The strong membership influx in the noncommunist parties creates political problems both for the parties concerned and for the SED. New membership accrues to the LDPD, CDU, NDPD and DBD for the purpose of evading the SED.

The SED is structured in accordance with the so-called production principle, so that its working members are organized in their enterprises. It thereby promises itself more of an influence and more disciplining, because any possible refusal to engage in one or another public effort has direct repercussions in one's work life. In contrast, the noncommunist parties, like other bourgeois parties in Western states, are organized in accordance with the so-called territorial principle. Where one lives, individualization is greater and so is the chance to dodge unpleasant obligations.

The proportion of the intellectuals in noncommunist parties today suggests that precisely the so-called new intelligentsia, those that got their academic training in the GDR, has sought its political roof in the noncommunist parties. Still in the 1960's, the other Bloc parties were as a rule forbidden to accept members of the new intelligentsia. But meanwhile they have won out over the SED. Periodic conferences with scholars of the humanities and social sciences, pedagogues and members of the technical intelligentsia have marked their efforts since the 1970's.

The new membership influx has pushed the parties in the people's representations of the big cities and towns more against the SED in the last decade. Conflicts evidently arise where the new intelligentsia has found its political base. On the level of communal policy opposition can better be formulated than in ideological issues. The leading party must not always have the last word on a decision that is to be made, on where, e.g., a new swimming pool is to be built.

A clear consequence of that was that the SED clearly trimmed the percentage of deputies of other parties in the various people's representations. So their percentage in the city-district assemblies of the larger cities shrank from 1970 till the last communal election for the time being, in 1979, from circa 10 to barely above 6 percent. This accrued to the benefit particularly of the FDGB [Free German Trade Union Federation] and the FDJ [Free German Youth], whose deputies, it is estimated, are SED members up to 70 or 75 percent. Things look similar in the kreis assemblies and city-kreis assemblies of the middle-size towns, while the composition of people's representations in the small towns and communities, bezirk assemblies and the People's Chamber have remained constant.

Training and Publicity

To train their associates and their low and middle-level functionaries and as places for a specific reception of their legacy, the parties have educational institutions. The CDU has a training facility, "Otto Nuschke", in the former Baroque Castle of Count von der Schulenburg in Burgscheidungen, In a remote area of the Mark, in Bantikow near Neustadt on the Dosse, the LDPD conducts the "Dr Wilhelm Kuelz Central Party School" in a castlelike former industrial mansion. the NDPD located its National Policy College in Waldsieversdorf near Berlin, and the DBD, its Thomas Muentzer party school, in the small village of Borkheide, south of Berlin.

More diverse, however, are the parties in their everyday publishing. The CDU, along with its central organ, NEUE ZEIT, puts out five regional papers with a total circulation of 270,800 copies. Then comes the journal STANDPUNKTE, which

is aimed at the Evangelical Christians, with a circulation of 2,700 copies per month, and BEGEGNUNG, for the Catholics, with 3,000 copies. They also publish an organ for the functionaries, UNION TEILT MIT. Then the CDU has two publishing houses, Koehler & Amelang and Union Verlag, which are important above and beyond the CDU. Along with political CDU literature, they put out essays and books on historical and ecclesiastic-religious themes and a broad pallet of fiction. Union Verlag is publishing Heinrich Boell, for instance.

DER MORGEN, the central organ of the LDPD, comes out in another four regional editions at a total circulation of 442,300. LDPD INFORMATIONEN is the LDPD organ for functionaries. The party owns the publishing house Buchverlag Der Morgen which, along with specific LDPD literature, covers a wide field of historical themes and fiction. It is the general publisher, for instance, of Stefan Heym.

NDPD owns a total of six dailies, including the central organ NATIONAL ZEITUNG, with a circulation figure of 191,600. They also used to publish a weekly, DEUTSCHE WOCHE, with a 600,000 circulation figure, and a more sports-oriented paper, NZ AM MONTAG, at 200,000 copies, both of which had to go out of business, however, on 29 December 1952 because the press of that competition had become too strong for the SED.

There was a sort of vestibule organization run jointly with the SED, a working association of former officers, with Maj Gen Ret Otto Korfes (NDPD) as the chairman and Maj Gen Martin Lattmann (SED) as his deputy. From 1958 to 1971, it published the MITTEILUNGSBLATT DER ARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT EHEMALIGER OFFIZIERE. On the one hand, it was targeted at former Wehrmacht officers in the FRG, but then it also dealt with historical themes in military affairs and by that token made a significant contribution to clarifying the status of contemporary history in the GDR.

The functionaries' organ of the NDPD is DER NATIONALE DEMOKRAT, its publishing house, Verlag der Nation, with a profile similar to Buchverlag Der Morgan, only with a stronger accentuation of historic-national themes.

The DBD is the only noncommunist party that has only one daily, BAUERN ECHO, which comes out in five regional editions at a total circulation of 91,100. SED competition becomes very clear there, as the SED has always regarded the DBD merely as its own extended arm into the peasantry. The SED publishes the NEUE DEUTSCHE BAUERNZEITUNG with a 195,100 circulation. The DBD functionary organ is DER PFLUEGER, and the publishing house it owns is the Deutsche Bauernverlag that is putting out more technical literature than publications of general interest.

Except for the parallel already drawn between BAUERN ECHO and SED competitive efforts, comparisons with SED organs often made in the West lead to false conclusions. The SED's central organ, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, has by itself a circulation of 1.1 million copies daily, to be sure, yet what is often overlooked is that enterprises and institutions, from the smallest to the top, and all units of the mass organizations are under the obligation to subscribe to NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and other SED publications. For the newspapers of the noncommunist parties, on the other hand, no mandatory subscription exists, except by their own party apparatuses. They constitute, as it were, the choice over against the duty in reading the SED press.

The LDPD dailies are getting the widest dissemination by far outside their own party readership, enjoying a circulation almost three times the number of LDPD membership. One reason for it may be that particularly the LDPD feuilleton is much less conventional than that of other papers. The movie, "Insel der Schwaene" [Swan Island], which quite frankly deals with the problems of youth in the GDR, and which had recently been panned in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND and in the FDJ central organ JUNGE WELT, got highly favorable reviews in DER MORGEN and in the LIBERAL DEMOKRATISCHE ZEITUNG.

After the LDPD dailies come those of the CDU and the NDPD. Both parties' circulation of dailies exceeds the number of party members more than twofold. The DBD paper, on the other hand, hardly seems disseminated beyond the party membership. In terms of party membership the BAUERN ECHO circulation figure lies 12 percent below the number of DBD members.

Withdrawal into the Party Niches

While the circulation and dissemination figures of the newspapers give some idea of the resonance noncommunist parties encounter, at differing degrees, in society, the officially registered party members who--more or less formally--have once committed themselves to join the work in the commissions of the National Front, a roof organization of all parties and mass organizations under SED leadership, reflect the public nature of niches in the "other Bloc parties." Officially, the political work of those parties is always seen as an integral element of the work in the National Front. In 1963, e.g., the party structures of the LDPD were brought in line with the regional structures of the National Front. For the other parties that was also done at various points. For all that, only barely 24 percent of the DBD membership assumed the obligation in 1978 to get involved in the work of the National Front. Up to 1982 the proportion even dropped to 22.3 percent. If that is compared with the 1962 figure, identifying circa 29 percent of the DBD membership as volunteer National Front associates, the definite drop becomes obvious and the DBD, like the other parties, also gains the character of a niche party. The LDPD shows for 1971 about 20 percent of its members committed to involvement in the work of the National Front commissions. For all of 11 years official policy managed no more than an increase to 21.6 percent, in 1982. The NDPD shows 20.9 percent of its membership working in the National Front for 1978 but is cautious enough to avoid any new statement about that at its 12th party congress in 1983. The CDU is more frank in this regard. While still 19 percent of its membership was reported to be working in the National Front in 1978, in 1982 it had dropped to merely 14.4 percent. This goes to say that more than 24 percent of the volunteer associations in the National Front commissions quit in recent years or, as to new members, did not even assume any commitments from the start to get involved in the SED-dominated roof association. Part of the drop, one assumes, has to do with the debate on military service and defense education.

Despite the small number of noncommunist volunteer associates in the National Front, they show a high fluctuation rate. Not many seem to be able to stand it there long, or they only committed themselves and showed up in statistics, but never in the National Front organizations, for that matter. The fluctuation of his party members in National Front organizations, LDPD Chairman Gerlach observed in this context, was "relatively high."²

Official Functions

The official functions the SED assigned to the noncommunist parties do not conform to their actual functions as niches. One of their official functions is to reeducate, as transmission belts of the "working class party," parts of the population critical of official policy. "Through a thorough reeducation process, the middle class circles close to us are to come to understand their tasks in the construction of socialism," says a CDU executive committee resolution of 1958.³

The term "transmission belt" stems from the theoretician and practitioner of the Russian Revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Lenin held the view--which he found confirmed in practice--that socialist consciousness did not develop spontaneously. Most people would develop merely a "trade unionist" consciousness. That term Lenin derived from the English trade unions and meant by it some conscious tinkering with the symptoms of capitalism that would not get to its roots and overthrow it. Therefore society needed a politically conscious vanguard, the "working class party" as a "new type of party," the ideas and policy of which would have to be channeled by special organizations into the various social strata. As a special target group he named the bourgeois middle class strata and the peasants. In his speech at the 20th anniversary of the "Democratic Bloc," which unites, along with the SED, all noncommunist parties as well as the FDGB, the FDJ, the Democratic Womens League of Germany and the Culture League of the GDR, Walter Ulbricht expressed that as follows: "We know how to appreciate the efforts of the friendly parties they have engaged in through the work with all members and circles close to them in the National Front. They picked up the world of ideas in those population strata and helped attract them to the socialist way."⁴

Picking up the world of ideas means in the GDR differing from one another and from the SED in the language, style and the traditions to be absorbed. The official mission of the CDU is, for influencing the churches, to pick up the ideas of Luther, the Calvinists and the Catholic Church so as to appoint them crown witnesses for SED policy. The LDPD is to do something similar with the intellectual representatives of the middle class. That also includes the traditions of the leftist-liberal German Democratic Party and the rightist-liberal German People's Party of the Weimar Republic.⁵ The National Democrats, on the other hand, have to cultivate more the representatives of the national-conservative circles and, in particular, pick up the ideas of the German-national Wehrmacht and Reichswehr officers, special value attaching there to the Prussian virtues in connection with Prussian history. There is something odd in this respect with regard to the Farmers Party. Seeking to probe into revolutionary peasant ideas of their own, one could think of nothing but the German Peasants' Confederation in the early 16th century which, for all intents and purposes, wanted to abolish bondage, reduce manorial dues and divide clerical estates, and of Thomas Muentzer and the Peasant War. The DBD itself found out soon enough that such traditions are merely propped onto it and therefore concentrated more on relevant technical issues in agricultural policy and agronomy.

Another official function of the noncommunist parties lies in their partial representation of interests of their members and the population circles related to

them. The point is one cannot seek to influence certain population groups while grossly violating their interests. Most strikingly this relation of tension between the transmission belt and the representation of interests was described recently by the CDU: "For one thing: the CDU is not the political mouthpiece of the church. We cannot and do not want to bias the church in our direction. But then again: Christians--members of the churches--find in our party a broad field for political activity offering them rich opportunities for shaping our socialist society. Thus we are living in the field of tension between not being a church party and our claim to being a party of Christians."⁶

The representation of the members' interests in the CDU related and relates essentially to clamping down on atheistic propaganda, in the LDPD and the NDPD, particularly, to the efforts of creating chances for economic survival for parts of the middle class. "If there are classes and social strata in the GDR," Manfred Gerlach announced on behalf of his party in a radio interview on GDR II in 1972, "then there naturally also are diverse interests, including individual interests, that do not always conform with overall social interests. That is perfectly natural."⁷

A third official function for the noncommunist parties lies in opening up chances of promotion for less important positions in the state apparatus and in the working life to those who have some reservations about the SED. That reduces the frustrations noncommunists might develop in dealing with SED members by channeling them into chances for individual careers. Sure enough, it is still a fact that, especially, teachers and other associates in the educational field still find advancement difficult when they adhere to one of the noncommunist parties, while advancement in the military and security organs is completely ruled out for members of other Bloc parties. Today, in contrast to the past, there is no longer one NVA officer who is a member of one of the parties that are "friendly" to the SED. The diplomatic service likewise, with very few exceptions, remains closed to the other parties. For some so-called nomenclature cadre, exclusive SED membership is even mandatory. That includes the "cadre chiefs," the personnel managers of all state enterprises. Membership in one of the other parties, on the other hand, clearly benefits craftsmen, tradesmen and members of the free professions.

A fourth official function of the noncommunist parties lies in collecting reports on the political mood in their membership and bourgeois circles close to it which are then passed on to the SED top leadership via the National Front. Names are usually not mentioned but opinion trends are shown, such as reactions by certain public circles to measures from the GDR government and its leading party, the SED. This passing on of opinion trends has a certain course-correcting function because the SED can then tell how far it can go and whether it might have to change certain measures taken. In the Berlin Bezirk LDPD association, e.g., a canvass of opinion on the German question was prepared in the late 1970's which, together with other surveys, may have induced the SED late in 1982 to drop its thesis of an "independent GDR nation" and to refer again today to the "German people" as well as to the "socialist Germany."

Such canvassing of opinion comes from the lower party echelons and is passed on in their own party apparatus. Granted, not only the noncommunist parties are information sources for course correction, but all public organizations of the GDR, along with the opinion poll institute under the SED Central Committee, set up in 1965, are putting together such canvasses of opinion. It is also known that interrogating security organs in GDR prisons have political prisoners provide individual assessments of political issues for the same purpose, evidently to create also a canvass of opinion in the overt political opposition.

Bourgeois Leeway in the Field of Tension of Soviet Postwar Policy

Not all noncommunist parties in the other Germany from the outset held functions assigned to them by the SED. The CDU and LDPD originated shortly after World War II in Berlin and raised the claim to being parties for the residual parts of the German Reich. The executive boards residing in Berlin therefore referred to themselves still long after they were set up as Reich party executives. As it turned out, they could expand their influence only within the Soviet zone of occupation and put the parties variously and spontaneously founded in Leipzig, Dresden and elsewhere under the roof of the Reich party executives. Unification attempts with similar CDU and liberal parties founded later also in the U.S. and British zones, and later still in the French zone, failed on account of the growing divergency among the four occupational powers in Germany as well as of the refusal by many FRG party representatives to tolerate the conduct, especially, of the LDPD but also of certain CDU representatives under the special conditions in the Soviet zone of occupation.

In the Soviet zone of occupation there was, for one thing, a revolutionary-Bolshevist line by and large represented by Col Segei Tulpanov, representing the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, and then there was a more flexible line in the various functions of Ambassador Vladimir Semyonovich Semyonov. Walter Ulbricht, the man of the hard line in the SED, it is being reported, liked to avoid talking with Semyonov and rather got the blessings for his measures from Tulpanov. Otto Grotewohl, originally the SPD chairman in the Soviet zone of occupation and later in the SED executive, which had absorbed the SPD, in this connection reported that Semyonov had expressed his concern to him about "that some measures initiated by Tulpanov and Ulbricht had exceeded the objective of the Moscow policy, which could further complicate an already tough situation."⁸ The first chief of the Soviet Military Administration, Marshal Grigoriy Zhukov, who in 1928 had taken a general staff course under the Reichswehr, had offered Otto Grotewohl when he was still the SPD chairman to remove Walter Ulbricht from the KPD leadership. But Grotewohl had missed taking advantage of that offer.⁹

When difficulties arose between the SED and the Soviets on the one side and the CDU on the other, and when Andreas Hermes and Walther Schreiber first and, later, Jakob Kaiser and Ernst Lemmer, on Soviet orders, were removed from the CDU executive, Grotewohl was supposed to attempt, on advice from Erich W. Gniffke, Ulbricht's adversary in the SED, by talking to Semyonov, to keep Ernst Lemmer. Grotewohl and Gniffke wanted to keep less steadfast politicians like Otto Nuschke or Luitpold Steidly from becoming the new CDU chairmen.¹⁰ The attempt at intervening came too late, however.

With support from various representatives of the Soviet Military Administration, bourgeois politicians were able through discreet maneuvering to hold on for some time to some leeway which has still some after-effects today. Leading representatives of the LDPD and the CDU, mainly the chairmen Manfred Gerlach and Gerald Goetting, still cultivate their own ties to the Soviet Embassy in East Berlin. On Soviet request, therefore, Gerald Goetting was the only representative of a noncommunist party in the Soviet power sphere in 1982 who acted as an honor guard at Brezhnev's bier in Moscow. The executive committees of both parties as well as of the other parties invite Soviet embassy personnel at irregular intervals to meetings of their central or main committees and to events sponsored by their central party schools.

The Soviets and the SED as Party Founders

The initially fairly large leeway of the CDU and the LDPD was curtailed in 1948. The SED saw to the founding of the DBD, the Soviets, to that of the NDPD. The Soviet Military Administration, so Colonel Tulpanov informed some high SED functionaries, had "gained the conviction through some surveys on former members and functionaries of the Nazi party that there are quite some useful forces who would be hard to integrate with the existing mass and party organizations. Former Nazi functionaries are now being released, and with some of them I talked at length. To activate those forces, we have proposed advocating the formation of a party in which these forces can be gathered, united and made serviceable to the further development of the zone. The party is likely to be called National-Democratic Party. Those forces are to be given the chance to develop in the zone."¹¹

That information has in the meantime also been confirmed by reports in the NDPD central organ. "Five men of the middle class," NATIONAL ZEITUNG wrote, for example, on 26 May 1963, "were invited by the Soviet commandatura and asked to indicate what they thought about a political cooperation among former NSDAP members, officers, craftsmen and private proprietors." From that talk came the founding of the NDPD in Potsdam-Babelsberg. Being greatly backed by the Russians, it could even publicly quarrel with the SED at the start. Press polemics occurred in 1948, for instance, between the NDPD Chairman Lothar Bolz and NEUES DEUTSCHLAND. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND rapped the national and "insouciant relationship with the Soviet Union due to reasons of convenience" and squawked about non-socialist conceptions. Lothar Bolz, in his rejoinder, wrote: "Such conceptions make you indignant. We cannot help you. We can only repeat we shall not sell ourselves to any world-outlook (including yours), a social dogma (including yours), or any class standpoint (including yours)!"¹² When the Russians later lost their special interest in the NDPD because it could bring no great influence to bear on the national-conservative forces in both parts of Germany, the NDPD became subject to targeted SED subversion and its leeway was cut back. In 1954, e.g., state security in Gera Bezirk appointed its associate Lothar T. department chief III in the NDPD control commission. Also over against the LDPD, the NDPD provided itself with its own profile already in 1948. It was more and more shoved against the LDPD in the early 1950's, and in 1952, the political advisor of the chief of the Soviet Control Commission, Semyonov, said that eliminating the LDPD was the NDPD's "most important task."¹³

The DBD never got a leeway of its own staked out by the SED. Its constitutive program of 1948 contains no political conceptions of its own. The LDPD commented on that in 1948 as follows: "The antifascist parties that exist, our own party above all, are perfectly able to represent the farmers' interests. The real aims the other side is pursuing in forming a farmers party, coming down to forcing the farmers off the non-Marxist parties and weakening them thereby, must be clearly explained to the peasantry."¹⁴ This year there were, for all that, 23,436 farmers in the LDPD. To give the DBD a hold on the peasantry, SED members were delegated into the new party.

Between Accommodation and Correction, Motives for Political Action

Several politicians in the noncommunist parties have sought to walk the tightrope over the gap opening frequently between the two lines of Soviet policy in its zone. They also had to take account of SED policy, leaning on, and seeking to push further, the revolutionary-Bolshevist line of Soviet policy in its chief representative Walter Ulbricht. The SED would also rely on politicians in the CDU, LDPD, NDPD and DBD. This involves in particular the LDPD Chairman Hans Loch and his general secretary Herbert Taeschner, Heinrich Homann, who in 1952 advanced from being the political business manager of NDPD to deputy party chairman and became the chairman in 1972, and, temporarily, Gerald Goetting, who at the early age of 26 became the CDU general secretary in 1949. His special task was to paralyze CDU Chairman Otto Nuschke's influence in his own party. In 1966, Gerald Goetting became the CDU chairman and has sought, at least since then, to strengthen the CDU profile. The role he plays today is not the same one he played yesterday. Herbert Taeschner, primed through the collaboration of the SED with Major Siora of the Soviet Military Administration in Saxony, advanced to LDPD general secretary in 1950 when he was only 34 years old. His stern Stalization measures in the party ran into sharp resistance, however, from Johannes Dieckmann, deputy LDPD chairman and president of the People's Chamber, who together with his personal aide Theo Hanemann, today the director of the Wilhelm Kuelz Central Party School, got rid of Taeschner. His successor Manfred Gerlach, LDPD chairman since 1967, has been more conciliatory from the outset.

The motive of the politicians operating in a sort of grey zone between the two lines of Soviet policy and the SED was, apart from their very personal vanities, to mitigate the impending dictatorship of the proletariat and conserve the bourgeois structures in the GDR. Then they were still hoping for a reunification and wanted to salvage what could be salvaged for Germany. In 1959, for example, Johannes Dieckmann quoted Goethe, saying: "Loyal services in daily preservation obviate the need for revelation," affirming the first part of it and qualifying the second. "It has been said a while ago in some connection one or another of our party friends had been censured for being too liberal or too democratic. What can one say about that? No one among us can be too liberal or too democratic, if we correctly understand the meaning of the word 'democratic' in our time."¹⁵

Walter Ulbricht, an opponent of the "grey zone forces" in the noncommunist parties, later confirmed their corrective influence: "We frankly admit we have also learned quite a lot from our friends in the Bloc parties. Many sharp edges in politics, unavoidable in the severity of the class struggle in Germany, were smoothed through opinion exchange and cooperation."¹⁶

Johannes Dieckmann, LDPD

Johannes Dieckmann was one of the most clearly defined national-liberal politicians in the GDR. He could not become the LDPD chairman, even when that position became vacant twice, because the SED always vetoed it. When the Saxony Land association, the most "conservative" one in the LDPD, nominated Johannes Dieckmann for party chairman in 1951, Dieckmann had to renounce his candidacy.

Prior to 1933, Johannes Dieckmann was active in executive positions of the right-wing liberal German People's Party (DVP) and had a hand in the ousting of Dresden's chief mayor Bernhard Blueher, also a member of the DVP, because Blueher had also courted the support of the communists. An official LDPD tribute of Dieckmann, published in 1974, states that the FRG policy of western integration had given him a "sense of paralysis." In spite of that he had combined his attitude with the "illusory expectation politicians like himself could establish ties and, together with the politically reasonable circles in the FRG, somehow bring a halt to such development." In his Germany policy, Dieckmann oriented himself to "the policy of Bismarck, which assumed that good relations with the neighbor in the east accrued to a reasonable mutual interest. He was impressed with the Rapallo policy which, as one knows, was based on the thesis that the vast eastern empire was a European and world political factor, regardless of which political system prevailed there; and thirdly, Dieckmann looked to Gustav Stresemann for corroboration."¹⁷ Up to the early 1960's, Dieckmann publicly called for a national compromise "in Bismarck's sense," reiterated the possibility of separate ballots in the GDR, and emphasized the need for all-German elections. "Is not one of the basic prerequisites for free elections in a country," he asked, "that that country is free from alien troops?"¹⁸

The SED, opposing early already in public any independent all-German role in East-West settlements, wanted Dieckmann replaced repeatedly. His view, shared also by others, that the LDPD should "be the mediator between East and West," did not fit into its concept.¹⁹ The minister of justice, LDPD Chairman Hans Loch, was posited against him. In the central organ, DER MORGEN, he called Dieckmann an "anti-self-critical bard." The People's Chamber president hovered "above the clouds like a smiling Buddha and does not krack down as a Jupiter tonans, an angry thunder god. Such mistakes even the oldest pelican must not commit. We know that many of the old individualists, who as adherents to the pseudo-liberal constitutional theory of of a night watchman's state are mainly to be blamed for the degeneration of liberalism, can no longer be of benefit to our progressive liberalism."²⁰ Still in 1958, the SED paper NEUER WEG printed a birthday greeting at Dieckmann's 65th birthday together with a picture of a snowman.²¹

Dieckmann was not dropped because the Russians happened to remain interested in his all-German and Rapallo ideas. Only much later, in 1961, the SED found itself compelled to acknowledge him somewhat: "Dieckmann has been and is no communist. He has been and is an outstanding representative and politician of the liberal German middle class, that part of the German middle class that cares for the true interests and peaceful future of the German people." Even so, the deputy LDPD chairman was never truly reconciled with the SED. In a last will and testament provision, he set down that an SED representative should not be allowed to speak longer than 5 minutes at his gravesite.

Hermann Kastner, the SED System Nearly Surmounted

A similar role, independent of GDR conditions, was played by Hermann Kastner. In 1949 he was elected cochairman of the LDPD together with Karl Hamann, who was later arrested. From there he became the deputy prime minister of the first GDR government. When his son had defected to the West on 18 April 1950, the SED intimated to Kastner he should resign his office and quit the LDPD. On Soviet pressure, however, the LDPD had to reinstate Kastner a little later. Kastner, as was discovered later, had been the Gehlen organization's highest ranking informer in the GDR. In 1956 he came to the FRG.

At the latest since Stalin's death on 5 March 1953, the old Zhukov-Semyonov line became Moscow's official government policy. Before Stalin died and when Kastner spent 4 weeks on the Crimea, Semyonov had arranged a 3-day meeting between Stalin and Kastner. The Russians were interested in making the GDR altogether more attractive and finding an all-German compromise. "Ulbricht was only formally still the general secretary of the party, factually the leadership had already been withdrawn from him."²² On 19 June 1953, Kastner was asked in Berlin by Semyonov as the Soviet high commissar to submit suitable proposals for a popular government policy. One day later, Kastner, in a memorandum, proposed reinstituting the independence of judges, eliminating SED influence on jurisdiction, filling the most important administrative position regardless of party membership, and the further development of the consumer goods industry. Semyonov showed open-mindedness to those proposals. Yet he categorically turned down the demand for new elections, which People's Chamber President Dieckmann had raised several times before. Kastner, after his talks with Semyonov, thought it feasible he could replace Walter Ulbricht as deputy prime minister. Semyonov also had toyed with the idea, as was learned later, to have Hermann Kastner, CDU Chairman Otto Nuschke, or the former Wehrmacht general and the later chief of staff of the Garrisoned People's Police Vincenz Mueller (NDPD) appointed prime minister. The Russians also contemplated to what extent the GDR Foreign Minister Georg Dertinger (CDU), who had been arrested on 15 January 1953, and the former LDPD Chairman Karl Hamann, arrested at the same time, should be reactivated in a new cabinet.²³

The flexible line of Soviet policy for the time being came to an end with the after-effects of the June insurrection in the GDR that gave a boost to the hard line in Moscow and East Berlin. Cautious feelers were thrown out later still. For instance, in mid-1956, Kastner, on Soviet orders, was to conduct talks with FRG and other western politicians on settling the German question. The Soviets offered to put the SED predominance in the GDR up for grabs and, for the sake of serious talks, to give more power to the noncommunist parties.

Otto Nuschke, CDU

Otto Nuschke, CDU chairman after Kaiser and Lemmer had been ousted, from 1948 to 1957, was a conformist in matters of principle and in some limited areas insisting on his own will. Today's tribute to him is that of "teacher and father" of the CDU. Without any influence on the general line, he sought to moderate in individual cases, protect one person or another from persecution or the penitentiary, and mitigate various SED orders. As Tulpanov observed in a review of 1975, he did not "share the conception of the class struggle as a historic inevitability."²⁴

From 1949 up to the time of his death in 1957, Nuschke was the deputy prime minister of the GDR. Simultaneously, from 1949, he was in charge of church affairs, replaced though by the communist Eggerath in 1956. That, for all intents and purposes, did away with Nuschke's authority because he had sought concessions between the SED and the churches and had not only, to the limits of his ability, defused the SED's atheism propaganda, but also prevented the elimination of theology departments from state universities. When the SED wanted him ousted in February 1950, the Soviet Military Administration kept him on.²⁵

Particularly in 1949 and subsequent years, Nuschke sought to pit against SED intentions an active neutrality policy. He furthermore warned of the "National Front's suffering shipwreck" by the all-German efforts by various forces. To Professor Ulrich Noack, the representative of the national-neutralist Nauheim Circle in the FRG, he expressed skepticism, however, in the same context: "Indeed, all of us are going to be doomed in our efforts concerning the unity and liberty of Germany."²⁶ Way back in 1948, he had explained his reason for nevertheless wanting to remain at work in the GDR, in a public speech: "There are only three alternatives for the Germans in the eastern zone: they either commit suicide or defect to the West or seek some compromise with the Soviet occupation power."²⁷

Vincenz Mueller, NDPD

From 1949 to 1953, Vincenz Mueller was the deputy chairman of the NDPD and later, chief of the general staff of the National People's Army (NVA). In 1957, he was suspended on grounds of having opposed the SED resolutions on the leadership role of the party in the NVA. Still under the German Empire he had decided to become an officer. As a young major in the Weimar Republic, he had become General von Schleicher's adjutant. In World War II, in 1943, he had been promoted to lieutenant general and was awarded the Knight's Cross. While in captivity, he joined the National Free Germany Committee (NKFD) and the "Association of German Officers." Mueller was a confidant of the Soviets. Between 1950 and 1954 he maintained close contacts with his former Wehrmacht comrades who later got high positions in the Bundeswehr. His political conception was a German independence from East and West, which did not imply an eastern leaning to him. A neutralization of all of Germany Mueller regarded as necessary only to a limited extent.

His western partner in talks was Col Hermann Teske who maintained contacts with Mueller "with the knowledge of the authorities" and who had his proposals and political conceptions discussed, as referred to, vaguely, in the Mueller-Teske correspondence, in "family council," subsequently always informing Mueller again about the outcome. The "family council" included, along with the later inspector general of the Bundeswehr, General Heusinger, the later commander-in-chief of the NATO Central Europe Command, Speidel, and the generals von Sodenstern, Vieban, von Natzmer and others.

Those contacts, that concerned themselves almost exclusively with the question of German unity, did not continue after 1954. The FRG "authorities" urged the contacts to be broken, and the East also seemed to switch gears. In East Berlin, Teske did not get any farther than to Heinrich Homann, the then deputy NDPD

chairman. The contacts between Colonel Teske and Lt Gen Mueller would often take place in the NDPD building, and they sometimes would even include Soviet Col Aleksandrov and be held at the Soviet headquarters in Berlin-Karlshorst.²⁸

Mueller later continued his contacts. As the deputy minister for national defense of the GDR he received the then FRG Finance Minister Fritz Schaeffer (CSU) on 11 June 1955 and on 20 October 1956 to discuss the solution of the German question with him. The plan of a confederation between the two German states played a role there, as a relationship similar to that of the Benelux states. Schaeffer is said to have proposed the confederation plan. Subsequent to his meeting with Mueller in East Berlin, Schaeffer also talked with the Soviet Ambassador Pushkin.²⁹

All contacts and all-German efforts between politicians of both German states, held in somewhat of a "grey zone," finally broke down. Vincenz Mueller committed suicide on 12 May 1961.³⁰ The true motives for it are unknown. In spite of it, or perhaps because of it, he got a solemn state funeral in the GDR.

Belated Sequel or New Beginning?

The "grey zone contacts" still only broke off in part or were later resumed with a different cast. As "German patriots in both German states," the retired Bundeswehr General Heinz Karst and NVA officers whose contacts were backed by one of the deputy defense ministers of the GDR, talked together in 1980 in East Berlin. Karst had gone to East Berlin and Potsdam as a member of the "James von Moltke Circle, which also has adherents in the GDR." The topic of discussion was to get closer to German unification.³¹

National Importance and International Contacts

Opportunities and chances for such contacts are smaller today for sure than they used to be in the 1950's. At that time the regime was not yet as consolidated as it is today, the Soviets had a great directional authority, and there were more members of noncommunist parties in the GDR government. The ministers in the first GDR government, as of 12 October 1949, included three members of the CDU, two of the LDPD, and one each of the NDPD and the DBD. Of the 30 ministers in the current GDR government, 27 are SED members, the CDU providing only the minister for post and telecommunications, the LDPD, the minister of justice, and the DBD, the minister for environmental protection & water management. The NDPD no longer provides a minister, in compensation for which the chairman of the state contract court, who is a member of the NDPD, along with the ministers who are members of the CDU, LDPD and DBD, were nominally made deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. The only NDPD member left in the diplomatic service is Ferdinand Count von Thun und Hohenstein. He is the permanent GDR representative at UNESCO in Paris. In contrast to the past, however, all the chairmen of the noncommunist parties are represented nominally as deputy chairmen in that important power organ, the State Council of the GDR.

Despite the clear loss of position by the noncommunist parties, the influence of some of their representatives ought not to be underrated. For instance, as deputy chairmen of the People's Chamber national defense commission, NDPD Chairman Heinrich Homann and LDPD Chairman Manfred Gerlach are simultaneously

members of the GDR National Defense Council with its full emergency authority under Erich Honecker's chairmanship. The names of the members of the National Defense Council are not made public in the GDR, except for its chairman.

At its 15th party congress in Dresden in 1982, the CDU defined itself as "a peace party" and has, essentially, domestic policy importance. To reach into the sphere of the Evangelical churches, it works closely together with the Christian Peace Conference (CFK) that was founded in Prague in 1958. Its pendant on the Catholic side is the "Berlin Conference of Catholic Christians of European States" (BK), set up upon the initiative of CDU functionaries in 1964. The wider the elbow room gets for the churches in the GDR, the greater the importance also the CDU can lay claim to.

A different yet essential importance attaches to the LDPD today. It is "capable of some differentiated views on certain matters," FDP deputy chairman and chairman of the FDP Bundestag faction, Wolfgang Mischnick, announced after his talks on 5 March 1984 with LDPD top functionaries in the party building in East Berlin.³² Wolfgang Mischnick himself was an LDPD member till 1948 and deputy chairman of the Saxony chapter.

Only temporarily have contacts between the two parties been interrupted. While the Union parties in both German states do not talk with each other at all, the CDU in the FRG strictly refusing any contact, contacts between the FDP and the LDPD have persistently been going on on various levels. In 1947, all four liberal parties in the zone set up their "Democratic Party of Germany" with a contact bureau in Frankfurt/Main. Cochairmen were Theodor Heuss (West) and Wilhelm Kuelz (East). Early in 1948, however, the attempt at an all-German party foundered on the unwillingness of the FRG liberals to continue cooperating with LDPD Chairman Wilhelm Kuelz and on the rejection of Johannes Dieckmann's proposal not to take part in the formation of German separate states. In 1955, an LDPD delegation showed up, uninvited, at the Sixth FDP Congress in Oldenburg. It was not admitted to the auditorium. From 4 to 6 October 1956 official talks ensued in Weimar. The FDP was represented by Erich Mende, Walter Scheel and Wolfgang Doering; for the LDPD, Manfred Gerlach, Rudolf Agsten and Harald Werthmann took part in the negotiations. All three continue to have leading positions in the LDPD. On 13 January 1961, invited by the Liberal Students Alliance in Marbach, Johannes Dieckmann spoke in Marburg, or rather, he tried to speak. Broken windows and catcalls such as "hang the guy" spoiled the atmosphere. Then another public talk before the rostrum was held in 1966 between representatives of both parties, in 1973 there was a meeting between Wolfgang Mischnick and Manfred Gerlach, and after the GDR dropped its rigorous demarcation policy against the FRG the FDP was officially invited to attend the 12th LDPD Congress in Weimar in 1982. The FDP accepted the invitation. Shortly thereafter, Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), LDPD member till 1952 himself, met with Manfred Gerlach in Halle.

At the most recent meeting in East Berlin, the LDPD was invited to attend the next FDP congress and for talks with the FDP executive in Bonn. One of the goals of the new contacts is to agree on a framework within which medium-size and small enterprises in both German states can be drawn into economic cooperation. The desire of the SED as well as LDPD leadership is to make the small and medium-size enterprises in the GDR more efficient.

How ambivalent the SED feels about national and international LDPD contacts is indicated by that none but the DBD was sent from the GDR to attend the "Second Security and Cooperation Conference in Europe of European Center, Liberal and Agrarian Parties" from 14 to 16 October 1983 in Finland, though several contact partners of the LDPD, as the Liberal People's Party of Finland, the Democratic Party of Poland, and the FDP of the FRG did attend that conference.³³

The DBD, whose domestic policy importance, as already discussed, is confined at most to politically representing the peasantry, has no intra-German but, instead, some international contacts with the Finnish Center Party (formerly the Agrarian Union), the Greek Peasants Party (AKE), the Cyprus Peasants Association and the agrarian associations in Austria, Japan, Sweden, Norway, Belgium and Denmark. In addition, with the Icelandic Progressive Party, Denmark's Radical Venstre, the All-Ethiopian Peasants Association and the Cuban Association of Small Farmers. Two of those parties, the Icelandic and the Danish, are members of the Liberal International. The Finnish Center Party has an observer's status there.

The Bulgarian Peasant Party and the United Peasant Party of Poland are referred to as friendly parties. In a joint announcement in 1982, they took a position on the security situation in Europe, endorsing the attitude of their states' leading parties. DBD contacts seen as the SED's outstretched arm into the agrarian sector makes clear that the LDPD's national and international contacts had meant to be subverted. Soon thereafter, thus, the LDPD followed suit. On 18 May 1983, an extensive announcement was published from the Polish capital of the LDPD, the Polish Democratic Party and the Czech Socialist Party--all three also contact partners of the FDP. It was followed by an international press conference at which Manfred Gerlach, in response to a question from DER MORGEN, stressed the LDPD's ties with the Finnish Liberal People's Party, the right-wing liberal Italian Liberal Party (PLI), the Netherlands' leftist liberal "Democrats 66," the Belgian Liberals, the French "Radical Leftist Movement," the Colombian Liberal Party and the Liberal Party of Great Britain.³⁴ In February 1984, Gerlach then visited his contact partners in the Netherlands and France. In March 1984, cooperation was agreed on with the Libertarian Party of Austria (FPOe). Six of the eight western parties that are contact partners of the LDPD are members of the Liberal International.

In conformity with its domestic policy function in the GDR, the CDU only has contacts within the church sector. The NPD, to be sure, had tried in vain, in the late 1940's and early 1950's, to make contact with parties and institutions in the FRG. Today it has neither national nor international conversation partners outside the GDR borders. The stronger intra-German contacts become at this time, and the more of a perspective attaches to them, the greater becomes the importance of the LDPD and the CDU. As mentioned above, the Soviet Union also has by no means lost its interest in those parties.

Political Impotence and Forming a Profile

For most of the noncommunist parties, their subservience to the SED, ready to snap to and publicly documented at all party congresses and other events, has become a problem. Public debates no longer take place as they did in the early 1950's. Nor do politicians give public explanations anymore, as they used to be

doing way into the 1950's when some noncommunist GDR politicians would be talking with FRG politicians and clergy outside the GDR. Especially the CDU and the LDPD seek to strengthen their partnership with the SED by emphasizing their sharing the say-so in all public domains and are also demanding their sharing in the GDR's diplomatic service. At the same time, under the roof of the public political uniformity, they have ensured for themselves a wide area of political-cultural independence. They have sought to compensate for their large political impotence by forming political-cultural profiles. Having to assume the traditions of Christian, liberal and--as far as the NDPD is concerned--national middle class thought as the SED's transmission belts, the parties have broadened all that into a wide field of activity.

FOOTNOTES

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2. In THUERINGISCHE LANDESZEITUNG, 3 April 1980.
3. "CDU Top Executive Resolution 1958," "Dokumente der CDU," Vol 2, 1955-1958, East Berlin, 1958, p 175.
4. W. Ulbricht, "Speech for the 20th Anniversary of the Democratic Bloc," "20 Jahre Blockpolitik," East Berlin, 1965, p 15.
5. Among others: "Old Democrats from the LDPD: GDR--Fatherland of the People," DER MORGEN, 22 May 1962.
6. K. Radzimanowski, "Applying the Yearning for Peace to Politics," UNION TEILT MIT, 1982, No 6, p 11.
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9. Ibid., p 365.
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11. W. Leonhard, "Die Revolution entlaesst ihre Kinder" [Child of the Revolution], Cologne-West Berlin, 1955, p 396.
12. "Critical Comments on a Party Program," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 17 October 1948; "Reply to Mr Max Nierich," NATIONAL-ZEITUNG, 31 October 1948; "Not So Mr Selbmann?" NATIONAL-ZEITUNG, 5 December 1948.
13. INFORMATIONSBUERO WEST (IWE), 2 July 1952.
14. LDP-INFORMATIONEN, 1948, No 9.

15. J. Dieckmann, "Incidental Remark at the Ninth LDPD Central Executive Board Session, 24/25 July 1959," "Dokumente-Reden-Aufsaetze, Schriften der LDPD," No 25, East Berlin, 1982, pp 172 f.
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17. R. Agsten, "Johannes Dieckmann--His Way Through Socialism, 1945-1969," "Schriften der LDPD," No 11, East Berlin, 1974, pp 27 f.
18. "DIE WELT Asked--Dieckmann Replied," DIE WELT, 10 August 1956; "Free All-German Elections--Talk with People's Chamber President Dr Dieckmann," KONKRET, 1961, No 3, p 7.
19. "H. Muelier, Chairman of the Karl-Marx-Stadt Bezirk LDPD Association, Talking with the Kreis Chairmen of the Bezirk Association on 28 January 1954," Private Archives.
20. "H. Loch, LDPD and Criticism," DER MORGEN, 7 September 1952.
21. NEUER WEG, 20 January 1958.
22. H. Brandt, "Ein Traum der nicht entfuehrbar ist" [A Dream Not Subject to Abduction], West Berlin, 1977, p 209.
23. DER SPIEGEL, 1953, No 29, pp 5 f; 1953, No 35, pp 3 f. INFORMATIONSBURO WEST (IWE), 20 June 1953 and 29 May 1954; cf background: Preface of A. Baring, "Der 17. Juni 1953," Stuttgart, 1983, pp 8 ff.
24. Sergei S. Tulpanov, "He Placed Himself Along the Working Class," "Erinnerungen an Otto Nuschke" [Memoirs], East Berlin, 1975, p 107.
25. Politisches Archiv, Berlin-Grunewald, OKP 015, 1953: Otto Nuschke.
26. From Marianne Noack's diary, 25 March 1950, "Welt ohne Krieg" [World Without War], 1966, No 3, p 8.
27. Nuschke according to J. B. Gradl, "Anfang unter dem Sowjetstern" [Start Under the Soviet Star], Cologne, 1981, p 156.
28. W. Rehm, "Rearmament and Reunification. All-German Officers Contacts in the 1950's," Lecture before the "Germany Research Society," 28 February 1984. About to be published in 1984 in the compendium "Wiederbewaffnung in Deutschland nach 1945" [Rearmament in Germany after 1945].
29. "We Talked About a Confederation--Vincenz Mueller on Details in His Talk with FRG Minister Dr Schaeffer," NATIONAL-ZEITUNG, 23 November 1958; cf. NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, 15 November 1958, DIE WELT, 17 November 1958.
30. "Pankow Indirectly Confirms General Mueller's Suicide," DER TAGESSPIEGEL, 17 May 1961.

31. Cf. footnote 28.
32. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 8 March 1984; DER MORGEN, 6 March 1984.
33. DIE NEUE BONNER DEPESCHE, 1983, No 12, p 35.
34. DER MORGEN, 19 May 1983.

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CSO: 2300/489

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

DECREE ON CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER, ECONOMY

East Berlin GESETZBLATT DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK in German Part I
No 14, 15 May 84 pp 173-178

[Decree signed by Willi Stoph, Chairman, GDR Council of Ministers and Hans-Joachim, Heusinger, Minister of Justice, on 22 Mar 84]

[Text] In implementation of Article 3 and Article 43 Paragraph 1 of the Law of 12 January 1968 on Crimes Against Public Order and the Economy - OWG - (GBI I No 3 p 101), the following is decreed:

Section I

Infractions of State Order

Article 1

False Statements to a State Organ

(1) Anyone who deliberately makes a false statement on personal data to a competent state organ or authorized person or, contrary to duty, refuses information about himself, may be reprimanded or fined an amount up to M500.

(2) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the commanders of administrative offices of the German People's Police, the chairmen or competent full-time members of local councils.

Article 2

Damage to Public Announcements

(1) Anyone deliberately removing, damaging or defacing a public announcement by a state or social organ, a social organization or transportation enterprise, may be reprimanded or fined an amount up to M500.

(2) In the case of minor misdemeanors as per Paragraph 1, the authorized members of the German People's Police are empowered to issue a warning and impose a fine of M10-20.

(3) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the commanders of administrative offices of the German People's Police, the chairmen or competent full-time members of local councils.

Note:

If damage to public announcements impairs state or social operations or the preservation of public order, such acts may be prosecuted as felonies as per Article 223 StGB [criminal code].

Article 3

Breach of Custody

(1) Anyone deliberately and without authorization using, destroying, damaging or otherwise removing impounded and distrained objects or objects in official custody, or without authorization breaks or removes a seal applied on behalf of a state organ, may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the commanders of administrative offices of the German People's Police, the chairmen or competent full-time members of local councils.

Note:

A serious breach of custody may be prosecuted as a felony as per Article 239 StGB.

Section II

Infractions of Public Order and Safety Disruption of Socialist Relations

Article 4

(1) Anyone who deliberately disrupts the socialist mutual relations of citizens by

1. Causing disturbing noise or otherwise unduly annoying citizens,
2. Illegally causing minor damage to objects or facilities, or defacing them, or destroying or rendering unusable objects of minor value,
3. Organizing, supporting or in any way cooperating in a meeting liable to disregard social interests or impair public order and safety, or refusing to leave such a meeting when requested to do so by competent state organs,
4. Openly demonstrating or inciting disregard of laws and other legal regulations, state or social interests.
5. Using objects, symbols or other insignia in a manner conflicting with state or social interests,

6. Contravening instructions by competent state organs for safeguarding order and safety,
7. Committing other acts contrary to the general interests of the socialist society or the needs of citizens for legality, order and safety,

may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) Also to be called to account is anyone who carries out inquiries directed against laws and other legal regulations or their implementation, collects written statements, distributes or initiates them, or cooperates in such acts.

(3) If objects or facilities serving or freely accessible to the public are impaired by the misdemeanor as per Article 1 Nos 1 and 2, and if a more lasting educational effect on the offender is necessary, he may be ordered (either additionally or only) to contribute his labor to public service work.

(4) In the case of minor infractions, authorized members of the German People's Police are empowered to issue a warning and impose a fine of M10-20.

(5) Objects used or made to commit a misdemeanor as per Paragraph 1 Nos 3-7 may be confiscated in addition to the imposition of a fine or as the sole punishment, and independent of the rights of third parties.

(6) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the commanders of administrative offices of the German People's Police.

Note:

Significant disruptions of socialist mutual relations may be prosecuted as crimes against state and public order or wilful destruction.

Article 5

(1) Anyone who deliberately and without good reason fails to comply with a request by the German People's Police for assistance in the defense against a direct threat to persons, objects or facilities, or does not comply adequately although able to do so without significant danger to his life or health or without infraction of important duties, may be reprimanded or fined M500.

(2) Also to be called to account may be anyone who, as a person in authority fails to comply with a request by the German People's Police for defense against or the removal of a threat to or disruption of public order and safety, or hinders or obstructs the necessary measures.

(3) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the commanders of administrative offices of the People's Police.

Article 6

Breach of Domestic Peace in Public Buildings

- (1) Anyone who deliberately and without authorization enters public buildings or enclosed sites or lingers there without authorization, may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.
- (2) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the commanders of the administrative offices of the German People's Police.

Note:

Breach of domestic peace in public buildings committed by force, threats of force or repeatedly, may be prosecuted as a felony as per Article 134 StGB.

Article 7

Order and Safety in the Traffic System

- (1) Anyone who deliberately or negligently
 1. Contravenes the legal regulations enacted to safeguard order and safety in the railroad system or the regulations issued on their basis by the railroad,
 2. The service orders issued as per the regulations or instructions as per No 1,
 3. Without authority enters means or facilities for transportation or contravenes the regulations on staying in them, or
 4. Damages or misuses ticket machines or luggage lockers,may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.
- (2) In the case of minor infractions as per Paragraph 1, the employees so authorized by the organs and offices competent as per Paragraph 3 are empowered to issue a warning and impose a fine of M10-20.
- (3) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the commanders of the administrative offices of the German People's Police, the full-time members of kreis, city or city councils competent for traffic, or the managers of the competent management organs and offices of the GDR Railroad.

Note to Paragraph 1 No 3:

Forcible entry and threats of violence or repeated wrongful entry or unauthorized lingering in public means or facilities of transportation may be prosecuted as a felony as per Article 134 StGB.

Article 8

Inadequate Safety Measures With Respect to Construction or Demolition Measures and to Buildings

(1) Anyone failing deliberately or negligently to secure construction or demolition measures, construction sites, construction equipment and appliances, construction material stores, wells, shafts, excavations, cellars, openings or slopes may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the commanders of the administrative offices of the German People's Police or the competent full-time members of local councils and the competent managers of the State Construction Supervisory Authority.

Article 9

Endangerment of Livestock, Maltreatment of Animals

(1) Anyone who deliberately or negligently fails to carry out or does not comply with the measures for protection against endangering the health of livestock by epidemics, parasite infestation or other special threats, as instructed by central or local state organs or the managers of the veterinary specialist organs or specially authorized veterinarians as per legal regulations, may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) Also called to account may be anyone who deliberately mistreats an animal.

(3) In the case of minor infractions as per Paragraph 1, the managers or authorized employees of the veterinary specialist organs and, as per Paragraph 2, authorized members of the German People's Police or the managers of advisory councils for animal welfare and animal hygiene and veterinarians working in state veterinarian practices are empowered to issue a warning and impose fines of M10-20.

(4) In cases of infractions as per Paragraph 1, the conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the managers of the veterinary specialist organs and in cases of infractions as per Paragraph 2 of the commanders of the administrative offices of the German People's Police, or in the case of mistreatment of farm breeding or other livestock of the kreis veterinarians.

Note to Paragraph 2P:

Serious mistreatment of animals may be prosecuted as felonies as per Article 250 StGB.

Article 10

Infractions of a Ban on Activity

(1) Anyone deliberately infringing a court imposed ban on an activity may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the chairmen or competent full-time members of kreis, city, city district and communities.

Note:

Serious infractions of a court ban on activity may be prosecuted as a felony as per Article 238 Paragraph 2 StGB.

Article 11

Abuse in the Field of Legal Advice

(1) Anyone who deliberately and for remuneration handles other people's legal affairs without having the required license, may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the Minister for Justice.

Article 12

Misuse of Vending Machines

(1) Anyone who deliberately obtains the services of a public vending machine or selfservice facilities of the German Postal Service without paying for them may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) In cases of minor infractions as per Paragraph 1, authorized members of the German People's Police, in the case of misuse of self-service facilities of the German Postal Service authorized employees of the German Postal Service are empowered to issue a warning and impose a fine of M10-20.

(3) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of commanders of the administrative offices of the German People's Police. In the case of misuse of coin telephone boxes, stamp vending machines or other self-service facilities of the German Postal Service, the conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of managers of the respective post and telephone offices.

Article 13

Unauthorized Vehicle Use

(1) Anyone who, against the wishes of the authorized person, uses a motor vehicle or boat, driving of which requires a license, may be reprimanded or fined up to M500 if the effects of the act on the rights and interests of citizens or society and the culpability of the offender are minor, so that no felony is charged.

(2) Also called to account may be anyone who deliberately and against the wish of the authorized person, uses a bicycle or other vehicle, the use of which requires a license.

(3) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of commanders of the administrative offices of the German People's Police.

Note to Paragraph 1:

In other instances, unauthorized vehicle use may be prosecuted as a felony as per Article 201 StGB.

Article 14

Public Drunkenness

(1) Anyone who, in public, seriously offends decency or human dignity due to drunkenness or other objectionable behavior, or causes other disruptions of public order and safety, may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) Anyone who deliberately or negligently in the course of exercising a profession or trade

1. Dispenses or sells alcohol to drunk persons, or
2. Dispenses alcohol to persons who are obviously drivers of a vehicle

may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(3) In the case of infractions as per Paragraph 1, the conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the commanders of administrative offices of the German People's Police, of infractions as per Paragraph 2 the duty of the commanders of administrative offices of the German People's Police, the chairmen or competent full-time members of local councils.

Article 15

Misuse of or Damage to Alarm Installations

(1) Anyone who deliberately misuses or damages a public warning, reporting, signal or alarm installation or emergency calls, may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the commanders of administrative offices of the German People's Police or the chairmen or competent full-time members of local councils.

Note:

Serious misuse or damage to alarm installations serving fire or disaster fighting may be prosecuted as felonies as per Article 191 StGB.

Article 16

Defacement of Protected Cultural Objects and Objects of Nature Conservancy

(1) Anyone who deliberately defaces memorial sites, memorial tablets, memorials or other protected cultural objects and objects subject to nature conservancy, may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) Also called to account may be anyone who deliberately impairs or misuses the distinguishing marks of these objects.

(3) In cases of minor infractions as per Paragraphs 1 and 2, kreis council employees duly authorized by the chairman are empowered to issue a warning and impose fines of M10-20.

The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the chairmen or competent full-time members of kreis, city or city district councils.

Note:

Damage and other damaging effects on protected cultural objects may be prosecuted as felonies as per Article 12 of the Cultural Object Protection Law.

Article 17

Responsibility for Misdemeanors by Minors

(1) An adult inciting a child or adolescent to commit or participate in a misdemeanor, may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) The competence for the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings depends on the legal regulations, breach of which was the subject of the incitement.

Section III

Infractions of Economy Managing Measures

Article 18

Infractions of Fixed Hours of Opening

(1) Anyone who, in the capacity of manager or proprietor of a retail store, a restaurant or facility supplying or obtaining services for the public, infringes the opening hours fixed by the local councils, may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the chairmen or competent full-time members of local councils.

Article 19

Inadmissible Favor Shown With Respect to Providing Goods and Services

(1) Anyone who, as manager or employee of production, trade, service and other business enterprises or other facilities requests, accepts or allows him/herself to be promised monetary or other benefits for the unjustified or inadmissible provision of goods or services, may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the chairmen or competent full-time members of local councils.

Note:

Inadmissible favors coupled with the abuse of authority may be prosecuted as bribery as per Article 247 StGB.

Article 20

Infraction of Price Regulations

(1) Anyone who negligently

1. Initiates, demands or takes in another than the legally admissible price,
2. Submits another than the legally admissible and binding price offer for investment projects,
3. Fails in his duty to document the admissibility and computation of the prices charged by him (price documentation duty) or infringes his duty to display prices (price display duty),
4. Reports wrong data in applications, reports or notifications to price organs and thereby or in other ways obtains unjustified prices,
5. Fails to follow instructions by the price organs or obstructs their supervisory operations or makes them more difficult,

may be reprimanded or fined up to M10,000.

(2) Also called to account may be anyone who deliberately offers or grants another than the legally admissible price, or commits a deliberate act as per Paragraph 1 without causing substantial damage.

(3) Consonant with the legal regulations in effect, the additional proceeds obtained by excessive prices must be repaid to the injured parties or seized on behalf of the state budget.

(4) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of

- The director of the Price Office at the Council of Ministers,
- The state secretary at the Price Office,
- The deputies of the director of the Price Office,
- The manager of the Central State Price Control of Investments at the Price Office,
- The managers of departments and outside branch offices of the Price Office,
- The managers of price departments or sections at the local councils,
- The managers of fiscal and price control organs at other central state organs, who carry out price checks on behalf of the director of the Price Office.

Note:

Serious offenses against the price law may be prosecuted as felonies as per Article 170 StGB.

Evasion of Taxes, Levies, Other Payments to the State Budget
and Social Security Contributions

Article 21

(1) Anyone who negligently causes

1. Taxes either not to be fixed at all or fixed too low,
2. Taxes, levies or other payments to the state budget to be calculated and paid by the taxpayer not to be declared or reported at all or declared and reported in too low an amount,
3. In contravention of the legal regulations grants or allows favors in the fixing or collection of taxes or other levies,
4. Unjustifiably or in an unjustifiable amount applies for price subsidies or price equalization amounts, or calls on such subsidies or price equalization payments,

may be reprimanded or fined up to M10,000.

(2) Also called to account may be anyone who commits such an act deliberately but without causing serious damage.

(3) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the chairmen or competent full-time members of bezirk or kreis councils or the managers of financial organs in other central state organs, authorized by the Minister for Finance.

Article 22

(1) Anyone who negligently causes

1. Contributions to the compulsory social security and accident insurance not to be fixed at all or fixed too low,
2. Contributions to compulsory social security and accident insurance payable by the contributor not to be paid or paid in too low an amount,
3. Favors with respect to contributions to be granted or permitted in contravention of the legal regulations,

may be reprimanded or fined up to M10,000.

(2) Also called to account may be anyone who commits such an act deliberately but without causing serious damage.

(3) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the chairmen or competent full-time members of bezirk or kreis councils or the managers of financial organs in other central state organs, authorized by the Minister for Finance.

Note to Articles 21 and 22:

Deliberate offenses against the tax, levy or social security insurance law involving serious damage may be prosecuted as felonies as per Article 176 StGB.

Article 23

(1) Anyone who looks after or should look after his own or other parties' affairs with reference to taxes, levies or other payments, price subsidies, price equalization amounts or contributions to compulsory social insurance and, in so doing, deliberately or negligently infringes a legal regulation issued in the interest of the ascertainment, fixing, safeguarding or collection of taxes, other levies, price subsidies, price equalization amounts or contributions to compulsory social insurance, obstructs or makes more difficult checks by financial organs in these fields, or fails to comply with an instruction given him, may be reprimanded or fined up to M10,000.

(2) Anyone who deliberately and without permit against reward aids with tax affairs may be reprimanded or fined up to M1,000.

(3) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the chairmen or competent full-tims members of district and kreis councils.

Article 24

Infraction of Duties to the State Audit Office

(1) Anyone who deliberately fails to comply or inadequately complies with instructions by the State Audit Office, gives wrong information, withholds or removes documents needed for auditing or in any other way obstructs audits by the State Audit Office, may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the director of the State Audit Office and the managers of the State Audit inspectorates or the managers of fiscal organs in other central state organs authorized by the Minister for Finance.

Protection of the Currency and of Postage Stamps

Article 25

(1) (1) Anyone who deliberately, without intending to prepare forgeries, but without permission makes, keeps or passes on, or makes or passes on copies of the instruments listed below, may be reprimanded or fined up to M1,000. The following are the items involved:

1. Paper looking exactly like that used to produce GDR currency and recognizable by external features,
2. Stamps, seals, engravings, plates and other tools capable of being used to imitate or forge currency (notes or coin) of the German Democratic Republic or foreign currencies, or valid postage stamps, metered postage and international reply coupons,

3. Prints or illustrations looking exactly like GDR currency or foreign currency or valid postage stamps, metered postage and international reply coupons,
4. Prints or illustrations capable of subsequently being so changed as to look exactly like GDR currency or foreign currencies or postage stamps, metered postage and international reply coupons,
5. Tools capable of being used for the manufacture of such prints or illustrations.

(2) The items used for commission of the act or produced by them may be confiscated regardless of the rights of third parties.

(3) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the competent representative of the president of the GDR State Bank; if the infraction concerns the security of postage stamps, metered postage and international reply coupons, of the managers of district directorates of the German Post Office.

Article 26

(1) Anyone who, having in good faith accepted imitated, forged or withdrawn GDR currency or foreign currencies or postage stamps, metered postage and international reply coupons, deliberately offers them as genuine or still valid, or causes them to be turned over after having recognized them as imitated, forged or withdrawn, may be reprimanded or fined up to M500.

(2) Currency, postage stamps, metered postage and international reply coupons in the meaning of Paragraph 1 are to be confiscated.

(3) The conduct of disciplinary proceedings is the duty of the competent representative of the president of the GDR State Bank; if the infraction concerns the security of postage stamps, metered postage and international reply coupons, of the managers of district directorates of the German Post Office.

Note to Articles 25 and 26:

Offenses against the protection of currency or postal stamps may in other instances be prosecuted as felonies as per Articles 174 and 175 StGB.

Article 27

Increased Fines

A fine up to M1,000 may be imposed for deliberate misdemeanors as per Article 2 Paragraph 1, Article 4 Paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 5 Paragraph 2, Article 6 Paragraph 1, Article 7 Paragraph 1, Article 8 Paragraph 1, Article 9 Paragraph 1, Article 10 Paragraph 1, Article 11 Paragraph 1, Article 12 Paragraph 1, Article 14 Paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 15 Paragraph 1, Article 16 Paragraph 1, Article 19 Paragraph 1 and Article 24 Paragraph 1, if

1. Serious damage was caused or could have been caused,
2. Social interests were grossly disregarded,
3. State or public order and safety were seriously affected, or

4. The offense was committed for personal gain or repeatedly within 2 years and a fine was imposed.

Article 28

(1) In effect for the conduct of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of fines is the Law¹ of 12 January 1968 on Crimes Against Public Order - OWG - (GBI I No 3 p 101).

(2) A citizen of the German Democratic Republic may be called to account as per Articles 2, 4, 6, 7, 12 through 17 and 25 through 27 even if he commits the misdemeanor abroad.

Article 29

(1) This decree takes effect on 1 July 1984.

(2) Losing effect on the same date are:

- The decree of 16 May 1968 on Misdemeanors (GBI II No 62 p 359; Ber No 103 p 827),
- The Second Decree of 15 September 1971 on Misdemeanors (GBI II No 67 p 577),
- No 1 of the attachment to the Decree of 11 September 1975 to the Amendment of Regulations on Fines (GBI I No 38 p 654),
- Article 20 Paragraph 1 of the Decree of 5 January 1984 on the Management and Conduct of Public Passenger Transportation - Passenger Transportation Decree (PBVO - (GBI I No 4 p 25)).

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Law of 12 January 1968 on Crimes Against the Public Order - OWG - (GBI I No 3 p 101), in the version of the Foreign Exchange Law of 19 December 1973 (GBI I No 58 p 574), the Law of 19 December 1974 on the Amendment of the Criminal Code, the Adjustment Law and the Law on Crimes Against the Public Order (GBI I No 64 p 591), the Law of 28 June 1979 on the Amendment and Supplementation of Criminal and Criminal Procedural Regulations and the Law on Crimes Against the Public Order (Third Criminal Code Amendment Law) (GBI I No 17 p 139) and the Law of 25 March 1982 on the Social Courts of the German Democratic Republic - GGG (GBI I No 13 p 269).

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CSO: 2300/495

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

WORKER ENTHUSIASM RESULT OF INCREASED REMUNERATION, BENEFITS

East Berlin NEUE JUSTIZ in German No 4, Apr 84 pp 129-132

[Article by Dr P. Sander, senior scientific assistant, and Prof Dr W. Thiel, Section for Jurisprudence, Humboldt University, Berlin: "Scientific Technical Progress and Socialist Labor Law"]

[Text] Without scientific-technical progress, social progress is impossible. To enhance the economic and social efficacy of scientific-technical progress and organically combine the advantages of socialism with the accomplishments of the scientific-technical revolution therefore is the declared policy goal of the working class party. To this end it is important--in terms of the economic strategy issued at the 10th SED Congress--"to take another step"¹ to create an efficient material-technical base that makes possible stable economic growth and high labor productivity and efficiency in public labor. Public production intensification is what mainly leads there.

To manage, organize and structure these processes is a major task for our state and our law. It also is a challenge to jurisprudence; it being a matter, after all, of fully exhausting the potentials in socialist law for accelerating the scientific-technical progress while determining its limits.³ All legal branches are advised to engage in conceptual deliberations about the connections between scientific-technical progress, the possibilities and requirements for its acceleration, and their own responsibilities in that.

Approaches in Law Theory to Examining the Influence Potential of Labor Law on Accelerating Scientific-Technical Progress

To settle the question about the use and efficacy of socialist labor law in accelerating scientific-technical progress one has to proceed from two basic positions: (a) Scientific-technical progress ultimately is the decisive basis for social progress,³ and (b) scientific-technical progress controls the decisive function in the total conversion of the economy to the intensive course of growth.⁴

If in that connection the potentials of labor law are to be disclosed, one must not start with the scientific-technical progress "as such" but with the social process of shaping it.

The application potentials of labor law and its function, which ensures, regulates and possibly also promotes scientific-technical development, can only come out of the production relations, which in the final analysis are none but the necessary form of motion in the productive forces. To find out what labor law can objectively effect in this process, one must proceed from the level we have reached and the development obtainable from labor relations (as a manifestation of the production relations), hence from the social relations that form the core of what labor law is regulating.

We agree with K. A. Mollnau, that even under the conditions of the scientific-technical revolution there is no reason "to place in doubt, directly or indirectly, the definition of the Marxist-Leninist theory of law, that what law has to regulate evolves from class society relations."⁵ Labor law also neither regulates technology nor technical labor relations.⁶ Nor does it affect technical development itself directly. What it can effect, however, is a certain attitude by the working people on the development, assignment and use of the technology, and thus a certain production mentality or--in the broader sense--the labor mentality. The people's attitude toward scientific-technical progress is something that also has to be "produced."

We shall seek to suggest the labor law potentials for forming working people's attitudes adequate to social labor relations and their development in some points, and we proceed from the following:

1. Labor law asserts itself, as all other law, "not by itself, as a speed-up factor in scientific-technical progress,"⁷ but only through interaction with many other factors.
2. Labor law can have the effects that emanate from it and are formulated in its tasks only if they conform with material conditions, if it itself conforms to them in substance and does not function as a "surrogate" for economic solutions. Relations shaped by law, if law is to have positive effects on them, must always conform to materially "produced" attitude conditions.
3. Also in connection with scientific-technical progress, a growing or active role of law always only means activating the subjects involved in the labor law relations, i.e., mainly the working people with our without managerial authorities. It is to be ascertained whether and to what extent labor law can become an impulse⁸ for motivating the working people, in conformity with the qualitatively new demands placed on labor relations, to act more and more creatively.⁹ Here also must be taken into account that new or active behavior must come out of the material relations and can only on that basis be enforced by various forms of management.

One at times can hear it said "that socialist labor law, as an important official management tool" had to "make a fundamental contribution also to scientific-technical progress in the GDR."¹⁰ That is at least illusory and is not going to improve our understanding of the actual possibilities and effects of labor law.¹¹ We are announcing doubts of principle about this thesis that labor law can directly affect the acceleration of scientific-technical progress.

Intensively expanded reproduction as the "permanent form of motion in the economy" and the requirement for "uninterrupted rationalization," scientific-technical progress being its decisive means, primarily lead to qualitative changes in labor relations.¹³ That also is the substantive and methodological starting point for examinations in the science of labor law of the relation between scientific-technical progress and labor law.

While there is and can be no direct connection between scientific-technical progress and socialist labor law, there does yet exist one connection that proceeds via the dialectic between the working attitude and working relations--i.e. via that which labor law regulates. Therefore the science of labor law must clarify which objective effects scientific-technical progress exercises on the working people's work attitude and on socialist labor relations, and which demands therefore have to be made on the implementation, and finally the enactment, of law in the labor law field.

This shall now be demonstrated with regard to some key points:

Scientific-Technical Progress, Socialist Democracy and Labor Law

Scientific-technical progress makes qualitatively new demands on the perfecting and spreading of socialist democracy. It requires "in tendency an increasing 'democratization' of scientific-technical creativity and economic creativity as such."¹⁴ This makes it necessary to strive for expertise in management (including industrial one-man management), in official management and in the working people's sharing of it.

Industrial one-man management and an expert management-sharing by the working people are two sides of one and the same democratic process. One-man management (and not only the sharing in it) is profoundly democratic in nature as it embodies, as a decisive form of the exercise of political power, the democratic nature of the socialist state.¹⁵

Only when one understands democracy like that can one get the correct political idea for enhancing the efficacy (also) of labor law and its potentials for contributing to the implementation of scientific-technical progress. But if one places one-man management in opposition to socialist democracy,¹⁶ one runs the risk that socialist democracy in the enterprise is simply reduced to the working people's sharing of it or as a democratic appendage to one-man management, brought in from the outside, as it were.¹⁷

When trade union rights are incorrectly interpreted in terms of law policy, it is clearly due to a conception of democracy we cannot share. Especially the greater expertise thanks to scientific-technical progress and the creativeness of all working people require and make possible a responsible exercise of all participatory rights set down in the Legal Code. Trade union rights--exercised creatively and constructively--never inadmissibly constrict the manager's elbow room but are, in conformity with the democratic essence of socialist labor relations, authorizations aiding the manager in decision making, in the sense of the democratic exercise of power. The problem of the dialectic between management and shared management in the enterprise cannot be resolved by "more" management authority over against "less" democratic participation. Rather, this is a matter of shaping (also in terms of law) a unified democratic process, that of the democratic essence of socialist labor relations. Managers have to conform to that in their managerial and work attitude.

Enterprise managers and managerial associates, in particular, have to organize the working people's democratic participation--also by means of labor law regulations--in such a way "that it is not confined to the economic and social processes but also relates to the various aspects of introducing new technology and technological prerequisites."¹⁸

Scientific-Technical Progress, Work Attitude and Labor Law

Of the highest significance to organizing all socialist labor law is the realization of economists and sociologists that scientific-technical progress "produces" or requires an entirely new work attitude. H. Nick writes: "Under the conditions of increasing automation, the relation between man and his tools changes fundamentally. Man releases himself from being tied in technologically with the production process. Man-machine relations become more elastic in tendency. Not the technological processes are what concretely controls the work attitude. Altogether, the possibilities for external controls over the human work attitude is reduced, so that inner motivation, an inner impulse for work, becomes more important."¹⁹

At the same time, the effects scientific-technical progress has on the technological specifics of the labor functions certainly are contradictory; even opposing tendencies can be found there. Despite the fact that the possibilities for externally controlling human work attitudes are reduced and a conscious attitude toward work becomes increasingly important, technological discipline gains an overriding significance, "i.e. strictly following technical instructions--including safety provisions--for the enterprise and the servicing of the installations. Many technical changes make labor operations technologically more and more specific, in the sense that the kind of operating, the speed and the sequence are to a large extent prescribed by the technical system in use."²⁰

These distinct tendencies depend, not last, on the degree of technization itself so that, although inner motivation becomes more important, the strict external "technological" discipline by no means becomes immaterial. The effects resulting from that for labor law and its implementation are as diverse as they are differentiated.

The first thing to stress is that a creative work attitude is even under socialist conditions not automatically produced by scientific-technical progress. Even socialist labor relations need managerial influence with specific legal means. The ways and means of such an influence depend, naturally, on the level of labor relations achieved. And so the implementation of labor law in this connection, it seems to us, has to be focused especially on the following :

First, it is a matter of stimulating the working people's creative work attitude.

The creative work attitude needed especially also for handling and coping with scientific-technical progress cannot be demanded by means of labor law norms; material and moral incentives are needed for that. This calls for a complex use of labor law provisions--wage and bonus regulations, working hour and labor safety regulations, all the way to enforcing the demands for cultural and welfare care in the enterprise. Yet such a work attitude is not induced only by economic

levers and other forms of recognition, but also by the forms of labor law responsibility. Applying labor law liability in line with the legal policy concern of the Legal Code is imperative for developing social activity based on proper standard conduct.

Labor law, it seems to us, has all it takes to affect socialist work attitudes with regard to both objective conditions and subjective factors. That also is the reason why we should primarily aim at enhancing the efficacy of regulations in force in connection with the scientific-technical progress. Legal regulations in force should be amended only when there is evidence they obstruct progress or fail to help implement the functions of socialist law.

Second, it is a matter of stimulating work performance aimed at or relating to the acceleration of scientific-technical progress. The key question there is how we can best enforce through labor law the unity of the attitude, stimulation and rating of performance.

Unarguably, scientific-technical progress makes new qualitative demands on all working people, and this with regard to their attitude and conduct in the labor process. For all that, there are still specific labor tasks or at least certain characteristic features of labor tasks calling for special levels of skills, responsibility, capabilities and facilities in engaging in scientific-technical work. Normative labor law largely conforms to those requirements, e.g. through regulations on functional plans, forms of material and moral incentives and so forth.

This then mainly concerns the management and stimulation of the creative activity of the working people concerned, oriented to targets, to achieve maximum scientific-technical results through a rigorous application of law in the enterprise (e.g. by setting down performance parameters and in rating performance as produced). One will have to analyze how much existing regulations suffice or are effective, but also if there are other areas where more favorable conditions could be created for creative labor. And even when the conditions are sufficiently regulated by the law, one must check and see whether enough is made of the potentials of legal influence on the working people's attitudes in accordance with requirements and the set of legal tools is used to the fullest.

Third, more of a challenge to and stimulation of collective labor performance.

Intensively expanded reproduction calls not only for a new work attitude by all involved in the labor process, but also for more collectivity. E. g., operating and servicing larger machine aggregates by work collectives is something that gains increasing importance through the further acceleration of scientific-technical progress.

This then also turns the position of the work collective in the production process into a legal problem. The liability of primary collectives, collectivity and democracy, collectivity and discipline, collective labor tasks, forms of collective wages, collective accountability--these are just a few key terms which, it seems to us, have to lead to considerations on how much the labor law position (the labor law status) of work collectives conforms in GDR labor law to future requirements. If it does, one will have to examine how regulations in

force are being used and, in particular, which experiences there are in those collectives that are extensively rationalizing. One must then also find out whether--with respect to primary collectives--further labor law rules are needed, i.e., whether through the influence of scientific-technical progress on the qualitative development of the labor relations the field of labor law application is expanding.

Fourth, it is a matter of reinforcing socialist labor discipline. It is gaining increasing importance in being a decisive manifestation and essential developmental criterion of work attitude. That also includes, not last, the technologically conditioned discipline as imperative for a creative work attitude.

Scientific-Technical Progress, the Substance of Work and Labor Law

Scientific-technical progress affects the character of labor especially through the qualitative changes in the content of labor. The chief trends in that are "the reduction of heavy physical work and work that is dangerous to health, ensuring the most harmonious interrelations possible between physical and mental work, the enriching of labor with intellectual-creative elements, the reducing of mental routine, especially where the stress on nerves is high, and reducing simple activities that can be done with little knowledge on low levels."²³ By merely listing these things it becomes apparent that the implementation of labor law, especially the provisions on labor organization, labor discipline, wages and bonuses, but also the rules on vocational training and skills, have to take account of these chief trends. In structuring labor tasks and defining the substance of labor, Article 73 of the Legal Code, for example, is to be interpreted wholly in that sense.

Scientific-technical progress will not automatically "lead" to changes in the substance of labor; it requires them because demanding labor contents stimulate a creative work attitude by the working people as much as they are required for it. For all intents and purposes, normative labor law has to assume various contents of labor without discriminating; it does not "regulate" labor content, yet it can stimulate the requirements for labor tasks to become more intellectual, more creative, a more adequate rating of labor tasks in terms of wages, and other such things. Thus it does not meddle with the structure of labor content. One might consider, however, it seems to us, if and how, over long range, because of the differences in the substance of labor, a commensurate differentiating work attitude also might be feasible in normative terms (such as, e.g., the work attitude of those who work intellectually and creatively, or the work attitude of those who, through creating the scientific leads, directly affect the acceleration of scientific-technical progress).

For scientific-technical progress to "lead" to such substantive labor that requires a creative work attitude of the working people, the enterprises or the managers, in particular, have to meet a number of labor law obligations. In particular, substantive labor has to be combined into working tasks that
--induce performance and personality development,
--stimulate creative work attitudes,
--require high socialist labor discipline, and
--ensure well balanced proportions among the needed skill levels, the given job requirements, and individual work capabilities.

Simultaneously, the administration of labor law has to make sure that the progressive changes in the nature of the work performed (e.g., the elimination or, at least, the mitigation of hardships in labor or similar burdens on the working people) will in principle not lead to wage reductions, but that enrichments of labor assignments through skilled activities will be appropriately evaluated and stimulated.²³ Scientific-technical progress must be adequately reflected not only in creating and structuring labor tasks, but also in how they are handled in the labor contract. Enterprises ought to make more of arranging for more combined and complex work assignments in line with the criteria mentioned above. That includes the so-called planned job rotations, to avoid monotony, and raising the qualitative requirements for work assignments even when low requirement activity criteria must unavoidably be part of them.

Official managers and trade unions together have to see to it that enforcing the labor law in setting down and concluding contracts on work assignments always conforms to the requirements of the scientific-technical progress.

Scientific-Technical Progress, Working Conditions and Labor Law

The unity of scientific-technical progress and humanism, which is possible only under socialist social conditions, demands that all measures in implementing the scientific-technical progress also imply improvements in the working people's working conditions.²⁴

This is not an automatic process, however. It requires target-directed official management, not last by legal means. Labor law, through normative regulations and a commensurate administration of law, effects improvements of the working, learning and living conditions in labor relations and in the public relations closely combined with them. The labor conditions are the key. They include, among other things, the working tools, the labor objects, the technology, the labor safety, the labor organization as much as the duration and distribution of working time and the cultural and welfare care in the enterprise.

It is evident that the scientific-technical progress has a large share in determining the totality of the working conditions. Health protection and labor safety and their labor law stipulations are highly important to setting up the kind of working conditions that conform to scientific-technical progress while they also reflect the profoundly humanistic concern of socialism. "Health protection and labor safety aim not only at simply reproducing manpower, at maintaining life and health as such, but also at such working conditions and measures for social welfare, in material and in time, that can positively affect the whole personality of the working people in their development."²⁵

That is also served by the health protection and labor safety principles resulting from the "generalization of objective laws and essential traits of objective reality; they serve as a guideline in theoretical work, in jurisprudence, and in the practical implementation of health protection and labor safety in the enterprises."²⁶ That lends these principles, to be sure, a fairly high degree of abstraction. At the same time however, they are sufficiently concrete to express persuasively the need for taking account of the unity between scientific-technical and social progress.²⁷

Occasionally the health protection and labor safety principles have run into criticism.²⁸ It has been alleged that they do not satisfy the current requirements of scientific-technical progress: "They are imprecisely formulating the differentiated legal liability and the moral responsibility that goes with it, do not adequately account for the importance of the working people's education and training needed to enforce health protection and labor safety, and overestimate the possibilities now available to prevent accidents and sickness and make our technology safe."²⁹

Such criticism misconceives the nature and function of the health protection and labor safety principles. All it leads to is that industrial practice focuses on still existing shortcomings and that atypical specific manifestations and problems in enforcing industrial health protection and labor safety are taken to be the essence of the matter. As all other principles, however, the health protection and labor safety principles still have to "convey what socially significant action is expected, regardless of the concrete act taken by a given subject. Thereby they enable the individual to act in conformity with social interests."³⁰ They do not merely copy what exists; they direct theoretical and practical action by anticipating in an ideal sense the socially intended, relevant objective itself.³¹

Only against that background, the demand also, and especially, for a labor safety law that is intelligible and practically feasible is politically and legally justified.³²

FOOTNOTES

1. E. Konecker, "Bericht des Zentralkomitees der SED an den X. Parteitag der SED" (SED Central Committee Report to the 10th SED Congress), Berlin, 1981, p 49.
2. Cf., inter alia, K. A. Mollnau, ed., "Recht als Maßstab, Rechtstheorie unter den Bedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Revolution, Beiträge zum X. Weltkongress der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie" (Law as Criterion--Law Theory under the Conditions of the Scientific-Technical Revolution--Contributions to the 10th World Congress of the International Association for Legal and Social Philosophy), Berlin, 1981; K. A. Mollnau, "The Relations Between Scientific-Technical Progress and Law as a Research Task in Law Theory," STAAT UND RECHT, 1981, No 11, pp 972 ff; W. Linden/R. Osterland, "Scientific-Technical Progress--Socialist Law Development," STAAT UND RECHT, 1980, No 1, pp 24 ff (29); D. Seidel, "The Accelerated Implementation of Scientific-Technical Progress and the Tasks of Socialist Law," STAAT UND RECHT, 1981, No 5, pp 411 ff.
3. Cf. H. Nick, "Wissenschaftlich-technische Revolution," Berlin, 1983, p 93.
4. Cf. G. Mittag, "Economic Party Strategy--Clear Concept for Further Growth," EINHEIT, 1983, No 11, p 1006.
5. K. A. Mollnau, "Scientific-Technical Progress, Law, and the Image of Man," "Recht als Maßstab . . .," op. cit., p 79.

6. Dispute exists in labor law science on the so-called technical labor relations as objects of labor law regulations. For labor law and labor law science research this then raises the question how the more intensive interaction that combines with it between technical and labor law norms is to be rated, without advocating a "technicization" of labor law or a "legalization" of technology. K. A. Mollnau's approach [see footnote 5, pp 70 and 84 f] appears significant to us in this regard for law theory and law policy also in terms of future law research.
7. R.-W. Bauer/H. Dettenborn, "On the Contribution by Socialist Law to the Acceleration of Scientific-Technical Progress," "Recht als Maßstab," op. cit., p 88.
8. Cf. Authors' Collective under A. Kosing, "Dialektik des Sozialismus," Berlin, 1981, pp 248 f.
9. On labor law in its function as an impulse, cf. Authors' Collective under F. Kunz, "Sozialistisches Arbeitsrecht--Instrument zur Verwirklichung der Einheit von gesellschaftlichen, kollektiven und persönlichen Interessen," Berlin, 1980, pp 10 ff.
10. E.g. R. Sander/K. Schleuder/W. Sieber, "The Contribution by Labor Law to an Accelerated Implementation of Scientific-Technical Progress," WISSENSCHAFTLICHE ZEITSCHRIFT DER TECHNISCHEN UNIVERSITAET DRESDEN, 1983, No 2, p 159.
11. This all the less in as much as the examples adduced by Sander, Schleuder and Sieber [see footnote 10] to support their thesis are formulated solely as a criticism of the labor law in force and not substantiated through research on the efficacy of labor law. They write, among other things, that the consent demanded from the competent enterprise trade union management to raising wages within a given period for materially rewarding high achievements and granting a temporary task-related premium in the given period (Article 98 Paragraph 2 in the Legal Code) and the consent for industrial regulations in the field of health protection, labor safety and fire protection (Article 202 Paragraph 2 in the Legal Code) are regarded as "overdrawn," and yet they think that clarifying such problems could be a direct contribution to the acceleration of scientific-technical progress.
12. O. Reinhold, "Dynamics and Dialectics in the Development of Our Socialist Society," EINHEIT, 1982, No 11/12, pp 1162 ff (1166).
13. Cf. W. Schliesser, "The Conception of Developed Socialism in the Political Economy Doctrine of Socialism." WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT, 1983, No 5, pp 641 ff.
14. H. Nick, op. cit., p 117.
15. Cf. textbook "Marxistisch-leninistische Staats- und Rechtstheorie," 3rd ed., Berlin, 1980, pp 297 f; G. Schuessler/W. Weichelt, "Arbeiterklasse, Partei, Staatsmacht," Berlin, 1976, pp 48 ff (52).
16. Repeatedly in Sander, Schleuder and Sieber [see footnote 10].

17. Therefore, the concern expressed by Sander, Schleuder and Sieber [see footnote 10], that various trade union rights might inadmissible curb the margin for decision making by the one-man manager, would seem logical. On the labor law handling of the unity of management and shared management as an implementation of socialist democracy, cf. also H. Thieme, "Labor Law Responsibility and the Legal Obligation of One-Man Managers," NEUE JUSTIZ, 1983, No 4, pp 139 ff.
18. H. Schliwa, "On the Relation Between Freedom, Power and Democracy," "Staat und Recht in der entwickelten sozialistischen Gesellschaft" (GDR Conference on Constitutional Law and Jurisprudence, 18-20 November 1980 in Kleinmachnow), Berlin, 1981, pp 50 f.
19. H. Nick, op. cit., p 48.
20. Ibid., p 53.
21. In this context, labor law science would also have to raise the question about a creative risk attitude and a liability conception based on it. Significant impulses for thinking about that have come from D. Seidel, "Stimulating Creative Risk Decisions to Enforce the Scientific-Technical Progress by Means of Socialist Law," STAAT UND RECHT, 1978, No 6, pp 503 ff.
22. H. Nick, "Scientific-Technical Progress and the Substance of Labor," EINHEIT, 1980, No 11, pp 1136 ff.
23. Cf. H. Heintze, "Thirty Years of Conflicts Commissions," NEUE JUSTIZ, 1983, No 4, pp 137 ff.
24. Cf. G. Banse/H. Hoerz, "Scientific-Technical Progress, Philosophy and Law," "Recht als Maßstab . . .," op. cit., pp 105 ff (113 ff).
25. Textbook "Arbeitsrecht," Berlin, 1983, p 271.
26. Ibid., p 278, see also bibliography given at that place.
27. Cf. H. Rehtanz/G. Tietze, "Foundations and Principles of Socialist Labor Safety," "Arbeitsschutz" series, No 1, Berlin, 1981, pp 28 ff. Contains an account of the requirements of the scientific-technical progress for organizing labor safety (pp 22 ff).
28. E.g. by R. Sander, "Die Verantwortung des sozialistischen Betriebes fuer den Gesundheits- und Arbeitsschutz aus arbeitsrechtlicher Sicht," dissertation Jena, 1980, pp 86 ff and Sander, Schleuer and Sieber, [see footnote 10, p 161].
29. Sander, Schleuer and Sieber [see footnote 10, p 161]
30. D. Kirchhoefer, "The Concept of Principles in Marxist-Leninist Philosophie, DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE, 1974, No 4, pp 411 ff (416).
31. Ibid., p 428.

32. Cf. Sander, Schleuer and Sieber, op. cit., p 161. The examples for unintelligibility they provide are, however, inappropriate. The legal authority of the safety inspectors and the problem of quality guarantees are both intelligibly presented. Often it is a necessary jurisdictional form that one and the same complex is regulated on several normative levels; that by itself does not render a legal state of affairs unintelligible per se.

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CSO: 2300/513

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

MATERIAL INCENTIVES CENTRAL TO IMPROVED PERFORMANCE

East Berlin DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE in German No 4, Apr 84 pp 301-309

[Article by E. Schmidt and U. Dittmann: "Development and Effect of Socialist Morality in the Work Process Under Conditions of the Accelerated Implementation of Scientific-Technical Progress"]

[Text] Precisely in recent years have demands increasingly been raised for Marxist-Leninist ethics to be made more relevant to life and be more closely linked with practice. Highly diverse standpoints and ideas for solutions can be found here, as publications indicate, including especially also the debates carried on in the Soviet Union.¹ Here we shall not attempt to evaluate the various positions in that debate; we rather want to explain the view that the relation between scientific-technical progress in socialism and socialist morality has to be more strongly reflected by Marxist-Leninist ethics in order for us to be able to speak of its being adequately related to practice. Merely orienting to these problems is no longer enough today as more concrete statements are already required and are possible about the structure and function of this dialectic.

In discussing the connection between scientific-technical progress and morality in socialism, we can rule out any technological determinism. This rather is a specific manifestation of the general dialectic between determinism and freedom. The "German Ideology" comments on that as follows: "In reality, of course, what happened was that people won freedom for themselves each time to the extent that was dictated and permitted not by their ideal of man, but by the existing productive forces."² In other words: Social and personal freedom--and moral freedom as well, in our view--depend on the character and developmental level of the mode of production in its unity of productive forces and production relations. Social freedom is prerequisite to the personality development of the working people, including their moral development. Conversely, "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all"³ in socialist and communist society. In socialism these processes are inseparable from enforcing scientific-technical progress. The objective inevitabilities at work here are no barriers to but conditions for action. Free action by men, including the development of their moral freedom, is possible only in harmony with the deliberate utilization of objective social laws. Not until we accept that position, can the following questions be clarified:

Which moral problems arise while scientific-technical progress is being enforced? Which objective requirements and possibilities result for the development of moral awareness and conduct, and how must Marxist-Leninist ethics reflect these problems? This involves also a rating of scientific-technical progress from the viewpoint of ethics. Which function does socialist morality have in better coping with the increasingly complex reproduction conditions in socialist society? The "how" of production in socialism is increasingly decided by the conscious shaping of the totality of the reproduction conditions in their unity of natural, technological and socioeconomic determinants.

In discussing these problems we essentially confine ourselves to those determinants of moral development found directly in the production and labor process. In addition to a basic position on dialectical materialism, the development of interdisciplinary cooperation is required to resolve these questions. The point is that without knowing political economy, sociology, labor sciences and other disciplines, one can comment on these problems only in a very general way. The cooperation we are referring to is, however, not yet on the level it should be on.

Let us first turn to the question about the moral potential of labor in socialism under the conditions of scientific-technical progress. The dialectic of the character, substance and conditions of labor is an essential cornerstone for demonstrating, above all, the contradictory nature of moral development. These are the essential elements:

1. An accelerated introduction of science data in production causes the production processes to become increasingly objectivized. New problems arise for physical and mental activity, their interconnection, and their connection with new determinants for moral development. The more complicated theoretical principles for production objectively result in much higher demands being made on the technical skills and political-moral attitude of the working people. On behalf of efficient output, production processes must be coped with securely even if through partly or fully automated processes the working people's direct impact on them diminishes steadily.
2. Partly or fully automated production processes cause a functional change as between man and his tools. On the one side, the working people become more independent from technological coercion, wherefore their attitude, their risk readiness and their work motivation gain in importance. On the other side, not only new structures and types of work activities evolve, but mainly also new cooperation and communication relations among the working people. The working people's interdependence grows while the social division of labor is deepened though their spatial and temporal relations in the production process are frequently cut back. This requires new forms of collective labor. Too little attention is still paid to the diversity of cooperation relations in terms of their beneficial or inhibiting effects on personality and moral development; this wastes opportunities for coping with the social effects of scientific-technical progress.
3. Perfecting the production techniques and technology brings in a rapid growth of the basic assets allocations per working person and enhances the

economic effectiveness of human labor. Increasing production complexity gives the working people a high responsibility for the utilization of funds and the quality and quantity of output.⁴

These determinants in the developmental lines of revolutionary changes in techniques and of more effective forms in the division of labor and in cooperation in the labor process inevitably lead to new conditions and prerequisites for the labor and personality and moral development of the working people, yet they are not as such progressive, i.e. encouraging performance and personality formation. Such manifestations as not demanding enough or demanding too much, monotony or activities that are dangerous to health cannot simply be "compensated" for by the working people, nor are they incentives for high work achievements.⁵ The substance of labor and the labor conditions are essential for developing moral traits and attitudes in a worker. As part of overall social activity, the specific substance of labor is defined for the various working people in a given labor task; being concrete, it offers a lead for the leeway of action and the use of occupational skills, abilities and facilities. Even the possibilities to cooperate in the labor process above and beyond the scope of the work collective are not variable at will for the working people, so that the substance of labor as an experience potential and as "elbow room" are fairly limited for developing and forming skills and facilities and moral traits in a given worker. Even so, the substance of labor remains an essential basis for moral development even though it cannot get all it needs out of it. The mediating function of the concrete substance of labor for shaping and developing moral attitudes gains importance from the further socialization of production, labor and science. One must keep in mind, however, that there neither is a demonstrable linear connection between the dedication demanded by the content of labor and the development of stable personality traits nor does a certain content of labor produce an adequate moral stance.

Performance dedication and active moral conduct do of course not develop apart from the community, especially the work collective. They cannot do so simply by the limits an individual runs up against in handling tools and implementing objectives. This objective constraint on individual work is greatly mitigated by the integration of the individual with overall social labor. Through the cooperative nature of the division of labor process the working people are interconnected by way of their specific labor activities. These cooperation relations that find their full development only in socialism as planned and organized relations of comradely cooperation and mutual assistance in the production process, are the basis for the comprehensive application and perfecting of individual knowledge and skills. "In the planned cooperation with others, the worker sheds his individual constraints and develops his capacity for becoming a species-being."⁶ The conscious experience and shaping of these cooperative relations, particularly within the work collective, is necessary not only for doing one's work at one's job, but also as the stimulus for developing and rating moral conduct. Still too little attention is paid today to the diversity of cooperation relations in terms of their beneficial and inhibiting effects on personality and moral development.⁷

What has so far been said shows that the advantages of the socialist mode of production must be used deliberately for gaining social effects from scientific-technical progress, especially for moral development. What matters mainly is

to plan more long-range and implement more purposefully these social effects or "social benefits" by keeping in mind the implications this has for a change in the moral profile of the working people.⁸ In connection with that it is important to determine more accurately still what is meant by social effects and find a sufficiently adequate criterion that will include the moral development of the working people. There are no uniform conceptions on that as yet today.

While economists mainly point to the importance of improving working and living conditions,⁹ to many working people the crucial social effect lies in personal material incentives. Sociological surveys come up with diverse results on this matter, however. One such sociological survey in the Soviet Union ascertained as the most important the improvement in working conditions; remuneration came second, and what was held to be important after that were the diversification and attractiveness of work.¹⁰ Sociological surveys in the GDR, however, find personal material incentives to be the crucial criterion. That is quite in line with the social, mainly the economic, stage of development of socialism. As a sign of moral development one may perhaps also rate the fact that for most of the persons surveyed the money is not the only motive for good work, but there is also the desire to develop one's own capabilities, and then there is a strongly developed need for the social utility of the labor.¹¹

Social effects, it seems to us, must be gaged against the objective conditions the working people have for the all-round development of their personality as well as against the use made of those potentials. There is no straightforward connection between the quality of working and living conditions and personality development. What is decisive is that the social demands made on the working people¹² due to the changed working conditions because of scientific-technical progress are coped with at an optimum. By coping with them at an optimum we mean the sort of social action that serves both the immediate social requirements and well understood personal interests, mainly the personality development. It is especially important to achieve this social effect in R&D. Thus it would not only be an economic but also a social effect, of crucial importance to the development of the working people concerned, if the contradiction could be resolved between the abilities and actual performance attitude in a large number of members of the scientific-technical intelligentsia.¹³

What are the conclusions from these remarks? First, that socialist moral development does not proceed on its own, is not automatic, but a lengthy and contradictory process. As there are positive as well as negative results of the scientific-technical progress (where we always have to determine concretely any given system of reference), there can also be positive and negative results in moral development directly or indirectly related to scientific-technical progress. The central problem is that the moral qualities that are crucial in socialism for coping with the scientific-technical progress have to be shaped still more purposefully. Furthermore, the labor activity and labor conditions have to be reorganized still more according to plan so they become the material foundation and an incentive for the working people's actions and thereby encourage personality and moral development.

What possibilities arise for shaping socialist morality in the working people's consciousness and actions under the conditions of the accelerated implementation of scientific technical progress? In socialist society, policy is the stimulus for moral progress. The SED's strategic political objective of elevating the material and cultural standard of living of the working people on the basis of increased labor efficiency and productivity is impossible to implement without moral components. Morality, especially labor morality, acts as a means for it. Even so, morality is not first and foremost a means. Enforcing it among the working masses is in itself a goal or purpose. The more moral conduct works in coping with the scientific-technical progress (is a means), the more it also changes the working people, shapes their value concepts, moral needs, and cultural demands made on life, and thus becomes a goal (purpose). The party presupposes such a conscious self-reliant conduct and the shaping of moral subjectivity--in the sense of moral freedom--among the working masses as a condition for achieving political goals while it seeks to further develop these moral qualities. The working people in the developed socialist society, on objective and subjective conditions, are ever better able to view the economic and social effects of scientific-technical progress in their social as well as well understood personal interest, take part deliberately in implementing them and control them, all the way to an ever more conscious shaping of their own lives, the development of an active position in life, the all-round development of their capabilities and the cultivation of their needs and their ever more complete satisfaction.

The possibilities for developing certain moral traits are greatly dependent on an individual's social position. Not only the function of the working people as the social proprietors of the means of production, but also the concrete situation they run into as producers and their role in the social organization of labor, the manner in which they obtain, and the size of, their share in public wealth are all factors of importance to moral development. Here the living conditions and the ideological position also affect the morality formation processes. And then there are factors that have a direct effect in the labor process itself. Among them are the effects of the further socialization of production, labor and science, which in socialism produces the historic conditions for the gradual approximation of physical and mental, managerial and production work. The unity of the working people's productive labor and their exercise of power in socialism forms the basis for the process of rapprochement between the working class and the intelligentsia, which implies also some re-production of diversity and inequality.¹⁴ This results from the division of labor process, which then still has the characteristic feature that through whole groups of people being tied up with specific activities and functions, classes and strata reproduce themselves and that labor contents and activities themselves, due to the developmental stage of the material-technical base and the juxtaposition of various technological levels, show considerable disparities in terms of the available and actually assigned qualifications. Then there also are other contradictions resulting from the fact that the now economically still necessary going into the assembly-line principle in production goes hand in hand with obsolete ideas about the intra-plant division of labor that has to be accomplished. That leaves chances for using labor science knowledge unused, so that in the outcome for a part of the working class and between the working class and the scientific-technical intelligentsia, along with the objectively determined contradictions (such as between highly skilled and less skilled labor), others are also being reproduced for which there is no need anymore.

This state of affairs under consideration provides management activity with the task to handle and resolve objective contradictions between the working class and the scientific-technical intelligentsia by turning them into an impulse for enforcing our economic strategy and a spur to social and individual development. That equally applies to the dialectical interrelation between identity and distinction in the moral profile of both social groups.

Socialist morality is undeniably developing both in the working class and in the scientific-technical intelligentsia. Yet it is not enough to formulate the general, the common features in this moral development; the dialectic between the general and the particular, after all, means that the general exists in various individuals. In connection with scientific-technical progress there are right now, along with general, also diverse demands being made on the moral profile of the worker and of the engineer. The scientific-technical intelligentsia in seeking the highest achievements demands an orientation to world standards (at least for some positions), an acceptable risk, far-reaching responsibility all the way to the social consequences of scientific-technical data and inventions and the readiness for adaptability. Those are, not last, demands made on moral conduct.

This process of course also places a higher moral challenge on the workers class. Its political-moral qualities as the leading class in socialist society develop and reinforce themselves primarily in the labor process. It does not mean, however, that each and every worker can in fact subjectively use, or uses, the opportunities objectively available to the workers class in exercising its power (e.g. getting involved in socialist democracy). On the other hand, we are not persuaded that the scientific-technical intelligentsia because of certain objective social demands has more favorable opportunities for shaping socialist morality in thought and conduct than the working class has. Thanks to its place in the production process, mind you, the workers class brings along fundamental prerequisites for such essential moral traits as discipline, collectivity, a sense of responsibility, solidarity, willingness for sacrifice, comradeship and mutual aid. Such moral attitudes must, particularly under the conditions of changed labor contents and the more complicated cooperation and communication relations in automated production processes, be more purposefully reproduced, and much more according to plan, than in conventional activities. Drawing the workers more into deliberately structuring their working conditions through innovator activity, and into management and planning, are no longer only possibilities here but objective requirements, to which party policy keeps orienting us. Ultimately it is a matter of multiplying the moral qualities of the workers class and the socialist intelligentsia in socialist cooperative efforts in such a way that these advantages and potentials of socialism comprehensively come into their own.

There is no disagreement in Marxist literature about the indispensable function of morality as a driving force in ideas which, through perfecting personality and developing socialist collectives, affects the scientific-technical and economic processes. Moral impulses basically work together in socialist society with their dialectical opposite, material incentives in the form of the socialist performance principle. An adequate material equivalent of any given performance can also be a moral incentive, in terms of the identity of opposites. Inadequate wages violate the performance principle. Morality can do little good there. And

even worse: it opposes the development of modes of thinking and conduct commensurate with socialism. None but the unity of material and moral performance incentives through the use of the performance principle develops the various working people's personal interest in high achievements--particularly also with regard to new scientific-technical solutions.

The principle of "each according to his capabilities" expresses the opportunities inherent in socialism for personality development as much as the political-moral demand society makes on its members to actually make use of these conditions. That not all working people are living up to that yet, it seems to us, is due not only to unfavorable effects of labor contents but also to deficiencies in work and moral education. Often the working people's personal motives and interests are still insufficiently taken account of by their managers and inadequately stimulated, materially or morally. That applies, e.g., to promoting risk readiness, seeking new solutions, and striving for top achievements on the part of the scientific-technical cadre.¹⁵ Refusing to measure everything with the same yardstick but material and moral recognition for high achievements, appropriate "penalties" for poor results, the daring to differentiate still more, deliberately heightening the social prestige of the scientific-technical intelligentsia, material and moral incentives for its self-reliance and responsibility--all these are necessary prerequisites for producing the sort of scientific-technical accomplishments that can strengthen the positions of socialism, domestically as in the international arena.

The dialectic between equality and inequality in the performance principle follows, for one thing, from the same yardstick being applied to people who differ in abilities and achievements. Then it also results from the identical position of the working people as the public proprietors of the means of production, on the one side, and their inequality as producers on account of the degree of maturity in the mode of production, on the other. This dialectical contradiction can and must be used as an inducement of labor discipline.¹⁶ For developing socialist work morality it is significant too, it seems to us. The overlapping element in forming a working people attitude marked by comradeship and mutual aid in all sectors of the economy is rooted, after all, in their identical relation to public property. That the working people differ in knowledge and skills and that they are doing all sorts of different work by no means precludes the communalism in their basic political-moral stance, e.g. their all being aware of being socialist proprietors. Social equality as well as the inequality due to objective and subjective causes function as productivity factors inherent in socialism, which do not lead to thinking in terms of competing but of productively contesting and comparing one's strength in socialist emulation. Essential is that a moral rating must complement the economic rating, as it were, to take into account uneven natural and social preconditions for any given work performed.¹⁷ Not only the economic effect, the seeking after performance also, individual effort, is respected by socialist society and has a positive effect on the further shaping of socialist work ethics. Moral evaluation provides an understanding for objective requirements in that it appreciates not only highly skilled and complicated labor, but also simple and heavy physical work, indispensable for society yet still not finding any substitution for human labor by technology or an opportunity for progressively changing the nature of the work. Workers who are still working under hard conditions or are not assigned according to their skills because the material-technical prerequisites for that are not sufficient as yet, are undoubtedly

articulating a justified moral claim to finding a progressive solution for that situation. This reflects an essential feature of socialist morality altogether: Moral is what benefits society and offers the individual much room for unfolding his interests, capabilities and inclinations. Morally dubious, on the other hand, are attitudes by individuals that satisfy personal interests and claims at the expense of society or at the cost of others. When some scientific-technical measures, along with higher economic effects, also lead to a temporary increase in monotony, try the nerves in the work process that cannot at once be remedied for objective reasons, the achievements by the working people concerned should, not last, also get some special moral recognition.

Personality development, along with the unfolding of capabilities, also has to do with developing "reasonable" needs in line with socialism. We like to endorse the standpoint expressed in Soviet literature, that "reasonable needs" are such that promote the all-round development of personality. That includes ethical needs too. "That there are ethical needs means that personal inclinations coincide with demands raised by moral duty."¹⁸ Such ethical needs, it seems to us, express themselves most concretely as needs for the social utility of work performed and for responsibility, in the will to perform and the willingness to take risks and so forth. Moral impulses arise from there for an accelerated implementation of the scientific-technical progress, even under the proviso that a lot of work is still not such that the work can become a need, let alone a vital need. The relation with one's work hence is determined not only by the nature of the work but also by the economic and social position of the working people on the whole. Here morality plays a significant mediating role.

The decisive trait of personality development lies in increasing awareness, especially in the knowledge and political-moral identification with any given social requirements and the development of activities to implement them. Social and personal freedom enlarge in this process objectively. That provides moral conduct with a quality so that one can talk of moral or ethical freedom in practical public life. By moral or ethical freedom we mean the aware, independent, creative activity of personalities and collectives that relies on objective social requirements and proceeds from the norms and values of socialist and communist morality. This activity goes on in the various sectors of public life and is equally important for social and personal development. Ethical freedom, it seems to us, embraces more than the characteristics often mentioned in literature, of awareness and voluntariness.¹⁹ In contrast to the lowest level of human history, when individuals were hanging directly on the "umbilical cord" of society and had no autonomy, communist society is marked by a form of collectivism in which man can and should fully develop his moral subjectivity. This subjectivity presupposes the existence of an individual who has gained a certain degree of individual freedom and some autonomy over against his environment and develops his talents and inclinations, his individuality.²⁰ An individual finds social conditions as givens in which he makes decisions, more and more independently and creatively, both on his share in coping with public demands and, in connection with that, on his shaping his personal life. In this he can make an optimum contribution to the implementation of scientific-technical progress--while proceeding from the conscious knowledge of social concerns and his own personal capabilities and potentials.

In drawing a conclusion from the problems dealt with, the following may be stated: In the substance and scope of its effect, socialist morality is ultimately determined by the degree of the society's maturity, especially by the scientific-technical progress that has taken hold in it. Without scientific-technical progress and the economic development it gives rise to there is no social progress and, hence, no basis for an all-round personality development for the working masses. The inevitable unity of economic effectiveness and humanism in socialism, for all that, does not explain disparities and contradictions and, in some respects, even reversals in moral development in certain sectors of our public life or in some people. For that reason we must consciously seek, along with the economic, also the social effectiveness of scientific-technical progress, in particular also with regard to its function in promoting morality.

Socialist morality is always linked with men's active public conduct; in that sense then it depends directly on the degree of personal freedom. Especially on that level there are various alternatives for action that have to be made still more conscious in order for them to be used in the sense of an ever better control over social and personal living conditions. A task of Marxist-Leninist ethics should be to do more research about these processes through interdisciplinary cooperation with other social sciences on behalf of closer ties with practical life and of further elaborating theoretical positions.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. contributions in the rubric "Discussions and Judgments," VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 2, 1982.
2. K. Marx/F. Engels, "The German Ideology," "Werke" (Works), Vol 3, Berlin, 1958, p 417.
3. K. Marx/F. Engels, "Communist Manifesto," "Werke," Vol 4, Berlin, 1959, p 482.
4. Cf. "Probleme der Teilautomatisierung und Automatisierung in der entwickelten sozialistischen Gesellschaft. Studie der Sektion Arbeitswissenschaften der Technischen Universitaet Dresden," 1979, pp 111 f (Printed Manuscript).
5. Cf. T. V. Riabushkina/G. V. Osipova, eds., "Soviet Sociology" (in Russian), Vol 2, Moscow, 1982, p 36.
6. K. Marx, "Das Kapital," Vol I, K. Marx/F. Engels, "Werke," Vol 23, Berlin, 1974, p 349.
7. Cf. Authors' Collective under F. Macher, "Wissenschaftlicher Fortschritt und Inhalt der Arbeit," Berlin, 1980, pp 31 ff.
8. Cf. F. Pleschak, "Effectiveness and Performance Increase Through Automation--Industrial Management Tasks, Problems, Solutions," WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT, No 3, 1983, p 580.
9. Cf. F. Pleschak/P. Krejcik, "Automatisierung aus oekonomischer Sicht," Berlin, 1982, p 22.

10. Cf. I. I. Leiman, ed., "Obshchestvennoye razvitiye i NTR. Ocherki metodologii ekonomicheskogo issledvaniya" [Social Development in the Scientific-Technical Revolution. Research Survey on Economic Methods], Leningrad, 1982, p 162.
11. Cf. H. Rabe, ed., "Wie steht es um Leistungsstreben, Initiative, Schoepfertum?" [What About the Performance Drive, Initiative, Creativeness?], Berlin, 1979, p 114.
12. Cf. F. Pleschak/P. Krejcik, op. cit., p 23.
13. Cf. D. Angelus/R. Pawelzik, "Driving Forces of Socialism--Driving Forces of the Scientific-Technical Progress," DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER PHILOSOPHIE (DZfPh), No 8, 1983, p 948.
14. Cf. "Lebensweise und Sozialstruktur. Materialien des 3. Kongresses der marxistisch-leninistischen Soziologie in der DDR" [The Way of Life and Social Structure--Materials of the Third Congress of Marxist-Leninist Sociology in the GDR], Berlin, 1981, p 82.
15. Cf. H. Hoerz/D. Seidel, "Verantwortung--Schoepfertum--Wissenschaft" [Responsibility--Creativeness--Science], Berlin, 1979, p 17; F. Adler/R. Winzer, "What Motivates for High Scientific-Technical Achievements?" EINHEIT, No 5, 1983, pp 457 ff.
16. Cf. S. E. Kapiwenski, "Developed Socialism--Current Labor Discipline Problems," FILOSOFSKIYE NAUKI, No 4, 1981, p 3.
17. Cf. H. Schliwa, "Performance and Humanism," DZfPh, No 12, 1982, p 1444.
18. B. N. Vorontsov, "On the Reasonable Needs of the Personality and Its Criteria," FILOSOFSKIYE NAUKI, No 3, 1983, p 25.
19. Cf. A. G. Chartschew/R. Miller, eds., "Ethik," Berlin, 1976, p 101.
20. Cf. J. Barna, "Freedom--Value--Moral Worth," DZfPh, No 8, 1977, p 971.

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CSO: 2300/513

BAN ON ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES IN GARRISONS URGED

East Berlin ZEITSCHRIFT FUER MILITAERMEDIZIN in German Vol 25 No 2, 1984 pp 86-88

[Article by Col R. Hornei MD and Lt Col G. Wagner MD, senior medical officers:
"Health Education and Capability--an Important Contribution to Fulfill the
Constitutional Right and Honorary Duty of Citizens for the Protection of the
Socialist Fatherland"]

[Text] Our people's socialist way of life and health are known to develop most solidly in peace.

For realizing the peace policy it is of principal importance for mankind that socialist society, headed by the Soviet Union, is a strong power of peace that has invested a lot in breaking imperialism's military supremacy and does not permit, and never will permit, a destruction of the military-strategic equilibrium with the devastating consequences that would have, or a military blackmail of socialism by NATO, especially by the United States.

The socialist armed forces are the instrument for this peace-preserving mission. What the target and purpose of our armed forces training are, was discussed by the minister for national defense, Gen Heinz Hoffmann, addressing executive NVA cadre early in February 1983 in Dresden. Among the things he said was this: "Our armed forces preparation serves the unequivocal purpose to allow imperialism no sort of military superiority, foil its war plans, and force, if possible, its abandoning any military adventures. Socialist armed forces have to be vigilant and combat ready to oppose the imperialist aggressor with determination."⁵

For fulfilling this responsible military mission, which is of great political consequence, class conscious, militarily well trained, and physically and psychologically capable soldiers, NCO's, warrant officers and officers are needed.

This alone makes health education relevant for the members of the NVA and the border troops of the GDR and the other protective and security organs. A healthy life-style, promoting health and maintaining health under the conditions of the service and of life, deliberate hygiene and active support of measures for medical care are the major emphases on health education in our armed forces.² It also is necessary to see to it that male youths and adults are healthy and physically and mentally capable when they enter their military service.

But also the reservists without service deserve our undivided attention, as it is important, after all, to encourage their political, sports and health development so that they can at all time and in every way meet the demands for our national defense.

You sometimes run into the notion a modern and highly motorized army like the NVA makes no special demands on the soldier's physical acumen; but that is mistaken and due to a misassessment of developments in military affairs.

In socialism the development of working and living conditions goes hand in hand with the gradual reduction of heavy physical work and an increase of mental demands in shaping the processes of life and labor. But in military affairs, what is crucial in the demands made on the soldiers is coping with highly developed combat equipment, the requisite coordinated collaboration among the various arms and services in the coalition armies, and the dynamism and severity of modern combat. That, logically, calls as much for greater intellectual-psychological demands as for greater demands for strength, speed and endurance.

Surveys in sports and performance medicine have told us¹ that physical capability is not likely to come without health, psychological stability, not without physical toughness. That is why we attach so much value in military service preparation not only to the regularly and individually required measures for the health protection of children and adolescents, especially medical and stomatological care, but also to all-round physical toughening in line with the demands military service makes for strength, endurance, dexterity and speed. We have rating criteria from the results of medical examinations of conscripts and reexamining their physical capabilities after having been called into active service. The results show how well an individual has prepared himself for the service.

We discussed all this already at the Sixth National Conference for Health Education.⁶ Our repeating it does not mean we have reason to be dissatisfied with our youth.

We are talking here about a greater effectiveness of the health education for youths in preparation for their military service because the army must objectively make higher demands on physical capabilities and some soldiers initially are not yet up to par.

Our minister is known to have stated at the 10th SED Congress, assessing the abilities and attitudes of our conscripts, that what they bring along was very uneven when called for active or reserve duty, but it mostly was good or even very good.³ However, we are addressing the preparatory tasks for military service also in view of the fact that the potential of recruits in our republic is going to fluctuate much in the next two decades. Yet the NVA's fighting strength and combat readiness depend on steady personnel replacement. To ensure that, year after year, for the formations and troop units, we shall in the future enlist more and more in older age groups.

For these young men who are not proceeding the traditional way of school-apprenticeship--army--occupation, the question about responsibly preparing for military service comes up in an entirely novel fashion.⁴ On the one hand, their school,

apprenticeship, and hence also their athletic, premilitary and GST training, are matters they dealt with quite some time ago; on the other hand, their personalities have developed, their habits have solidified, their experience in life has grown.

These are new conditions we have to take account of. As the minister for national defense put it at the Seventh Congress of the Society for Sports and Technology: "We shall pay more attention to reserve military service in the 1980's and 1990's." We must make sure that capable and operationally ready military units can always be replenished from the ranks of the reservists. That requires for them to be qualified and ready to serve as fully capable fighters on whom demands can be made up to their 35th year of age. Anyone can deduce for himself and his area of responsibility how important health education is especially for such citizens and how necessary it is to lead a healthy life and engage in sports.

Looking back at the Sixth National Conference for Health Education and developments in the GDR since then, we find social conditions have further improved for health education in preparation for the military service.

This development is reflected not only in the various legal enactments passed since, some of which, however, we may refer to:

- Rules on socialist defense education and premilitary training,¹¹
- the provision on periodic health checks for children and adolescents,¹⁰
- the accord on further improving medical care for people engaged in sports,¹⁴
- and the streamlined GST defense sports program for keeping reservists in good condition.¹²

All these documents together form a good legal or directional basis to meet the demands made on the preparation for military service as issued by the military service law.¹³ In active military service the point is, after all, to prove one's fitness through the demands made on combat readiness, on life under unusual conditions, constantly under physical and psychological stress.⁸

Such demands can be met only by someone who in preparing for his military service is willing to toughen his body, sharpen his senses and mold his psyche. To get there, one needs, among other things, to lead a healthy life.

The tasks arising out of this complex of the socialist way of life, living a healthy life, defense dedication and maintaining one's fitness require many efforts to be coped with, which we must carry out together.

Being realists, we can see not all young people yet understand that leading a healthy life is an indispensable condition and that a readiness for it in principle must be followed by concrete action. How hard it is to set effective examples for life-styles and health we know well enough from our own experience.

Persuasively conveying expertise, stirring up personal responsibilities, inducements to active involvement and using test situations are probably all needed to affect conduct permanently.

That realization induces us to carry on the pre-service health education intensively during the military service itself.

Health education in the armed forces means, in its proper emphasis, instilling discipline.

Not a suggestion, but an order is what starts successful action in an army.

The high fighting strength and combat readiness we need demand stipulations for forming and maintaining stable physical and psychological performance capabilities. To meet that requirement in the ordinary military service and to abide accurately by the rules set down in military regulations, health education in the army must not just be an appeal to reason and to political and moral responsibility, it also means, and mainly so, enforcing the commands and orders issued.

Health education is carried out in the NVA, the border troops of the GDR and the protective and security organs as

- an element of the military and political leadership by the superior officers,
- an educational and training task in military, political and specialized training,
- a subject of political mass efforts by the political, party and FDJ organizations,
- an area of sports and sports organizational measures by the ASV,
- an emphasis in health guidance and the training for medical orderlies, and
- a field of overall social responsibility for all soldiers within the framework of their rights and duties.

The crucial criterion and the goal to be attained in health education in the NVA and the border troops of the GDR manifest themselves in the contribution made to reinforcing military discipline and order, in a noticeable increase of fighting strength and combat readiness, and in the soldiers' physical and psychological fitness.

We have faced, and most successfully so, this obligation to reproduce military service capabilities and fitness⁹ and may refer, as evidence for it, to

- the increase in physical capability achieved during the military service,
- the evident improvement of the health conditions, and
- the instilling of hygienic behavior.

These examples are also pointing to key aspects of our health education. Then also we have taken measures against alcoholism. This problem, to put it plainly, also lies, if not primarily, in the questions of who drinks how much and what kind of alcohol. To ensure permanent combat and operational readiness, we want to prohibit the consumption of alcohol in the barracks and in preparation for the service. The military superiors, the political, party and FDJ organizations, and the medical service in their educational capacity must pay attention to alcohol being consumed at the wrong time and at the wrong place because the abuse of alcohol consumption not only impairs the health and capability of a soldier but also prevents him from spotting his target and hitting it with his first shot.

We may also say a word about our influence on smoking. Promoting non-smoking, it seems to us, is mainly an educational problem, but bans can only be issued when they are militarily justified, enforceable and controllable.

The fact is most young soldiers got into the smoking habit before they entered their service. It is also a fact that military service sooner curbs than favors smoking. And still it is hard to induce young smokers to give it up; only 18 months of basic service can hardly correct what could not be prevented in 10 years before, at home, at school and in vocational training.

To expect or even to demand an effective change in the attitude toward smoking during basic training is, in view of these facts, unrealistic.

Our target groups for doing something against smoking are mainly the career NCO's, warrant officers and professional officers who are trained to set examples as superiors, training officers and educators. We have been quite successful in this regard, as evidence shows, and shall carry on that way.

By way of summary: Leading a healthy life is not only an essential element of the socialist way of life, not only a basic prerequisite for personal well-being, but also, and not last, an expression of civic responsibility in being ready and able to bear arms for the protection of socialism. Seen that way, leading a healthy life cannot only be a personal decision but must also, emphatically, become and remain an official task and public mission.

The NVA, the border troops of the GDR and the other protective and security organs are willing to keep making an ever more effective contribution to that. Thereby we conform not only to the mission the public health minister, Prof Dr Mecklinger, assigned to military medicine,⁷ but also to our own need to have the fresh seed of insight in much of our educational work prior to military service ripen into the need for healthy living.

The needed stipulations and necessary prerequisites are laid down in legal and military regulations. Thereby, we think, the NVA and the border troops of the GDR are laying the premises on which we can keep building after the end of active military service.

FOOTNOTES

1. W. Bringmann, "On Some Aspects of Regular Sports Activities at Mid-Life in Relation to Health and Capability," MEDIZIN UND SPORT, Berlin, No 20, 1980, pp 134-138.
2. H. R. Gestewitz, G. Rehwald and K. Bartsch, "The Importance of Basic Medical Care in the NVA's Health Protection Organization," MILITAERMEDIZIN, Berlin, No 19, 1978, pp 98-100.
3. H. Hoffmann, "Paper Read at the 10th SED Congress," "Materialien des X. Parteitages der SED," Berlin, 1981.
4. H. Hoffmann, "Speech at the Seventh Congress of the Society for Sports and Technology (GST)," BULLETIN DES VII. KONGRESSES DER GST, 1982, pp 2-12.
5. H. Hoffmann, "NATO Arms Buildup Enforces Consequences for Socialist National Defense," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, Berlin No 38, 1983, 30, 5/6 February 1983.

6. R. Hornei, E. Pobbig and O. Bartz, "Public Requirements for the Health Education of Youth from the Vantage Point of National Defense," ZEITSCHRIFT FUER MILITAERMEDIZIN, Berlin, No 19, 1978, pp 57-58.
7. L. Mecklinger, "Welcoming Speech at the 10th Anniversary Celebration of the Society for Military Medicine in the GDR."
8. K.H. Orgelmeister, "Growing Demands on Military Service Preparation," MILITAERWESEN, Berlin, No 27, 1983, pp 39-41.
9. J. Scholtyssek and I. Koenig, "The Socialist Way of Life in the Armed Forces," MILITAERWESEN, Berlin, No 26, 1982, pp 100-102.
10. "Order on Health Care for Children and Adolescents," GBL, No 12, 1979, pp 91-92.
11. "Resolution of the Council of Ministers Presidium of 22 October 1976 on Introducing Defense Education."
12. "Streamlined Defense Sports and Fitness Maintenance Program for Reservists. GST Executive Committee Secretariat Resolution of 6 April 1982."
13. "Military Service Law, 25 March 1982," GBL Part I, No 12, 1982, pp 221-229.
14. "Accord on Further Improving Sports Medicine Care for the Population Engaged in Sports," MEDIZIN UND SPORT, Berlin, No 20, 1980, pp 133-134.

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CSO: 2300/504

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION, TRAINING FACTS SUPPLIED

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 6 May 84 p 4

[Unsigned article: "Religious Instruction, Ecclesiastical Press"]

[Text] We continue with the answers of Imre Miklos, chairman of the State Office of Church Affairs, to the questions omitted from the television program "Sixty-Six."

[Question] Many viewers have asked what the standpoint of the State Office of Church Affairs is on the issue of religious instruction.

[Answer] Statutory decree number 21 of 1957 gives religious parents the right and the opportunity to request religious instruction for their child in the school where the child is studying. If there is the required number of applicants in the school, the principal incorporates two hours of weekly instruction in religion into the regular curriculum. Qualified clergymen teach religion in the state schools; for their service they receive from the state remuneration established in public education practice. Current religious instruction in the state schools is optional. It is possible to have an underage child enrolled for religious instruction; one of the parents, or a guardian, expresses the wish orally--or, in the case of nonappearance, in writing--to the school's principal or to the teacher conducting enrollment to let the child have religious instruction.

In addition to school religious instruction there is also a system of church religious instruction, for which the children do not have to enroll. The congregation's clergymen splits up the voluntary applicants according to age group for activities generally held twice a week. The National Council on Religious Instruction is in charge of supervision of religious education. In the last ten years it has published five new textbooks in religion.

[Question] Why can't there be a reference to the church ceremony and the funeral service in the obituaries which appear in the press? (Dr Imre Del Medico, 1149. Budapest, Handzsar Street 6.)

[Answer] As I already stated on the television program, religion in Hungary is the private affair of every citizen, and thus data concerning it are not indicated in personal documents and in statistics. The secular newspapers also abide by this when they do not indicate in the announcements published in

their obituary column the religion of the deceased and whether he was accorded secular or church funeral rites. In the ecclesiastical press as well as in printing-house obituaries there is, of course, the possibility for statements relating to religion, and relatives also avail themselves of this possibility in the newspapers of the denominations. Thus the editorial staffs of secular newspapers keep freedom of conscience in mind when they omit references to religion in their articles.

[Question] How many clergymen are graduated yearly in Hungary? Which is the most recent and valid provision of law regulating the relationship of church and state? (Dr Antonia Nyers, 7622 Pecs, A. Szalai Street 8/b.)

[Answer] Altogether 497 students are attending the Hungarian theological colleges during the 1983-84 academic year. From among them the number of students finishing their studies this year is 23. All told, 57 took their degree at Hungarian theological colleges last year, and altogether 113 students were admitted to the freshman classes of the new (1983-84) academic year.

An agreement between the Hungarian state and the Roman Catholic Church came into being on 30 August 1950. The state concluded an agreement with the Calvinist Church on 7 October 1948, with the Lutheran Church on 14 December 1948, with the Unitarian Church on 7 October 1948 and with the Jewish sect on 7 December 1948. There is no such agreement with the other sects, and on the basis of their submitted fundamental rules the state decides which among them are accepted as religious denominations. In this respect, article 43, section 7 of 1895 is authoritative and the conditions defined as law 33 of 1947 maintaining it in force. In connection with the appointment of church officeholders statutory decree number 22 of 1957 makes provisions.

[Question] What does the agreement between the churches and the state include in broad outline? (István Szabó, 6724 Szeged, Utztoro Square 10.)

[Answer] In the agreement concluded with the Roman Catholic Church the body of bishops recognizes and assures its support for the political system and the constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic. It declares that it does not permit the use of the Catholic Church or the religious sentiment of the believers for antistate political purposes. It calls upon the Catholic faithful to take part in the work of building the country. The body of bishops states in the agreement that it supports the efforts of the government of the Hungarian People's Republic directed at the preservation of peace and that it condemns warmongering.

In the agreement the government of the Hungarian People's Republic declares that it guarantees complete freedom of religion to the Catholic believers and operational freedom to the church. It provides--in the spirit of the agreement concluded with the other religious denominations--for the elementary operational conditions of the Catholic Church, and for 18 years--every three or five years, in a proportionally diminishing degree--allocates to it a reasonable sum. The government also undertakes the safeguarding of suitable financial circumstances for practicing priests. As I already mentioned on the program, the Hungarian state--as a result of good relations established with the churches--will henceforward, after the date indicated in the agreement, grant government aid to the churches.

The agreements concluded between the Hungarian government and the other religious denominations also, of course, reflect this spirit--according to the character of the individual churches--with minor variations. These agreements were supplemented by the 1957 statutory decree having to do with the appointment of church officeholders. In conformity with this decree the previous consent of the Presidential Council is required, for example, for positions dependent on papal appointment, for the positions of bishop, diocesan general superintendent and warden in the Protestant churches, and, moreover, for the positions of chairman, deputy chairman and secretary general in the Jewish denomination. The previous consent of the State Office of Church Affairs is necessary for filling the positions of teacher of theology in all denominations and furthermore for the positions of prebendary vicar and deacon in the Catholic Church, of bishop and general superintendent in the Unitarian Church, of bishop and vicar in the Greek Orthodox Church, as well as for the post of chairman of the Hungarian Council of Free Churches. On the strength of the good experiences accumulated since the birth of the statutory decree--and the agreements entered into since then--previous consent of the state is not necessary for filling the positions of theological rector, dean and secondary school principal, that of parson in the cities, or for the appointment of the national leading officeholders of the member churches belonging to the Council of Free Churches. It is merely necessary to notify the State Office of Church Affairs of the fact of the appointment. This notification is not required, however, in the case of positions for local parson, chaplain or secondary school teacher.

[Question] What is your opinion of the lively book publishing of churches? Are church publications censored? (Dr Jozsef Csotonyi, 1148 Budapest, Fogarasi Street 90.)

[Answer] All denominations have at their disposal the book publishing law, and church book publishing is capable of fulfilling the truly emerging demands. This year, in 1984, for example, according to the plans of church book publishing 93 works will appear in altogether 842 thousand copies. Among them figure publications related to religious life--hymnals, religion textbooks, Bibles--as well as religious belletristic works. Since 1982 the church publishers have their own book pavilion during the festive book week, and the volumes of church publishers are also sold in the state bookstores--at two locations in Budapest and in each county-seat store. I can answer the second part of the question: the ecclesiastical press and book publishing appear without any previous supervision. Church book publishing follows the practice of secular publishers: the publisher has someone read the works for evaluation before publication.

In Hungary the different denominations publish altogether seventeen newspapers--weekly, biweekly, monthly and quarterly. The one-time appearance of these newspapers is equal to 200,000 copies. (In addition to this the episcopates, the bodies of bishops, issue an encyclical letter to the congregations and their clergymen several times a year.) Among the Hungarian church newspapers roughly 400,000 annually reach foreign subscribers and readers.

(Our newspaper continues with the answers in next Sunday's issue.)

PROGRESS OF WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT RATED

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 14 Apr 84 p 2

[Article by Nikola Stanojevic: "Where Are the Limits of Self-Management?"]

[Text] It is difficult to estimate whether self-management will overstep the boundaries of the collective because this requires much deeper changes about which there is no talk in Poland, at least at present.

Warsaw. Poland is in many aspects an exceptionally complex country; it is like this also in the way self-management in enterprises appears and develops. Workers' councils are active in 90 percent of enterprises which comprise about 8 million out of the total number of 12 million workers in the social sector. About 100,000 people are employed in self-management organs, and 60 percent of them are workers.

This "ID card" of Polish self-management does not show all the complexity of relations in most collectives--relations between management, workers' councils, and trade union organizations. The basic thing is, as it is said officially, that these three factors should "share power in the collective," but that their jurisdictions should be defined, in order to know what each is supposed to do.

Presently the director does the decisive work, while self-management organs are more like advisory bodies. This is a result of the general economic and social structure in which the director is responsible to the ministries, and in which he, for example, must accept the government's orders whether the collective likes it or not. It is true that the methods of command which limit the autonomy of enterprises, and in a way influence the development of self-management, are of a temporary nature and will be applied, as it is anticipated, only until the economic crisis is over. Moreover, most directors are appointed by various ministries and are not elected through competitions. During the state of emergency alone about 2,000 directors have been changed in this way. The press has raised this question, but more in the domain of theory than of its practical meaning for collectives and self-management organs which should give their appraisal of candidates for leading positions in the collectives.

Exceptional Occasion

General Jaruzelski pointed out at a recent meeting of representatives of self-management organs from large Polish enterprises that self-management is "becoming an ever more important link in the economic system" and that "economic reform, thus self-management, represents our historical opportunity." It is obvious apart from this statement, that the leadership of the country thinks that it is impossible to achieve economic reform without self-management. However, the attempts to reform the economy are still made within the centralized way of management. Production ordered by the government, or the so-called operational programs, aimed at improving the supplying of specific categories of the population or to obtain as many mass consumption articles as possible, reduce the enterprises; space for maneuvering. But wishes are one thing, and real conditions under which the reform is being implemented are something completely different. This hybrid condition, in which the remains of the old style of management prevail, favors the forces that think there is no better system than the centralized one, and that everything is simpler and easier when it is directed from one place. Such conceptions are countered with arguments such as that centralist way of management showed its "values" in the Polish economy. It is necessary to wait for the results of the reform and for a wider development of self-management.

Self-management and reform have been offered from above, without the support of wider strata of the society, so that the situation is contrary to the one in the summer of 1980. At that time a great social force pushed the government to embark on the reform. Now it is necessary to win over this social force and convince it that its opportunity lies in the reform and self-management. In order to achieve this it is often pointed out that without attracting this subdued force, and first of all the working class, changes in the economy and in the method of management will not take place, because administration and political bodies cannot achieve such social development. It is also being said that mechanisms should decide, not people, yet personnel changes do not mean much if the mechanisms of management are not changed.

Difficult Task

When one speaks of self-management, one deals precisely with these mechanisms, but all the necessary conditions to prevent the arbitrariness of administrations, which frantically stick to their positions in enterprises, have not been created. On the other hand, some trade union leaders think that they should decide on issues of the collective. Finding themselves between this such "pinchers movement" self-management organs try to act in a trustworthy way and thus cast off the suspicions of a part of the working class. This is not an easy task at all, because there were attempts to introduce self-management before, during a more favorable political and social situation. It is being emphasized now that the action of self-management organs "considerably oversteps the narrowly conceived economic sphere." It is stated that self-management "makes social forces in the enterprise dynamic," by giving the members of the collective a new sphere of activity.

This sphere, these self-management fields still remain within the collective. It is hard to estimate whether this boundary will be crossed, because such a development requires much deeper change, and, at least for the time being, there is no talk in Poland about change.

12455
CSO: 2800/321

POREBSKI DISCUSSES PARTY STRUCTURE, OTHER ISSUES

PM201800 Katowice TRYBUNA ROBOTNICZA in Polish 4 May 84 pp 3, 4

[Interview with PZPR Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary Tadeusz Porebski by Danuta Olejniczak and Remigiusz Jakubowski; date and place not given]

[Text] Question: The intelligentsia constitutes a considerable proportion of the party structure. At the 15th plenum it was even stated outright that, in particular, the participation of administrative management circles' representatives in the party executive would not--contrary to some mistaken beliefs--facilitate party work. What conditions must be met and what should be done to ensure that the class interest of workers and peasants is consistently realized by the entire party?

Answer: It is true that at the 15th plenum it was feared that the excessive proportion of comrades from the so-called leadership echelon of our economic and state administration in the PZPR executive would not make our party work any more efficient. To dispel all doubt I must, however, add that this question is primarily concerned with the issue of the scrupulousness with which the party discharges its controlling function with regard to the administration. It is common knowledge that there exists a sense of a certain community of interests among comrades occupying high executive positions in many sectors of our economy. That is why they might in some situations develop a certain reflex of self-protection, so to speak. Personally, however, I would not exaggerate this problem out of all proportion. For a more detailed analysis demonstrated that, for example, there are not so very many representatives of the administrative management cadres among voivodship committee executives.

Nevertheless, the question does arise--as you have rightly pointed out--of the action that ought to be taken to ensure that the class interest of workers and peasants is realized. In this area I believe that it is of primary concern to maintain close ties--which we have been doing, in any case, with good results, since the ninth congress--between the party aktiv and the workers and peasants. We must carefully monitor all the proposals, suggestions, and recommendations voiced by the working class so that we can shape and revise the PZPR Central Committee's policy accordingly. At this point it is worth remembering that in the past periods the party's political blueprints were to a large extent out of touch with what the workers wanted. This, in consequence, resulted in the widespread conviction that the power-that-be knows better what the people want and that they do not have to consult too much with anyone about their actions.

The PZPR Central Committee 16th Plenum is due to take place soon. Speaking in the most general terms, it will be devoted to the role of the working class in our party and, in particular, in our state. The aim of the plenum will be to state precisely and to outline practical actions to emphasize even better the significance of workers in the PZPR. And, since we are talking about practical actions, the elections will be taking place soon. According to the PZPR Central Committee Politburo's recommendation, the proportion of workers among the candidate councillors proposed by the party in large urban areas ought to amount to no less than 50 percent. That is also one of the elements which will guarantee the participation of the working class in the shaping of our country's socioeconomic policy.

Question: You have spoken about the need to maintain ties with the working class. Do you often meet members of primary party organizations?

Answer: Unfortunately not since I have been working in the PZPR Central Committee, that is, over the past 4 months. This has been the time of the report and election campaign, of preparing for the National Delegates' Conference, and, just now, of preparing for the elections to people's councils. This has meant that I have had to spend more time on various meetings and conferences. Yesterday, for example, I took part in the third national meeting of representatives of work forces' self-government bodies, in which representatives of workers' councils from 350 enterprises all over the country also participated. I think that these self-government bodies represent to a large extent not only the interests of their enterprises but also those of the workers. When I was still first secretary of the Wroclaw PZPR Voivodship Committee I took part in several dozen or so direct meetings of that kind, so I know how very necessary they are.

Question: In certain industrial enterprises there has been criticism of the tenor of the National Delegates' Conference. Has it been incorrectly conveyed in the mass media, have we departed from the principle of being frank and open?

Answer: In our country there is a great variety of opinions on certain phenomena. I will not conceal the fact that, in addition to positive appraisals of the conference, we have also had negative opinions. If we wish to assess the atmosphere of the conference we must take into consideration all the elements which combine to create the picture. I do not think anyone will deny that Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski's address--I mean the Politburo report--contained criticism of the situation prevailing in our country, whether it be in the area of political, social, or economic concern. The demands raised by those addressed--that is, the delegates, party members, and members of the public--concerning the sober appraisal of the existing situation have thus been fulfilled.

There remains the issue of the way in which the plenary debate, as well as the debates in individual working groups, were reported. Before the conference, after much consultation, the PZPR Central Committee approved a formula whereby a 10-minute address made by one delegate from a given voivodship was taken as the voice of the whole delegation. A decisive majority of speeches made at

the plenary meeting fitted this formula. The problems and opinions contained therein were presented from different viewpoints. We reported those speeches almost as soon as they came. It was a different case with the reporting of the debates in the working groups. The reasons for this were many, and mostly technical. Those voices were reported in fragments. They were, in any case, often very individualistic and narrowly specialized. I can assure you that a full publication dealing with the National Delegates' Conference will be appearing in print. Before that happens, we hope that the delegates will have already relayed to their comrades and co-workers the matters which were discussed in their working groups and the atmosphere prevailing therein. The result of the debate is over 3,000 recommendations. These concern, among other things, improvements in different areas of our public and economic life.

Question: There is a fairly widespread opinion that Polish technical thought is not of the highest order, while the consensus on our achievements in academic research in other fields of study is that, great as they are, they do not have any influence on the practical side of everyday life. We are, for instance, proud of our eminent humanists (Kotarbinski, Suchodolski, and a host of other names which could be listed here) but we do not give much credit to our education system. In this connection a question arises, namely: What is the state of Polish learning, does it serve our society and our economy--and if so, in what ways?

Answer: All assessments ought to be formulated in relative terms, that is, related to some point of reference. As a country we have never had a highly developed technical potential. We have based our development in many fields on the achievements of others. It was so before the war and it has been so since. This is demonstrated, among other things, by the fact that we buy licenses abroad which, as is already known at the time of purchase, are not among the most up-to-date ones. Hence our ventures in the sphere of technology follow--so to speak--the method of chasing after the others and after their achievements. This is by no means a peculiarly Polish method. A definite majority of other countries do it too. Technology costs a lot of money and not every country can afford to keep on improving it in every field. It is also hardly sensible to count on one's own brilliant ideas. These do not occur that often in the course of history. Not to mention the funds that can be sunk into research.

This does not, however, mean that we are everyone's poor relation. Poland can be--and indeed is--strong in several technological fields. For example, we export sugar refineries and sulfuric acid production plants including good technology. The achievements of our mining machinery construction engineers are renowned in Silesia. Is all this the limit of our capabilities and aspirations? Certainly not. In the outside world Poles enjoy the reputation of being talented construction engineers. This should be capitalized on in a better way. The trouble is, however, that we have, among other things, quite a few good ideas at the laboratory level, but these have never been applied in industrial practice. In other words, in many cases no investment funds were assigned to parallel the progress of development studies. A classic notorious case which can be quoted here is the aluminum extraction process developed by Professor Grzymek. And so we must alter our policy in the whole of this area.

Your question also touched upon the problem of our humanists and the shortcomings of our educational system. Although I am not an expert in this field, I can without a trace of exaggeration mention here the truth--so obvious as to be banal--that even the best ideas require efficient realization. The imperfections of our educational system are in part a consequence of the lack of a good overall concept and also insufficient consistency in its day-to-day realization. We have not managed to develop sufficiently all the desirable elements within that system, those which would be welcomed by both the party and the country. I am thinking, among other things, about such issues as the esteem in which citizens ought to hold their socialist state.

When it comes to discussing the condition of Polish learning, everything depends on the criteria we choose in our assessment. If we take the number of fields of Polish learning in which our achievements are comparable with leading developments elsewhere in the world as the fundamental criterion, then we can mention, among others, mathematics, chemistry, and several areas in physics and electronics. We are, of course, speaking about theoretical achievements. I think that in the field of humanities we also have several fine and outstanding schools of thought, for example in philology. It is in the specific nature of small and medium-size countries that, because of an ability to concentrate their outlays and bring together larger groups of scholars and scientists, they can simply be better in some fields than in others. Besides, other considerations apart, it has to be said that in the final reckoning the condition of learning depends on the people, on their work, and on the organized educational establishments. It is thus with great concern that I observe the lowering of the status of certain disciplines. I think that this problem will be tackled by the congress of science and that the latter will compile a "map" of the stronger and the weaker disciplines, pointing out which of them ought to be developed more intensively so that an adequate level of science and learning can be reached in our country. It is, after all, necessary to know which disciplines require a more intensive investment and which can develop unaided.

And as to whether our science and learning serve our society and our economy, well, they do so to the extent of their capabilities. Although more could be asked of them--after all, to say that progress without science and learning is not possible is to state the obvious--it is often mistakenly assumed that only the work of our academics decides our socioeconomic development. Engineering and technical and economic cadres are involved in it to the same extent, even if they are not directly engaged in the academic field. It is up to the academics, together with the state, to map out the areas which should receive especially concentrated attention. Although for many people the experience of the past 40 years might not be conducive to optimism, I personally remain an optimist. I believe that the technical disciplines--once they are correctly placed and guided--can also greatly contribute to our country's economic development.

Question: How do you assess the condition of party organizations in higher education establishments and scientific research institutions?

Answer: On the basis of a study recently carried out by the central committee I can state that the situation was and still is quite complex. In the smaller scientific and educational centers the condition of party organizations is not bad--I would even say it is good. This means that they understand their role correctly, that they make efforts to influence their milieu, that they can boast many political and economic initiatives--in other words, they function almost normally.

But, on the other hand, in higher education establishments and scientific research institutions which function in large academic centers the condition and initiative of party organizations is definitely less than satisfactory. There are several contributing factors responsible for this. It is precisely in the large academic centers that a certain degree of frustration is apparent. Perhaps it is one of their distinctive features? It is demonstrated by the fact that their research work--expressed in the number of publications and new developments, that is, everything we term research dynamism--has slowed down.

It is obvious that we must try to alter this inauspicious climate and to win academic circles over to the topical issues in our country. But it is in the nature of things that it is more difficult for the party organization to act when a climate of this kind occurs. These are some of the factors which hamper our party work, as it were, from the outside. A factor which works from the inside, on the other hand, is the significant loss of membership suffered by party organizations in academic and research centers--not only because their numbers have fallen but also because of the impact this has had on the comrades who have stayed on.

I would not wish to make generalizations about this phenomenon, but these organizations are still failing to display any pronounced fighting spirit. They are lacking in the faith that people can be won over and milieus mobilized, even if it is just to define the prospects for the development of one's own organization. And yet, precisely because of the extremely difficult circumstances in which we have found ourselves, there is a great deal to be done by the party. I maintain that an active attitude is worth its weight in gold precisely when things are most difficult.

Question: So what specific essential tasks in the sphere of education and learning must be carried out by the party even before the 10th congress?

Answer: During the National Delegates' Conference we submitted our appraisal of the implementation of the ninth congress resolutions in individual areas. I will not deny that we noted with particular attention the criticism voiced by some of the delegates who believed that the pace at which the resolutions were being implemented did not meet the expectations. In connection with this, despite the existence of schedules for the implementation of the 9th congress resolutions at both the central and the voivodship levels and in certain institutions and establishments, we will analyze them again to formulate all the concrete steps we must take before the 10th congress so that we can rest assured that we have realized each resolution to the best of our abilities. Here

it has to be remembered that some of the resolutions are long-term in nature and their realization will take--and should take--much longer. This, among other things, demonstrates the decisive significance of the extraordinary ninth congress.

Before I described the concrete tasks I will take the liberty of correcting your question: The main concern is not only the tasks faced by the party but also the directions of activity to be followed by the state. Everything, in fact, which ought to be taking place in the entire country.

In the sphere of education the most important thing is to find an answer to the question of how, given our current resources, we can deal with the large numbers of children the--effects of the population explosion--who will be entering primary schools around the year 1990. In 1990 there will be 1.2 million more primary school pupils than in 1980, which means that we would need to build over 2,000 new schools. But it is not possible to build so many new schools in just 6 years, and so we must already start looking for some sensible interim solutions. It is quite obvious from this that the tasks facing the state are extremely difficult. At the conference there was also some talk--and I think this is a very important issue--of the need to update the teacher training system, and here many different suggestions and recommendations were proposed.

In the sphere of learning and technical progress we must first of all define the areas on which we intend to concentrate our attention. Next, we will need to reexamine all the technologies which have been put aside in "cold storage" and to decide which of them can and should be put into practice. And a third, more general task is to consider how to mobilize engineering and technical personnel, this being one of the main prerequisites for correct economic development.

There are many problems connected with higher education establishments. One is the question of modifying the student admission system, which would involve the possibility of providing more places for young people from worker and peasant families. Among the long-term goals there is the need to specify the state's requirements in the area of employment for higher school graduates. For there is still the dilemma of whether we should offer higher education to people for their moral satisfaction without necessarily backing it up with the guarantee of employment matching their qualifications, or correlate the teaching structure more closely with the existing employment prospects. It is also vitally necessary to examine teaching programs at higher education establishments from the viewpoint of present-day requirements, and also to look at the existing equipment in those institutions.

I have pointed out only a few matters which require intensive treatment: The full list is very long.

Question: Quite a lot has been said recently about a reorganization of our party apparatus aimed at enabling the party to carry out its leading role better without being hampered with matters of administration and management. How much truth is there in these rumors?

Answer: The idea of introducing certain adjustments to the existing structures came from the Central Committee, and has been present at the local organization level for at least the past 18 months. After 1980 a lot of innovative moves appeared in party structures, but there were also cases where these structures became disjointed and breakdown of communication occurred between the central committee structure and voivodship committees. A debate has started now on how to regain that capacity for proper communication. Party structures are, and ought to be, always secondary to the goals and tasks set [?by] the party. These structures, then, are not the most important consideration: The main concern is to concentrate the attention of party organizations on the most essential questions, for example those concerning internal party matters, and on a continuous endeavor to consolidate the party, as well as on their active participation in social and economic activity. One would have ideally wished to be able to abandon all administrative concerns, but it still often happens that a party structure received a message which says: "There is no more bread--what shall we do?" And instant intervention is required there and then. The decision on adjustments in the structure of the party apparatus will not be made in haste and it will not take comrades in local organizational structures by surprise. The decisions that will be made ought to help the party to discharge its functions in the fullest and most efficient way.

Interviewers: Thank you for talking to us.

CSO: 2600/995

FURTHER DISCUSSION ON ROLE OF SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian 9 Apr 84 pp 12-13

[Interview with Rados Smiljkovic by Slavko Curuvija: "Pushed Out of Politics"]

[Excerpts] The public has recently noted Dr Rados Smiljkovic's pronouncements on SSRN [Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia]. Dr R. Smiljkovic is a professor at the School of Political Sciences in Belgrade. He has dealt with the problems of sociopolitical organizations in our country for many years. He has written several noted books.

We talked with Professor Smiljkovic about the work of SSRN of Yugoslavia in his office in Belgrade. Here are some excerpts from this conversation.

[Question] Is there formally a SSRN membership and does it have any relation with classical political organizing?

[Answer] The SSRN does not have much in common with classical political organizations. The difference can be seen precisely in the issue of membership. The SSRN is an organization in which members and nonmembers have equal rights of participation. Collective and single members. It is a general people's parliament where one comes as necessary to ask and discuss specific questions of social and political life.

[Question] This is what the regulations say. However, you yourself recently said that a marginalization of the SSRN is in progress and that this leads to a certain politicization of various professional and scientific associations, for example, and even of some sport and religious organizations.

[Answer] The trend of pushing the SSRN and some other organizations as well to the margins of political life is constant. We are dealing here with the inertia of the old bureaucratic idea of the role of the SSRN as a wheel in the political system in which, according to this conception, state and party leadership must have the dominant role. It is true that the character of the development of this organization has also influenced its being pushed

to the side. I am thinking of its nonautonomous or insufficiently autonomous orientation in the programming of its own work, in its personnel policy, and finally in the performance of actions.

[Question] What are the consequences?

[Answer] The social, political, and even moral consequences of such a marginalization of the SSRN are perilous. Working people and citizens are left without the organization in which they should deal with political issues. The channel through which working people and citizens can influence politics is lost or blocked, with many consequences. Decisionmaking then falls in the hands of autarchic groups and individuals. Moreover, the pushing aside of the SSRN directly leads to the politicization of nonpolitical organizations and associations. New political groups appear, and they will keep appearing if the pushing aside of the SSRN is not overcome. Why? If people are not satisfied with the existing organizations, they create new ones, or a catastrophic political apathy takes place.

[Question] Is this related to Kardelj's warning that demands for a multiparty system would appear soon if the SSRN does not develop into a mass organization? Are some of the present demands for the establishment of a multiparty system, demands which are still only sporadic, related to this?

[Answer] I think that Kardelj was right. It is normal for the people who cannot satisfy their needs for political activity to search for new outlets. The first outlet which naturally appears to them is a multiparty system. Why? Because this is apparently the only visible alternative in the world today. Therefore we must develop the SSRN as a very open structure which will enable everybody to engage in politics. I have in mind all the working people and citizens of Yugoslavia. I have in mind both communists and noncommunists, believers and nonbelievers, all those who can contribute to the development of the self-management society.

[Question] Do you also have in mind those who are not enthused by socialism?

[Answer] I have them in mind too. Why not? It is better to take them to a public platform than to prompt them to create underground organizations for political activities. Because of the fact that we ignored certain trends and events in politics we had the Kosovo reaction and those of other nationalisms. Who knows what "isms" we will have to deal with tomorrow. The situation would be different if a broad democratic discussion could give expression to all the trends, except, of course, those which are extremely hostile, and if conclusions were reached this way.

[Question] You are among the people who do not particularly like seeing the role of the SSRN limited to the care of bonuses and electric power ration cards?

[Answer] The reduction of the SSRN organizations to the performing of technical and organizational tasks, not only their own but of other structures

too, coincides with the pushing of the SSRN out of the main flows of political life. This has gone so far that the SSRN has become a cog in the electric and oil industry machine. This is a far from intelligent way of dealing with a sociopolitical organization. On the other hand, take these discussions about theater plays. The party leadership and even some state organs talked about them, which is very surprising if we take into account the degree of our general political and social development. The SK and even state organs should talk about this, but only in the sense of giving an initiative for the discussion in the SSRN. Why did the corresponding SSRN section not discuss it?

[Question] Who is pushing the SSRN aside, and what kind of political organization is it which lets itself be pushed out of political life?

[Answer] Neither the constitution nor the program documents of the SSRN or SK give any foundation for such marginalization. On the contrary. Who then is pushing, and why does the SSRN let itself be pushed? I think that several parties are guilty: the SSRN, the SK, and the states. The Socialist Alliance carries the greatest responsibility because it has not taken advantage of the opportunities given by the constitution and other documents. It has not become an autonomous and authentic organization. To be sure, one must not exaggerate. It cannot be said that the SSRN has been totally sidetracked. At some levels and in some milieus it is, so to speak, on the main track. It is an indispensable organization for some tasks. For example, there are a number of villages without party organizations. The SSRN organization and their work is very developed there. I want to say that the process of the emancipation of the SSRN into an autonomous, authentic organization has started, but that it is not satisfactory at this moment.

[Question] Many people blame the SK, viz its organs, for this nonperformance by the SSRN. What is the SK's fault in relation to the Socialist Alliance?

[Answer] The issue is the position and role of the League of Communists in it. This was and still is the key issue.

[Question] This sounds like a phrase.

[Answer] I will express myself more concretely. I think that the SK must create most of the conditions for the development of the SSRN into the organization that we want. Why? Because communists represent 30 percent of all the employed people and an enormous majority of all the activists in our society. If this activist core is not active in the SSRN, there is little probability that it will develop by itself as an organization that we need. The most important thing here is that the SK should commit its power to the overcoming of the transmissionist ideas and practice in the SSRN.

[Question] Do the SSRN bodies, viz the bureaucratized structures in these bodies, prevent a better performance by the SSRN?

[Answer] This is supported by the fact that a considerable number of SSRN officials, according to my experience, are more conservative in this

relationship than specific bodies and individuals in the SK. More conservative in the sense that they unnecessarily look for....

[Question] ...their opinion in the SK bodies?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] How do such people get into the SSRN?

[Answer] The SK bodies are to a large part responsible for that, since their responsibility is the greatest. The problem does not consist in the fact that the SK is very interested and committed in the personnel policy of the SSRN. It has to be, but not as a marginalized organization. Yet this attitude prevails. I think that this is also one reason for their present relationship. Let me add something about this partnership. In the SK bodies, and also among some members, one can find the idea that the SSRN could become a separate organization or a partner of the SK. It is true that it could become a partner, if the SK would not be active in it, and it must act in such a way, not only because of the Socialist Alliance but also because of itself.

[Question] What should be done so that the SSRN could assume its true role?

[Answer] As I have already said, it should enable every citizen to engage in the part of the political life he is interested in. This is why we have developed various sections, but we developed them slowly, through a delegate system, as forms which one joins as a delegate. Few people join them directly. The SSRN however will live as an organization only if it is open to everybody. Moreover, the SSRN must itself overcome many anomalies of its own personnel policy. The practice from the time of the revolution must be revived, when the highest positions in the Popular Front could be reached by people who were not necessarily SK members, but citizens of great prestige in their communities. The SSRN must raise its prestige itself. There are many challenges where it can prove its worth. For example, at the time of the Skopje earthquake, it was an organization par excellence. It is remembered as the organization which reacted faster than any other. It must act like this in the political and even nationalist earthquakes, but it is not doing so any longer. And if it is not, who can respect it? It must exist and persist in the conclusions of the working people and citizens, and not watch events from beyond the fence. Or tell me, please, when did it raise the question of the control of some responsibilities, although it has an important controlling function? What is the use of this organization if it, for example, learned as late as other citizens how much money we owe to other countries?

[Question] Two days after this interview is published there will be a meeting of the SK SSRNJ which will discuss the realization of the constitutional role of the SSRN. What should this meeting do to shake this organization out of its lethargy?

[Answer] This conference should openly ask these questions and say what the solutions are. When it is not able to do this, because there are questions which cannot be answered immediately, it should openly say that it presently cannot give the answer. This is how I see it now. Conditions are ready for this: Main questions have crystallized; criticism has been sharp everywhere and it has turned up some answers. The conference should choose answers which agree with the further development of the SSRN as literally the main sector of the self-management political system. I do not expect anything else. If the conference does not do this, present practices will continue.
How far can it continue in the same way--I do not know.

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CSO: 2800/311

YUGOSLAVIA

POLITICAL REHABILITATION DISCUSSED

Victims Deserve Public Restitution

Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 13 Apr 84 pp 12-13

[Article by Zoran Erak: "Through Thorny Bushes to Justice"]

[Text] To admit a committed error is a moral issue of every humanistically-oriented movement. If we hurt human dignity, we must admit it and give the opportunity for an honorable rehabilitation to those who were innocent victims in their conflicts with various bureaucratic bosses and power wielders, fighting for party and society, and have remained faithful to the SKJ [League of Communists of Yugoslavia]. What is political rehabilitation in Yugoslavia, and how is it implemented (and why sometimes slowly)?

In several previous issues of our periodical, in relation to the 1981 Kosovo events, a number of political activists were mentioned (Jovo Sotra, Milos Sekulovic, Kadri Reufi...) who were simply politically discredited because of their opposition to the Bakali version of a "national renaissance." Excluded from the political life, at the beginning of the 1970's they began a painful period of living in a kind of social and political isolation which, at the least, produces many frustrations, and in some of the above-mentioned cases health problems too.

As the publication of some documents from that period clearly indicates that they were unjustly tried and sentenced, and that subsequent development in Kosovo vindicated them to a large degree, demands for their rehabilitation (and not only theirs) are becoming ever louder. However, there are also people who oppose this eminently honorable act, which should be a component part of democratic communicating and living in a movement such as ours. Even for the reason that--as a Kosovo official said, carelessly in our opinion--this would mean that the results achieved in Kosovo in the "post-Brioni period" would be questioned!?

The time ahead will certainly show that it will be necessary more than ever to gather in our movement all those who by their creative potential and achieved results show that they want, can, and know how to participate in the forthcoming battles, and to engage those who were unjustly pushed aside in the course of our revolution. The question of rehabilitation

of individuals who suffered in their conflicts with political bosses whom time and events moved to the archives of history is not only a question of moral principles of this society but also a question of its political integrity.

Very Able People

The theme of political rehabilitation in our country is not new, nor has it been aroused only by some present events. The novelty may consist only in the fact that lately we have been discussing much past mistakes more often, and thus also mistakes toward people. It is true that these discussions have not yet become "themes of the day," and it is questionable whether they can so become, as we are confronted today with much more difficult problems which require maximum concentration.

But let us first remember the words Tito said in the interview with Dara Janekovic in 1976. Tito answered one of the questions like this: "You see, there are people who have been expelled from the party, people who were in the party for many years, who fought in the war, but who come into conflict with somebody who, for example, is no longer in a position of leadership but who may have been able to depict them as harmful. There was an inquiry. Commissions established that they were guilty and not the one that accused them, and they were expelled from the party. I believe that some of them have never done anything willingly or maliciously against our development and against the party. It is difficult to prove now that they were maliciously accused. There are various accusations, and very clever people."

Tito added in the same interview: "We will pay greatest attention to prove the truth. But we need the sincere help of other people who must help us to judge correctly and to rehabilitate people who are not guilty. It is our duty to do this."

That was neither the first nor the last time that Tito talked about this topic, but the "sincere help of other people" has frequently been missing. Why? We will talk about this a little later.

First, what is rehabilitation?

Legally, in a wider sense, rehabilitation is the renewed recognition of the "reputation and honor" of a defamed and slandered or unjustly convicted person. In the narrow legal sense, rehabilitation is the "erasing of the verdict after the served, expired or pardoned (main) sentence with all the legal consequences related with the sentence." In practice, in such cases it appears as if the sentenced person was never sentenced; his name is erased from the criminal record and he is again regarded as a citizen who is "not guilty."

Party Sentence as a Social Sentence

In the contemporary criminal law there is legal and court rehabilitation. The former takes place a certain time after the day when the sentence was served, expired or pardoned, if the convicted person did not commit a new criminal act in the meantime. Court rehabilitation is possible when the convicted person files an application, and the court decides whether the convicted person has deserved to be rehabilitated because of his or her behavior. In Yugoslavia, the rehabilitated person acquires the full rights of a citizen immediately after serving the sentence ("basic rehabilitation"); he or she enjoys and can acquire all rights except for those which have been limited because of legal consequences of the sentence. But it is anticipated that even these consequences should cease after a given time ("complementary legal rehabilitation"), by the court decision taken after the convicted person submits an application ("complementary court rehabilitation"), or on the basis of pardon ("complementary rehabilitation by pardon").

But how is the concept of political rehabilitation defined, except that it is naturally, directly connected with the SKJ as the leading ideological-political force in our society? In practice, except for the documents which regulate the work of statutory commissions in the SKJ, and intraparty relations and procedures of punishment, appeals, reexamination of sentences and the instances of decisions, there is no complete document which regulates this area more precisely, especially if we do not understand the concept of political rehabilitation as a narrow party question. For in our conditions, the stiffest party sentence in practice often comprises the unsuitability to perform certain jobs in our society and economy, and is therefore a sanction with a wider social significance. For the same reason, political rehabilitation of unjustly convicted persons goes far beyond the party framework and enters directly the area of social rehabilitation.

In the crucial year 1948, political insecurity, indecision or even un-clearness in the acceptance of the Informbiro Resolution was (understandably) interpreted as an act of relationship to the state and it was necessarily subject to the provisions of the criminal law, which led to legal convictions. Naturally, political crimes which imply criminal sanctions are envisaged in present positive legal acts too, so that unjustly convicted people can be rehabilitated in the judicial, legal and political way, which was done in the case of 1948 and some of people active in it.

Therefore the answer to some of the questions about the existence of political rehabilitation in our country is unambiguous: It does exist!

No Explanation--As Usual

There are however many ambiguities relating to other questions of the volume and character of political and thus also social rehabilitation, and of the solution of cases of some publicly known "convicts," namely "judges"

and "defendants." More exactly, there is not sufficient information which would give a clearer indication whether the "cases" have been solved or not. One of the most recent examples is the rehabilitaton of Osman Karabegovic, a prominent Bosnian-Hercegovinian and Yugoslav sociopolitical worker. Although he is not the only one of this kind, he deserves somewhat more attention because he is the most recent one.

Let us remind the readers that on 26 September 1983 the news of Karabegovic's "return to the SK" and of the proposal for his membership in the Council of the Federation was published. But seeing that such a limited information could provoke confusion and all kind of questions, the competent authorities immediately sent the clarification (but not the explanation) of the decision: On the basis of the relevant regulations of the SKJ and SK BiH statutes, the Central Committee of the SK BiH took the decision "that the decision of the 48th session of the CK SK BiH of 27 Sepbember 1972 is no longer valid and that comrade Osman Karabegovic should be included in the basic organization of the SK BiH members elected to specific functions in the organs and organizations of the Federations and that his status in the SK should be regarded as uninterrupted."

As the explanation for such a procedure was not given, there appeared all kinds of "versions" in public. Since the event to which the rehabilitation referred had taken place more than 11 years ago and many people had forgotten what the issue was (while some never knew), the question of what Karabegovic had done was logically asked. Briefly, at a meeting in Sarajevo at the beginning of 1972, he (with Avdo Humo) sharply criticized the political leadership of Bosnia-Hercegovina because it "pushed aside the older generation," it "spreads mistrust among people," a narrow group of hardliners holds power in the CK SK of Bosnia-Herecegovina, and there is no democracy...a series of obviously heavy accusations. Twenty days after this meeting Karabegovic was expelled from the SK.

As the latest decision voided the earlier one without explanation, it is logical to ask why this restriction of "good reputation, respect and honor" is made quietly, with a short announcement about the voiding of the decision which was taken at the time in the general presence of the public? In cases like this one can assume that the condemned person deserved the rehabilitation by "his behavior," but it remains unclear what kind of behavior it is, if in our country, as a rule, people convicted in such a way do not have an opportunity to show the change of their behavior by means of public engagement. The application of the principle of "basic" rehabilitation has not been possible because it is applied after serving the sentence (specific time), but as in our country political punishment does not have a specific duration (although, naturally, not even the worst sinners are forever prevented from the possibility of returning to the SK), one must believe that the applied principles are analogous to the "judicial supplementary rehabilitation" (at the convict's petition) or that he has simply been pardoned.

Why hasn't the public been informed about the actual situation and why are such procedures made through the back door?

This has not been the first time in cases like this, or similar. Sreten Zujovic, together with Andrija Hebrang a member of the highest leadership of KPJ, was expelled from the party because he openly sided with the Infor-mbiro Resolution of 1948. It was informed later that he changed his attitude, and was later even accepted back into the party, and until his retirement he was the manager of a Belgrade collective. The act of his rehabilitation too was offered to the public as a meager information.

In the supplement, my cospeaker Igor Torkar addresses, within the framework of this topic, of the Dahau-Style processes" in Slovenia (1948-1952), and apart from the fact that you may be hearing about this for the first time, you also learn that this rehabilitation of the people who were convicted although innocent was also made according to the principle of as little publicity as possible.

One Hundred Guilty, One Innocent

Furthermore, it is not clear even today (because of very divergent testimonies) whether Miroslav Krleza was indeed expelled from the party after the war and then accepted again (rehabilitated), and because of the lack of true and accurate information there appear all kind of manipulations not only with the name of this master of our culture, but new proof is being offered that political rehabilitation in our movement is, in principle, "not a proper" act.

A certain reluctance to initiate the process of rehabilitation is undoubtedly based on the delicacy of the fact that in some cases some of the main advocates of punishment, or at least the coldblooded voters, still occupy important political offices. It is probably not difficult to rehabilitate the innocent person, but it is difficult to preserve the moral integrity of the judges, even when it is proven that they are not guilty, or at least not much. In the last analysis, it does not seem illogical or morally weak to think that it is more rational to respect the motto: "It is better to leave hundreds of culprits unconvicted than to condemn a single innocent man."

The public has been mentioning for some time the name of Milos Zanko, formerly a noted Dalmatian, Croatian and Yugoslav revolutionary, who did not manage to establish an "ideopolitical coexistence" (in fact he did not want it, in the sense of content) with the leadership of the Croatian "maspok" [mass movement] in 1971--Miko Tripalo, Savka Dapcevic-Kucar and their sympathizers. After a number of sharp conflicts with the protagonists of nationalist policy, Zanko was on the agenda of the famous 10th session of the CK SKH (in January 1970) and was politically discredited. According to the General Encyclopedia of the Yugoslav Lexicographic Institute, "his position on intranational relations and the role of the federation were condemned (qualified as centralistic-unitarian, and he was stripped of all his party and political functions)."

The rehabilitation of Milos Zanko has already been publicly demanded several times, but in spite of loud demands for the revision of some positions of the 10th session of the CK SKH, there are no official announcements that the "Zanko case" could be at least reexamined.

These examples show that the "other people" mentioned by Tito in the quoted interview, have indeed remained protected by their bureaucratic shelters and do not leave them without great need. The reasons why former party colleagues of the unjustly condemned persons do not by energetically defending the human dignity of the victims defend also their own moral integrity are interesting. The bureaucratic mentality is obviously at work here, which subordinates inner moral impulses to the official hint "from above"; if such a hint comes, they will discharge their emotionally charged weapons with full force and attack all the real or fictional culprits. If this were even public...

The Right to Infallibility

This bureaucratic mentality, from which the SK has not completely freed itself, is essentially very reluctant to revise decisions and sometimes vigorously defends the right to infallibility.

More than 10 years ago, a person who is not a prominent party official said the following words, whose acuity you can judge by yourselves: "In the SKJ the subordination mentality of Stalinist-type communists is still flourishing. The SKJ has not decidedly and radically rejected Stalinism in the international workers' movement and even in dealing with the masses of people whom it politically leads, but it is hard to deny that it has in its internal life in many aspects preserved the spirit of the Stalinist communist who believes more than he thinks, follows the leaders more than he remains consistent, opportunistically adapts himself rather than struggles without compromises." Although the author of these words would today make at least some stylistic reserve, taking into account the lapsed time and changes that have taken place, it is not foolish to conclude that this spirit has not yet definitely abandoned the vanguard mechanisms, and that one can find in it at least a partial reason for the political suffering of those who think rather than believe, who remain consistent and do not imitate the leaders, who fight without compromise instead of adapting themselves opportunistically. Prof Predrag Vranicki thinks, with some necessary generalization, that we are dealing here with difficulties caused by the limited democracy in the party, and a lack of dialogue within it and between it and society. A noticeable revival of such a dialogue offers the opportunity to reduce or solve the problems that are the topic of these lines.

A movement is as large and strong as its willingness to admit its mistakes, whether they are general and concrete political decisions or relations toward an individual. Errors made in relation to people must be corrected because the party is here for the sake of man. Well-known cases mainly deal with concrete situations which provoked various judgments, and these

could certainly not all be correct. But it is hard to return to the past and investigate who is responsible for erroneous judgments; it is more important to realize who is not, especially if at the time when he stated his views he came into conflict with the majority and suffered consequences because of it. I would say that freedom of thought is the supreme ethical principle with which the socialist movement enters history. Only in this context can one reflect on political punishment and political rehabilitation, as Professor Vranicki has said.

Slovenian Author on Persecutions

Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 13 Apr 84 pp 13-16

[Interview with Igor Torkar by Dragan Tanasic: "Death on the Installment Plan"]

[Excerpts] Two books are being published these days which have been the subject of talks in "informed circles" for months. They are Igor Torkar's novel "Death on the Installment Plan" and the third volume of Leo Kreft's memoirs. They both have a common theme--the so-called "Dachau processes" in Slovenia, which have been several times mentioned in our press lately. This "cipher" covers events which some people regard as the proof of the "Stalinist genesis" of our League of Communists, while others regard it as the model for a corrected mistake, but it remains as a warning for the future and the memory of the "great breaks" in our awareness.

After 70 years of life, Boris Fakin (Igor Torkar), chemical engineer, former collaborator with independent leftists at the university and their vice president, fiery orator at student meetings in Ljubljana at the time of fascist expansion, and the main editor of the leftist newspaper "1551," one of the founders of the "Slovenian Club," contributor to the NOP and later prisoner, and one of the first "guinea pigs" of the notorious stool-pigeon Rozman, illegal worker in the Osvobodilna Front, then a deportee in the Dachau concentration camp, director of the General Board of chemical industry in the SR Slovenia in the first postwar years, then again a prisoner, convicted to 12 years of prison as a "Gestapo agent," then rehabilitated, professor at the Academy of Applied Arts in Ljubljana, and above all a productive writer (4 collections of poetry, 22 plays, 2 books of prose), says that he has never been surrounded with so much attention and warmth of other people as he is today.

The reason is simple: his new novel, which will be published these days by Cankarjeva Zalozba in Ljubljana, Pomurska Zalozba in Murska Sobota and Globus publishing house in Zagreb in Slovenian and Serbo-Croatian languages is provoking great interest. The novel is in fact the fate of the protagonist who went twice through hell in 10 years. This is his story.

[Question] Book lovers have been awaiting your book for 1 year. Why such great interest?

[Answer] Well, with this novel I'm opening a taboo topic, the topic of the well-known "camp processes" which is interesting, especially for Slovenians.

[Question] Why specifically for Slovenians?

[Answer] Because there were no such processes in other Yugoslav republics, except for a small one in Split, Croatia.

[Question] When did these processes take place?

[Answer] In the period from 1948 to 1952.

[Question] Does this mean that your novel deals with that time?

[Answer] No, only one part of the novel. In it I tell the fate of one of our people, a young member of the SKOJ [League of the Communist Youth of Yugoslavia], party member, underground worker, partisan, and sociopolitical official in the postwar years. In the novel I follow him from his youth through all the difficult times he went through. I wanted to explain how a hero ended up being what I described.

[Question] Why was your hero disappointed already as a young man?

[Answer] His first shock was when Stalin and Hitler made a pact. I remember that at the time I was literally out of my mind, I could not concentrate. I incessantly wondered how our ideal--the first socialist country in the world, and especially our daddy, Stalin, whom we adored as a god, and who made us cry from emotion in the movie theater--could find a common language and common interest with Hitler. Still another disappointment followed: The attack of the great socialist country on a small country like Finland.

[Question] This seems to be an autobiographic novel?

[Answer] Not quite. The character of my hero contains several biographies: mine as a chemistry engineer Boris Fakin, because I experienced many painful moments under this name, and mine--as a writer Igor Torkar.

However, much of my novel is a result of my own, most direct experience, it contains as many experiences of many people from our generation, which were even worse.

[Question] What was the subject of the indictment against you and your comrades?

[Answer] On the basis of my present reflection I must say that the subject of the indictment was a direct reflex and consequence of Stalin's way of thinking. His thinking was rather primitive. He thought, and maybe he didn't--anyway, he talked this way--that all the people who have lived in the West, even as volunteers in the Spanish Civil War or concentration camp inmates, were suspicious and dangerous because they might have been contaminated by the decadent West.

[Question] In our country the situation was undoubtedly different?

[Answer] Yes, yes. But for the sake of truth you must not forget that by our spiritual set-up and belief we were similar to the socialist countries' camp. In that atmosphere and by that logic some people accused all of us former concentration camp inmates, and especially those who were in the notorious Dachau, that we were--Gestapo agents! The Dachau trial was the first large trial, and further 5 or 6 smaller judicial farces where former camp inmates were tried were organized later.

[Question] On the basis of what accusations?

[Answer] Both the investigators and the indictment stated that I signed the collaboration with the Gestapo. I denied that I have ever signed anything. I asked them to show this alleged signature to me. Instead of it, one half of a common sheet of paper was shown at the trial, which was supposed to be a copy of a document from the Gestapo files, and at the margin of the paper it was written that I was--a person of confidence. And all this was typed on a typewriter.

[Question] Has the origina of this paper ever been established?

[Answer] Yes, during the rehabilitation. Experts have established that this famous "proof" was a photocopy of a certain document, but that three sections from the true Gestapo files were omitted. This sounds like a joke now, but the court established at the time, among other things, that the maker of this "document" did not know German well because he made three important linguistic mistakes.

[Question] Have any of the detained people, your comrades, admitted in court that he worked for the Gestapo?

[Answer] At the main Dachau trial, it may seem unbelievable to you, all the main defendants admitted they were Gestapo people.

[Question] During Stalin's purges at the trials in the Soviet Union such admissions and self-accusations of the defendants astonished the entire world. Those who did not believe either the defendants, the indictments, or self-accusations tried to explain the mystery of those processes. Some spoke of horrible tortures, others sought reasons for self-accusations in "Slavic mysticism." However, when books like Plizni's "False Passports" and Zivojin Pavlovic's "The Balance of Soviet Thermidor" appeared, many things became clear. Didn't your comrades read these books?

[Answer] Probably not. But even if they had... You know what Swift said: "Nobody is as blind as the one who does not want to see." All these comrades of mine who admitted their collaboration with the Gestapo were, exactly like Plizni's hero, educated that the party was above them, that they should serve it, and as it requires sacrifices in the struggle to realize its program, it counts in the first place on its members' sacrifices. People thought like this at the time.

[Question] Can you tell me who were the accused ones?

[Answer] I can only say that the majority, both of those who received capital punishment and those who survived, were of leftist orientation even before the war, and some of them fought in Spain. Most of them were intellectuals. I can't remember their exact number. I only know that at the main trial 11 people were condemned to death and the others to long-term prison sentences. I was sentenced first to 6 years. I appealed the sentence and only 10 days later a new sentence arrived--12 years of prison!

[Question] How many years did you spend in prison?

[Answer] Four. I must say that in comparison with some of my comrades who were at the main Dachau trial (my trial took place later) I was treated very "gently." I spent 2 years in investigative detention, more exactly alone in the cell, and 2 years at hard labor.

[Question] When you think of those trials now, what thought was then dominant, what did you doubt least?

[Answer] I think that I have already partly answered this in a perhaps indirect way: If anything was clear to me and my comrades at these trials, it was that they were a copy of the false trials in the Soviet Union. I think that we have sufficient strength now to admit that in some occasions, before the break with the Informbiro, we made some mistakes.

[Question] As an old leftist, since before the war, what dilemmas did you experience during the writing of your latest book?

[Answer] As an eternal optimist and man who primarily wants to come closer at least to the historical and artistic truth, I was most afraid of falling into a black-and-white character portrayal.

[Question] How did you prove in the novel your conviction that good and evil are frequently close and that very little is necessary for them to change their roles?

[Answer] The same as other writers--through a direct dialogue, confronting the victim with the persecutors. I made them simply meet at the end of the novel. They talk and drink an entire night. The reader learns then that both of them went through the same path: Both were SKOJ members, then party members, and then partisans. It turns out that two comrades in the full sense of the word were sitting at the table. When we learn this, we can more easily understand the investigator's words: "If at that time you had been sitting in my chair, and I in yours, would you have believed that you were doing the right thing?"

The victim is silent, and the investigator continues: "We were told that there were clear and irrefutable proofs that you became Gestapo agents in the camps."

[Question] What else does their meeting reveal to the reader?

[Answer] The reader learns more about the investigator than about the victim, because he is making the confession now: "After I did all those dirty jobs they threw me away as guinea pigs are thrown away after their usefulness is done. I was given a decoration and later they made me a retiree. I was retired early--as a Stalinist! And, you see, these years of retirement have been the worst years of my life. I do not dare to make a balance sheet of my life. My personal conscience appears from somewhere and begins to destroy me inside. And if I take a few drinks, some figures appear, I cannot even determine who they are, some phantoms, I hear some voices too. And you are telling me that you are my victim, that I am your executioner. You can at least get angry and accuse me, but how do you think I feel? I cannot be angry with you or with others who visit me. And this one, and that one, and that one, and so on are coming." And he tells the details of his nightmares till the dawn. In the end he asks his victim again: Who is in fact, in some way, in my way, a greater victim--you or I?

[Question] You have not completely answered several of my questions; you did not complete your thought. Why?

[Answer] There is a lot of life experience and, as you already know, it is not exactly pleasant. This is why I will answer this question of yours a little metaphorically: I am a man without an umbrella. Whenever I had it, I lost it, and even more often it was stolen. Therefore I simply do not go out when it rains or when it hails. But let me tell you something about the organizers of the trials. You will see in the novel, in the chapter on Dachau trials, that I do not give their names. I only name their professional positions, for example: Chairman of the court, public prosecutor, colonel, etc. Why? Because what offended me most and gave me most pain was that I was judged by the public prosecutor's office of my own native republic. And it is not at all essential who represented

this office at that moment. The trial, for example, lasted 5 days. And to see it in a humorous vein, imagine a flower pot falling from a balcony on that public prosecutor's head the third day of the trial. Would this have changed anything? NOT the least. He would be immediately replaced by someone else.

[Question] Was a lot of publicity given to the trials during the court procedures?

[Answer] A lot of it! The public was incessantly informed in details, not only through the newspapers and over the radio, but also through loudspeakers on the streets. Our closest ones, our families, suffered enormous psychological pressure and humiliations.

[Question] And the rehabilitation?

[Answer] Are you kidding? The rehabilitation of those who were given prison terms was announced in 1971, and of those who were sentenced to death, in 1976. In both cases there was a brief news item, written in dry legal jargon. We have been rehabilitated only juridically, but nobody has experienced a sociopolitical rehabilitation yet.

[Question] Did you have the same conditions of life and work after leaving the prison as the other citizens?

[Answer] Formally I did, but in actuality it was different. I'll give you an example. The Ljubljana City Theater organized an anonymous competition for a new Slovene play. I got the first prize for my text "Sarena Lopta" [A Motley Ball] sent under quite an impossible pseudonym. The play was selected for performance. But 5 days before the opening night a review appeared saying that I offended the war for national liberation, dishonored the fighters, and a lot of other nonsense. The same play was later translated into other Yugoslav languages and received very favorable reviews. Eli Finci, among others, wrote a rave review of it. It is the most performed Slovenian play in Yugoslavia.

[Question] You say that informations about the rehabilitation were brief and published in the Slovene press only. Was this sufficient for their families to be freed from the suspicion that their parents were traitors?

[Answer] My novel answers this question.

[Question] Well, I'll ask then something else: While you were in prison, did you believe that one day you would be pardoned?

[Answer] What should I tell you; one day I did believe, the next day I did not, and one day later I believed again, and again not. It was a time when a man could not concentrate, think quietly, or put personal problems on the back burner. Later on I began to hope that if not today, then tomorrow or the day after, if not this year then perhaps the next, people

would realize they made a mistake and would ask for pardon, and I was right! But I hoped that this rehabilitation would be not only juridical but complete, both in the sociopolitical and moral senses. I even hoped that I might receive some banal material compensation. However, this has not taken place.

[Question] By writing this book you probably wished to make a balance-sheet of your life and, at the same time, free yourself from the nightmare which followed you for years. But was this the only goal, or did you try to achieve something else, too, with your book?

[Answer] All this is correct. This book is, in a way, an inventory of my life. But I also wanted to prevent some things from happening ever again. You see, at the time of rehabilitation some people wondered why we were doing this and whether there were any legal reasons for the review of those trials. One of our most renowned politicians said then that we were strong enough to admit the mistake--for the sake of history and our young generations. All the time, while I was writing this text I also had in mind precisely this idea and desire that our young generations, not burdened with legends or dark war and prison experience, should learn of them and not let such errors happen again.

[Question] Do you think that after these experiences that we have lived through something like this could happen again in any form?

[Answer] I do not think so. I repeat for the third time in this interview that I am an optimist. I think, wish, and believe that we have achieved a higher level, that such signs are already present, and that we will get rid completely of old ways of thinking and behaving. Precisely for this reason I believe in our socialism, but in socialism based on science, professional work, personal responsibility, solidarity which does not tolerate laziness, in just legislation and an independent judiciary. I believe in a socialist society which would be basically monocratic, but within the monocracy absolutely polycratic. Only in this way we could get out of the crisis, not only the economic crisis but the moral crisis too. I would like to say something else at the end, as a Slovenian. We will destroy the historical Slovene plague, clericalism, only if our socialist society also makes "clericalisms" on our part possible.

[Question] Did you meet any difficulties in the publishing of your novel?

[Answer] No. The manuscript went normally through all the editorial boards, received favorable reviews and the subsidy of the republic's community for culture.

[Question] We have talked a lot about the book, but the reader does not know yet what its title will be?

[Answer] I do not know myself what its title will be in the Serbo-Croatian edition. It is still being decided. As for the title in Slovenian, myself and Cankarjeva Zalozba, which dealw tih this task, have agreed it to be "Death on the Installment Plan."

Stages of Persecution

Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 13 Apr 84 pp 17-18

[Article by Nenad I. Kecmanovic: "Why Not?"]

[Text] Although the reaffirmation of the phenomenon of rehabilitation is no remedy for possible bureaucratic ailments of democratic centralism and socialist democracy, it is undoubtedly a significant mechanism for the mobilization of creative potentials and for lifting the moral integrity of every communist.

It is not unknown that the loud pronouncement of one's own political opinion against the authority of official attitude in our conditions often does not end just in a tolerant confrontation of various opinions and in the democratic procedure of counting voices "for" and "against," but as a rule incurs the moral, psychological, and ideological pressure of the majority opinion. Public suspicions ("What are the motives and background, with whom and for whom is the stand made"), name-calling (apostrophizing the author's first and last names, quoting and paraphrasing his statement), and labeling (classification into one of the standard opposition platforms) inevitably culminate in the Balkan dialogue etiquette in throwing the accused into the camp of the enemies of socialism and self-management. Gnoeological and moral criteria are wrongly intertwined, so that disagreement in opinions automatically entails moral disqualification. Whoever is not right must be deprived of his rights, whoever errs becomes a sinner, whoever is wrong is guilty as well. However, what nevertheless encourages the risk of a nonconformist defense of one's opinion is the supposition that practice, as the highest criterion of truth, will eventually prove him right. Whether he, according to the principle of democratic centralism and against the intimate disposition, in a disciplined way accepted the majority's attitude, or struck to his position, at the cost of bearing with ideopolitical sanctions or even expulsion from office or organization, he hopes that time will give him satisfaction and that his party comrades will verify it formally. A shorter or longer time span will often prove advantageous precisely to the specific individual position, regardless of the fact that originally it was not close to the others and for that reason could not lead to political decision or action. Periods of crisis, when society recalls when it has erred, abound in memories of such examples. The subsequent triumph of the attitude, judgment, solution, warning, etc., previously unaccepted, or more exactly rejected and even condemned by no means however means the rehabilitation, let alone the triumph of the author. No!

Why this paradox, how does it work? Simply by separating the opinion from the author, so that it is reaffirmed, but he is not rehabilitated. Taken independently of its original protagonist, it is now presented as an original creation of its newfangled advocates, first authoritatively launched from above, and then democratically repeated from below, as the finally discovered answer to the riddle of history. Owing to this, even those with a better political memory will gradually forget that this

"revolutionary new" socialist therapy was offered by somebody a considerable time earlier, while it could still prevent and not just cure. They will not be unpleasantly worried by their exactly determined political stupidity or burdened by a feeling of moral guilt because they discredited a man who was right. No, they will all again lightly and eagerly engage in the choir shouting out somebody else's correct opinion as their own, and reject their own, erroneous attitude as if it were somebody else's. Insofar as the unlucky individual who formerly was in the repressed minority and now has become the unrecognized inaugurator of the majority's position ignores this well-established political mechanism, he will find himself in even deeper trouble. One could even say that errors which remain errors are less dangerous, because they are gradually forgotten, than "errors" which unpleasantly remind of their existence by ceasing to be regarded as errors one day.

Developing a poignant saying by Neca Jovanov, we could summarize the fate of the observed individual in a few stages. In the first stage, as we have seen, not only is his idea the subject of sharp ideological criticism but he personally as well as an allegedly morally and politically indispensable person. In the second stage, sooner or later depending on the gravity of the incident, the error and the erring are gradually forgotten. In the third stage, as we said, objective social development leads to the rediscovery of his idea as a correct one, but independently of its original author. In the fourth stage, the former error becomes a part of official party policy, but this threatens to turn against the man who first formulated the idea, unless he becomes anonymous. In the fifth stage, as we will see, the author nevertheless demands public satisfaction and becomes a political case again. Why?

The first reason is that the admission that the individual was right and the party wrong would mean that in a specific case he was the one who was ahead in theory, i.e. who saw better and farther than the revolutionary proletarian party as a whole. Such a precedent would set up the possibility that in the future too, here and there, somebody, sometimes, and in something may be more progressive than the institutional vanguard. The League of Communists, which by definition has the historical mission of the leading movement in society, will not, however, allow at any cost that monopoly to be jeopardized. It is true that, in principle, the vanguard role of the party is not apriori given but assigned, yet it is much easier in practice to defend it as a right rather than realize it as a commitment.

The second reason is the fear that the admission of any error, and especially one which somebody noticed in time and warned about, would shake the party members' self-confidence and the faith of the masses in the party. Because being (in)capable to make a mistake once means that it is not infallible, and that consequently its judgments are not necessarily correct. They can then be critically examined and do not have to be followed blindly.

The third and last but not least important obstacle to endorsing the rehabilitation and promotion the factually confirmed wisdom and courage of a man who foresaw social development before and against the majority is the resistance of the very same people who were at the same time proven wrong with regard to the truth and to him. They might somehow recognize that he was right, if this would not automatically lead to the conclusion that they were very wrong themselves. It is completely irrelevant whether that happened out of sincere conviction, so that they discover their intellectual deficiency, or out of pure opportunism, so that they discover their moral deficiency. The only important thing is that the admission of his being right would entail the admission of their error. And as they represent the absolute majority this second time also, they have no reason to voluntarily expose themselves to blame. It all ends up with one more illustration of the old truth that democratic procedure does not necessarily lead to truth.

These are briefly the reasons why the organization again falls on the individual who asks the "majority" to spread the red carpet for him and hail him after history has already given him the ticket to the honor stand. The technique of this operation is very simple. It is based on the scheme of extreme relativity of meaning of political facts which allegedly assume alternate, radically opposed positive and negative signs in various concrete historical situations; on the confusion of value judgments with reality judgments; and on comical distinctions between well-intended and ill-intended criticism, revolutionary optimism and counterrevolutionary pessimism, etc.

In agreement with this, they will simply tell our political Don Quixote: "What you say about your predictions coming true is only conditionally true. True, from today's perspective it seems that you were right, but at the time the majority's decision was best. Our position was based on broader, quite real assumptions which in fact did not take place but which you completely ignored. Moreover, because of the dynamics of social development, circumstances at the time could not have been the same as at present, so that a different truth corresponds to them. Finally, your forecasts, however correct, were defeatist, turned toward the existing instead of toward the future. We know that no truth is neutral to ideas and that the Marxist worldview must above all concentrate on the revolutionary and progressive, on that which creates perspectives and pulls ahead."

Stunned by this incessant flow of senseless accusations (we could add many more) which were thrown on him just at the moment when he naively hoped that he too, after all, finally had come to his moment of triumph, the fighter for truth is faced with just one more dilemma: Should he abandon himself to disappointment and withdraw into indignation and cynicism, or should he gather his strength and engage himself again, but this time on the side of opportunism and careerism? The decision depends on how intimately he was touched by the moral that "the rooster who crows before dawn is the first to find himself in the soup."

Cultivated Conformism

Can we reconcile ourselves with this? We will,, naturally, easily agree that we cannot! Because if the member of the movement and the party who has been rejected once will have not only normative but also factually confirmed guarantees that he can return with his head either lowered or raised--depending on whether he has been proven right or wrong by events--then he will in the future side with the majority without any vacillation. The worst thing is that others will learn from their errors, so that a cultivated conformism will legally spread as a mass model of behavior, and "routine followers" will push out "creative activists." Tactical turncoatism, cowardly silence, confused talkativeness, noncommitment open to everything, deliberate keeping in the background, so-called disagreement with one's own position, etc., become in this case synonyms of political wisdom, professional skillfulness, career longevity and sense for teamwork.

Although the affirmation and development of the phenomenon of rehabilitation is certainly not a universal remedy for possible bureaucratic ailments of democratic centralism and socialist democracy, it undoubtedly is a significant mechanism for the mobilization of the creative potential of the organization and the community by raising the political dignity and moral integrity of every single self-manager and communist. Frequent, drastic and mass "deng Xiaoping-like" falls and resurrections in public life would certainly point to sudden ideological turns and political discontinuity in a country, which is absolutely inappropriate to our society. But total neglect of rehabilitations would point to a dogmatic negation of real contradictions of social development, rigidity and confinement of the system's political institutions, intolerance and sumgness of leading structures, which is also no less incompatible with the fundamental orientation of our community. Just to admit the crisis means in a way to open the issue of rehabilitation--in the name of stabilization.

12455
CSO: 2800/313

'NEOLIBERAL' IDEOLOGICAL TRENDS IN ECONOMY CRITICIZED

Belgrade KOMUNIST in Serbo-Croatian 20 Apr 84 pp 6-7

[Article by Milenko Predragovic: "Conservative Commitments in Leftwing Rhetoric"]

[Text] The crisis of Yugoslavia's social and economic development has become an expansive framework in which various forces on the flanks, with differing solutions, intentions and commitments are seeking an occasion for their own activity. Emboldened, probably, by the fact that our society has been too slow to extricate itself from the contradictions of the crisis, those forces have been ever more persistent in their demands for changes in the economic and political system, in a belief that the hands on the clock of history have stopped so that their views of the world can after all be taken up. However, it is here that the main disagreements begin: because of the fear for their own intellectual and moral integrity before the progressive segment of humanity, those forces accept self-management, but without that kind of political and economic system, which is obviously only a cloak for concealing rightwing and conservative commitments in leftwing rhetoric. The solutions to our crisis do not lie in answering how the past is to be repeated (in whatever economic, political and ideological version!), but which revolutionary measures reach out to that future in which the associated worker in the present, the self-manager, will define the essence of the liberation of labor and his own liberation.

In other words, under our conditions an action can be in the vanguard only if it is based on advancement of production relations, if it is based on social ownership of resources, if it is based on the creation of self-managing socialist communities and the creation of Yugoslavia itself as a self-managing socialist community of labor. That concept presupposes hegemony of working class democracy, without this or that minority interest acting as tutor and without that minority interest taking a leading role in political-economic relations in society. But bourgeois consciousness, burdened with its own experience, ever and again offers its own solutions which represent for it contradictions constituting a deep crisis, contradictions which cannot be overcome by this or that set of measures, but only by altering the wage character of the production relation. Here is the essence of all the disagreements which prevail even in our own space: the spears are not being broken over the actual crisis of our development, but over the character of the productive

forces and production relations. To be sure, the spectacles offered by practicalism may be deceiving, above all because of the methodology of the caviling approach to the crisis; after all, it seems that something attainable is being offered, but in essence, at least when it comes to the working class, it is only a spoonful of medicine. What is meant, for example, by the idea of the payment of gross personal incomes? Nothing other than that the individual determines only his own destiny: without the other workers, without the League of Communists, and indeed without socialism. In countries where that experience is nurtured there is no organized working class movement at all--all is subordinated to what appears to be an equal struggle on the market, while in actuality the working class is subject to exploitation without any sort of protection.

Our point in using this example was actually to begin an exposure of that ideological mosaic in our political economy which is being offered to us mainly as a criticism of the present social relation. In all that criticism in the last several years there has been a clear differentiation of the views of those who are making a direct attack on the system, those who think the same, but are more cautious, and criticize only individual parts of that system, and then there are still others who would "correct the system," who would set down rules for everything and resolve all society's contradictions with a state based on law! These latter are usually recruited from various strata of the economic, government and political bureaucracy, and the "corrections" in the system they look for conform to their own interests, the interests of what we would call the bureaucratic class.

What is actually the point of all this criticism, where is it headed, and what is its aim?

The Basic Organization of Associated Labor Under Attack

The processes of building the basic organization of associated labor as the economic, technical-technological and political protagonist in society are most frequently under attack from the criticism of various theoreticians of political economy. It is not peripheral questions of an organizational character that are involved here, but matters which cut deep into the production relation itself, into the material foundation of socialist self-management. "The Law on Associated Labor has in that respect exceeded the bounds of the constitution, in the terminology of the Law on Associated Labor: basic organization of associated labor--the business entity by giving it a giro account and by making it a juridical person. (...) This has had catastrophic consequences for the Yugoslav economy: efficiency in the conduct of economic activity has dropped off drastically, self-management has lost ground, and the enterprise has been broken up," writes Branko Horvat (GLEDISTA, No 7-8, 1981). According to him (also), "the consequences of OUR-ization [the process of creating the basic organizations of associated labor--translator's note] have been adverse," as can be seen in the decline of economic efficiency, the ground lost by self-management, the shattering of the work collective and of the enterprise. In the same article Horvat writes:

"The intentions of the ZUR [Law on Associated Labor] and other legal statutes were good, but all of these things have not been carried out as they should have been. The only decisive criterion which applies equally to science and to economic policy, is practice. If the results are bad, then it is irrelevant what the intentions were. Moreover, it is difficult to speak of the right intentions when we are dealing with a fundamentally erroneous conception, as the originators of the intentions might easily realize if they talked to the scientists."

Horvat also offers a solution: "The enterprise is a self-managing (political), production (technological and organizational) and economic (economic protagonist) creation. Those three structures do not coincide except for altogether small enterprises. The fatal defect of the OUR conception is the implicit assumption that those three structures coincide. (...) The enterprise as the basic economic entity is a juridical person and an autonomous business operator on the market." According to Horvat, the basic organization of associated labor is "too small a unit" to be the economic entity, but "too big" for the realization of self-management. He proposes that the workers self-manage in work communities, and that they realize other rights in self-management through their delegates. The reform of the system should be "conceived as a reintegration of the OOUR within the enterprise and as a restructuring of the enterprise to conform to self-management."

These are not isolated points of view: Their point of departure is the question of whether it is possible for a good system to yield bad results? However, their weak point is that they are based more on assertions and less on objective analysis, and their aim unambiguously reveals their theoretical grounding on bourgeois thought in the field of political economy. For example, Horvat's concept of self-management leads directly to worker participation, the favorite theme of the West European Social Democrats. On the other hand, the "autonomy of the enterprise as an organization" affords autonomy in enterprise as an activity, which only to a certain limit is the business of the economy, since it reproduces political representation as a definite social relation. To be sure, it is more effective than a delegate system whose construction has not been completed, but in the context of the exercise of economic and political power of narrow special-interest groups. The enterprise which is being offered us also is part of the arsenal of history: although mention is made of the possibility of further association of the enterprise, its "autonomy" inevitably leads to the group-owner social relation, the half-brother of private ownership in the enterprise such as existed in a phase of development of liberal-capitalistic socioeconomic relations. That is why even "the autonomy of the enterprise," with the right to make decisions on prices, the product mix, purchases and sales, selection, imports and exports (and so on), is nothing other than a mystification of early bourgeois society, and for our conditions and the time in which we live these are anarchoid projections.

The point of departure in the criticism of the evolution of new relations--with the basic organization as the focal point--is not as a practical matter the actual facts that the old economic structure has actually been destroyed, that new processes have been initiated, and that creative potential is being

liberated, in the context of socialization of the production processes and of the production relation as a whole--for overcoming the highly diverse recrudesences of the old bourgeois society and its outlook concerning ownership, enterprise and political representation. But that outlook has actually found a partner in the bureaucracy which ought to have been broken up precisely by the socialization of relations in production. It is another question whether the instruments which have been applied always led toward that goal. It is just that the ideological concept of the relations of socialist self-management based on social ownership cannot be replaced by any sort of historical relic, regardless of who wants it and on behalf of what and whom. But social ownership as a relationship of labor to labor and of worker to worker cannot be built up in the context of "the autonomy of the enterprise" as an isolated interest of a group of businessmen or of the workers themselves, it makes no difference. If the concept of the enterprise could have furnished an answer to the crisis in development, probably the crisis in development would never have occurred, not only in our country, but also in the capitalist countries. After all, if there is a conflict between the political (self-managing) entity of the basic organization of associated labor and the bureaucracy, then this is in essence a conflict between the old entrepreneurial outlook and the processes which have been initiated in the evolution of the new relations in society, which are both economic and political. It is altogether natural, then, that the basic organization of associated labor should have become the target of criticism and attack on the system of itself.

The Origin of the Neoliberalistic Concept

The form which revolutionary practice takes does not resemble in the least a laboratory for trying out theories developed in the study, a laboratory in which all games of solitaire of this or that school of economics, of this or that philosophical view of the world, come out. But the origin of most of the criticism of our system relies precisely on that theoretical view of the world, combined only with the most necessary modifications as to terminology, geopolitical aspects and the times. The problem is not that our system is subject to criticism, but rather the problem is that it is subjected to conservative critical thought which is unable to open up liberative prospects for the working class in the so-called transitional periods before the association of the free producers. We feel in our country the particular presence of neoliberalistic economic conceptions, whose roots go back to the 1940's, when liberalism was highly esteemed by Milton Friedman's Chicago school of economics, Arthur Laffer's California school, and theorists like Friedrich von Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Frank Knight, Henri Lepage, and the German group of economists around Alfred Mueller-Armack, and so on.

Those ideas have been reaffirmed once again in Reaganism and Thatcherism, and their basic content is that the economic role of the state is reduced to the minimum, and that in the name of the free deity of the Market, through whose freedom political freedom will also gush forth. The basic practical task of neoliberalism, however, is the reprivatization of the means of production (of the public sector in Great Britain, for example). In countries where the economic concepts of neoliberalism have been applied, the price is being paid by the working class, while private capital has been granted amnesty, from

which it is not difficult to draw a conclusion as to what kind of liberalism we are talking about in the area of political and more profound social relations.

There are quite a few people in our country who have leaned toward that neoliberistic economic conception, at least as far as certain of its components go, especially the market, group-owner enterprise as an activity through the enterprise as an organization, the price of capital, the floating rate of exchange of the dinar, and so on. To be sure, one needs to be moderate here: if someone advocates a particular solution, this still does not mean that one can draw analogous political conclusions and assume ideological commitments on that basis. But it certainly does not mean that one should not oppose such views.

In the entire context of those questions, the approach to the market is the most pronounced. The League of Communists has never denied the necessity of a market economy, but it has not made a fetish of that problem.

"Especially with the Long-Range Economic Stabilization Program it has become clearer that the market has to play a more significant role in the setting of prices than has been the case over the last 10 years or so. The positive effect of the market on the level and stability of prices is all the greater when there is competition on the market." (Ivan Stojanovic, POLITIKA, 25 March 1984)

"I proceed from the premise that a self-managed economy must be based on two complementary, but not opposed, mechanisms: the market and planning. Why? Because those two mechanisms basically guarantee the freedom (independence) of the organization of associated labor, which in a present-day definition (Ravis's--author's note) means 'the broadest possible set of equal freedoms which are valid for all.'" (DANAS, No 5) And then further (DANAS, No 31): "The neglect or displacement of the economic system actually constitutes excessive meddling of the political sphere in the economic sphere and in the sphere of self-management, in the sphere of freedom, equality and brotherhood." (Marijan Korosic)

The illustrations speak about the freedom of the market and about political freedom: it is through that kind of projection of the market and other economic interests that one arrives at the slogan of freedom, equality and brotherhood, which was lifted from the banners of the bourgeois revolutions. Or: freedom of the market is the freedom of the individual. The crisis of the "welfare state" has offered neoliberalistic conceptions, which are essentially conservative, on a very broad international scale. On the one hand it is a question of the higher degree of concentration of capital, and on the other of displacement of the working class interest, which capital has always done in phases of its own mutation into a higher and more complicated form of its own activity. So in our country it is "equality" which emerges instead of class solidarity, the enterprise instead of the organization of associated labor (with economic and political hegemony of the workers brought into association with one another through self-management), and loud demands for reduction of personal incomes as the culprits for the political downfall of

capital formation, and therefore also of investment policy and the other troubles of society. As a practical matter, we are talking about demands for a new redistribution and concentration of social capital modeled after processes taking place in the international capital relations.

Crisis of the System or of Its Instruments

"The conception of our economic system is wrong, since those who set up this system simply do not know how that system functions. A statement like that might seem drastic, but the only alternative, the only other possible explanation as to why we have fallen into what we have fallen into is that this is sabotage, deliberate sabotage. Accordingly, either ignorance or sabotage! It still seems to me that we are talking about ignorance...." (Branko Horvat, GLEDISTA, No 5-6, 1981)

This discrediting of the system has ties with opinions like the one which Ivan Sifret expressed in the journal DIREKTOR, where he wrote: "There is an ideological and political crisis in our country, a crisis of the social system." (Certain West European newspapers in fact carried those views of his, putting the main emphasis on the interpretation that Marxist regimes are not capable of running an economy: they are good only in revolutionary changes or in opposition, which are essentially the views of big capital.)

"It seems that the time right to undertake an organizational establishment of a system for self-management of the entirety of social reproduction. I call this strategic self-management. Sociopolitical communities would on the basis of professional analyses and through political structures devise several options of the strategic parameters on which the structure of the use of income, the economic structure, and also the level of stability of the currency in the coming period decisive depend. Work collectives would receive those projected options of the strategic parameters subject to management together with reasoned arguments as to the main implications that follow from the variants offered. The coordinating institutions in the self-managed economy (trade unions, economic chambers and banks) would examine these projections and offer their proposals and opinions. In the course of that examination there might also be a revision of the strategic parameters to be managed, revisions which would be adopted in the form of an option through a referendum by the principal work collectives deciding in favor of that version which they believe best links the short-term and long-term interests of the working class." (Milutin Cirovic, "Application of the Basic Economic System ...")

This lengthy quotation only appears to take into account the short-term and long-term interests of the working class. After all, were the views of M. Cirovic to be adopted, this would mean accepting tutelage over the working class, and self-management would be reduced to a form of participation. That is, preparation of the self-management decision is actually an integral and inseparable part of self-management decisionmaking. The working class must draw the cart of history, but in this case someone else will make the preparations as to which road it shall take! Nor does the working class of the West European capitalist countries have a position any different from that, so why then take pains to find new methods of arriving at old goals?!

All of this (and much other) criticism comes down to the criticism of the system itself or of its basic conception. Often the point of departure in assessments of the causes of the crisis is the system as set down in the constitution and the laws embodying the system, rather than the cause which stands in the way of the achievement of the new system and the instruments of current economic policy which are applied under the conditions of the old and new socioeconomic relations, which have not been distinguished from one another. Criticism with an ideological undertone alien to socialist self-management also arises as a principal recrudescence of that situation--of the duality of relations. Those contradictions and dangers that originate in the positions of the bureaucratic-dogmatic forces concerning its very role as a state-ownership monopoly through which the methods of administrative regulation of relations in our country would be pursued, were noted by the League of Communists back when the preparations were being made for the 10th LCY Congress. However, the criticism has escalated to a clear ideological schism in offering a concept which this society has already superseded or concepts which other countries and other social systems are applying. The League of Communists must furnish new and fresh answers to that criticism, above all by redefining its leading role in society through initiation of those actions and the setting of those tasks and goals in whose accomplishment the interests of the workers associated through self-management, of associated labor as a whole, will be confirmed, rather than the partial interests of this or that special-interest group.

7045
CSO: 2800/324

REACTIONS TO ARTICLES ON POLITICAL REHABILITATION

Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 27 Apr 84 pp 16-17

[Article by Jovan Miric: "Fewer Excommunications--Fewer Worries"]

[Text] In the title article on political rehabilitation (in INTERVJU No 75 of 13 April 1984) it was correctly said that "the question of rehabilitation of individuals who suffered in conflicts with political leaderships that have been put into the archives of history by time and events is not only a question of the moral principles of this society, but also a question of its political integrity."

The issue of rehabilitation is not an issue concerning only this or that individual (although this aspect must not be neglected either), but above all an issue concerning society, its basic values, commitments, and achievements. We are thus dealing with society, its political culture, humanism, the political and moral dignity of its leading structures, and in our case first of all with the League of Communists.

Who Should Rehabilitate Whom?

We can speak of two kinds of political rehabilitation. One is the rehabilitation of those who at a given moment went astray and were expelled from the SK, removed from their offices, and sometimes subject to a judicial process. The second is the rehabilitation of those who not only did not take the wrong path but warned of it, coming thereby into conflict with the official position and the behavior of the majority. When dealing with the latter kind of rehabilitation, the question is who should rehabilitate whom!

But in order to prevent any such question from being raised, the above-mentioned majority (perhaps strengthened with like-minded newcomers) moves the potential rehabilitees from the second category into the first one, thus preserving its infallibility.

Some political structures are very reluctant to rehabilitate individuals who have been proven right by events, among other things, because such an act would raise the question of their responsibility, not only for condemning

the individual but also for the course and result of the events. And as the sense of responsibility and self-responsibility is a rare plant on our political soil, it is quite understandable that rehabilitations are missing even in those cases that are more than obvious and suitable for rehabilitation. If the act of rehabilitation exceptionally takes place, this happens quietly and imperceptibly, away from the public's view and reactions.

A quiet rehabilitation is, however, only a partial rehabilitation. A man excommunicated from the movement and public life does not need rehabilitation for himself but for the cause to which he sacrificed not only his bourgeois comfort but also his political career. He needs rehabilitation as a public satisfaction, a public act, because he was publicly defamed and degraded. Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, rehabilitation as a public act means the satisfaction not only for the man to whom it is nominally directed but also for all those who were not singled out for punishment but were [indirectly] hit and hurt by sanctions (not only relatives but also many others, known and unknown, political and moral fellow travelers and fellow sufferers).

The act of political rehabilitation cannot be reduced to a dry bureaucratic formula. It must address the entire context and recall before the eyes and judgment of the public, the circumstances in which the conflict and "parting" took place.

The impossibility or exceptionality of political rehabilitation is an indicator of the authoritarian and nondemocratic spirit, and privatization of the sphere of public affairs (*res publicae*). As the authoritarianism of private property implies (and reproduces) a division between the powerful and the excluded, in the sphere of privatized politics the same division is established and renewed. The difference consists in the fact that in the sphere of politics the division is made absolute: Those who are excluded from public affairs are, as a rule or most frequently, excluded forever. Anyway, excommunication has always been an indication of dogmatism and absolutism, whether it was made in the name of a transcendent absolute, church, state, nation, or party.

One Must Know "Know How to Sin"

The idea of the party's infallibility is launched and carried on by those who identify the party and the movement with themselves. The party, which is constantly in the firing-line and drama of events, at the battlefield of ideas, commitments, and engagements, must have vulnerable spots, its "Achilles' heels." The individuals that "guard" it from such vulnerable spots and earthly weaknesses transpose the party to the beyond so that they can crown themselves with the halo of untouchability and infallibility. But it would be morally and politically wise to "know how to sin."

Controllers' Mercy

By rehabilitating those who at given moments had the courage to point out the deviations, errors and indecision of the party leadership, the party rehabilitates itself. But it seems that the cost of "political forgiveness" is high in our country; it does not have a market value but some other value whose magnitude is determined by the wielders of factual power. It is not politically wise, but it is useful for the pragmatic political mind.

Finally (but this should in fact be at the beginning of every essential discussion on the phenomenon of rehabilitation), one must point out the following: Whenever there is talk about rehabilitation, the prevailing idea is still that some politically decisive group ("political elite") should rehabilitate somebody. Such an opinion is an indicator of a submissive and authoritarian, not democratic political consciousness and culture. In a democratic process, the individual rehabilitates himself--by his free inclusion into the process (party, movement, politics). But if the process is closed and controlled, then the rehabilitation depends on the "mercy" (or better, on the judgment of the relationships of forces and one's own position) of the "controllers" from whom the opponent-potential rehabilitee once parted.

Let us narrow down the limits of political excommunication, and this will lessen our worries about rehabilitation.

Up to the Brink and Back By Milija Komatina

Communist organizations have stricter rules regulating their inner relations, which also means stricter "sanctions," than bourgeois parties. This is understandable because they assume great commitments for their nations and for history, commitments that can be realized only if there are high conceptual and moral qualities, and unity in cultivating these qualities and in living according to them. In order to be able to influence people, one must achieve and preserve authority, and there would be no authority without the vanguard role in anticipating the future and in the way of living, morality, justice, etc. Whoever is not up to all of this must--at least in principle--drop out sooner or later.

Punishment as Tattooing

However it is hard to understand why the entire communist movement has such difficulty in freeing itself from the tradition of regarding sanctions that have been pronounced and applied as something forever finished, which means that the possibility of rehabilitation is almost excluded. The party punishment is a kind of tattooing, worse than the other: Even when it is removed, the stamp remains forever. Thus, although communist organizations are far ahead of bourgeois parties in the demand to cultivate revolutionary spirit and high moral qualities, they are frequently inferior to the latter in attitude toward human mistakes. Why is this so? Let us say first that one must distinguish two problems in relation to political rehabilitation.

The first problem is the relationship toward the people who are punished or even physically liquidated, branded, all without corresponding guilt. How many of them there have been in our movement is probably not known to anybody, nor is it possible to learn it reliably because their fates are covered by the cloak of secrecy woven from various opportunities and opportunisms, including the opportunity to preserve the authority to judge. In any case, even if their numbers were negligible, it is not futile to discuss this topic. Communism arose in the name of humaneness which can be achieved in a world fragmented by class morality only by revolution. We need at least a little revolutionary spirit in order to overcome the opportunism which wants to hide what should not be hidden. Revolution is not violence, as both the foreign and our--already well-cultivated--political Right wants to show, but it does have some roughness. Revolution usually takes shortcuts. And when a man takes a shortcut, we often do not see him completely. We only see some of his properties, perhaps not the essential ones, and then it is concluded on their basis that this man is not what the revolution needs, and he is sacrificed.

Special Type Immaculacy

In intimate talks about this theme, examples of innocent victims are enumerated and the willingness to rehabilitate them is manifested, but we are strangely indecisive to do what should be done in this direction. Why? The reason must be the myth of the infallibility of the movement, that is, of the structures that represent it. Conceptual sources of this myth lie in the arsenals of Stalinist dogmatism, according to which communists are a "special type" of people who must not err, and if they do they must be boycotted, so to speak, both in this world and the next. In the arsenals of this type of communism, the measure of the leadership's infallibility consists in not failing to punish the culprit, and by no means attempting to preserve the man, which necessarily leads to an artificial increase the number of culprits. This myth, however, neither creates nor preserves the movement as such.

The second problem is the problem of the relationship toward the people who indeed were sinners and who were sentenced or subject to disciplinary measures. I remember an unpleasant case from my editorial practice. I was sharply criticized for having published the text of an author who was expelled from the SKJ, although there were no objections to the text itself. Such examples are rather symptomatic. Above all, they raise the question: Can a man change, or to put it in another way, is his ability, insofar as he possesses it, to be different than he was, a virtue or a vice?

Right to Return to the Line

Traditions are stubborn. They even expect that the future imitate them. This is not accidental. It is necessary to preserve recognized values which essentially mark the name of a nation or the essence of a movement. The lack of respect for tradition leads to a discontinuity which can be

dangerous for the very survival of a nation or movement. We must resemble our predecessors, if there is an awareness that they were good and that by preserving values for which they also fought we will have the right to regard ourselves good too. But mere sticking to traditions deprives every nation and movement of what makes them capable to live, namely creativity. Such an attitude is called traditionalism, which essentially means--conservatism. The communist movement, although it appeared in order to change the existing conditions, was, and still is, susceptible to traditionalism. The demand for changes then becomes the demand for the defense of the already created regulations. Revolutionary development is then replaced by stasis, which in fact rests on bureaucratic pragmatism. In such a case the answer to our question is negative. Man has the right to develop, but only within the strict framework prescribed by invisible or visible forces which are in any case autonomous with regard to a particular man. He can return to the right path away from the abyss into which he had fallen and be "in line," but whether all this will happen depends first and last on those who originally determined that this man, for some reason and in something, "deviated from the line."

Dogmatic Traditionalism

Man is not only what he is but also what he might be. If we deprive him of freedom, and the means to become something else which he is not yet but could be, we limit him so much that he ceases to be a man in the Marxist sense of this word. In this case he ceases humanizing himself and becomes just a mere puppet of forces that govern, that is, manipulate him. Accordingly, a "sinner" can overcome this trait and become something else, which is in agreement with the noblest trends of a nation or movement.

There is no doubt that the programmatic-strategic line of the League of Communists in its relation toward people is on clear Marxist and revolutionary positions. But examples furnished by practice certainly pose the question of the need for discussion about the degree to which the concrete behavior of its organizations, leading cadres and individuals agree with this line. The theme of political rehabilitation should be examined in the context of the democratization of the SK and its ability to change itself by changing social relations by means of developing socialist self-management. In any case, some rehabilitations, if they took place, would necessarily entail some sanctions, at least moral ones. This is approximately, among other reasons, why they are postponed.

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CSO: 2800/315

YUGOSLAVIA

BRIEFS

NEW SAWPY OFFICIAL--Belgrade, 23 May--At today's session of the SAWPY [Socialist Association of Working People of Yugoslavia] Federal Conference, Marjan Rozic was elected president of the conference. His mandate will last for 1 year. Marjan Rozic was born in 1932 in Bohinjski Bistrici. After the war he learned the trade of masonry and then completed studies at the school for political sciences in Belgrade. He became a member of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1949. He has been active in socio-political work for many years and has had positions and tasks of responsibility in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia and in the Federation. Among other things, he was chairman of the Republic Council of Slovenian Metal Workers, vice-chairman of the Central Council of the Federation of Yugoslav Trade Unions for Industry and Mining, secretary of the Central Council of the Federation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia, secretary of the SAWPY Federal Conference and chairman of the Ljubljana City Assembly. At the present time he is a delegate in the federal chamber of the assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, a member of the presidency of the SAWPY Federal Conference, the chairman of the committee of the basic organization of the League of Communists in the federal organs and organizations and chairman of the university council of Edward Kardelj University in Ljubljana. He is the recipient of high-level awards. [Excerpts] [Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 24 May 84 p 1]

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28 JUNE 1984